Adjectival Nominalization

Chapter 6 focuses on the semantics and metaphysical implications of the semantics of the adjectival nominalization “goodness.” Adjectival nominalizations of the form “F-ness” are almost always mass nouns. The mass noun “goodness” derives gradability of a kind from the gradable adjective that it incorporates. So “goodness” is a gradable adjectival nominalization. Mass nouns are distinguished from count nouns on the basis of two semantic properties, called “semantic cumulativity” and “semantic divisibility.” The denotations of mass nouns are then interpreted in terms of the mereological structure of a join semi-lattice. The denotation of gradable mass nouns incorporate scalar as well as mereological structure. In the case of “goodness,” the elements at the base of the lattice structure are instances of goodness. An instance of goodness is a so-called qua quantitative trope, precisely one degree of purpose serving qua exceeding a second degree of purpose serving, where the latter is a standard of comparison.

Ambiguity

Chapter 2 argues that the adjective “good” is fundamentally three ways ambiguous between so-called evaluative, quantitative, and operational senses. Compare: “This painting is good” (evaluative); “It’s a good distance from here to the Schuylkill River” (quantitative); “The light bulb is good; it’s the wiring that’s frayed” (operational). On the basis of several semantic, syntactic, and phonological properties, it is argued that evaluative and operational “good” are irregular polysemes encoded in one lexeme, called “purposive ‘good,’ ” whereas quantitative “good” is a distinct lexeme, whose meaning stands in the relation of homonymy to the former two.

Value

The gradable property associated with “good” is value. Chapter 4 pursues the question “What is value?” and does so by linguistic means. The term “value” is a mass noun. This mass noun is polysemous between generic and specific senses; where the former comprises so-called negative, neutral, and positive value; and the latter denotes only positive value. The chapter argues that positive value is purpose serving, which is to say contribution to the realization of a purpose. Consequently, for an entity x to be good is for x to contribute to the realization of a purpose to a significant degree. “Purpose,” as here employed, is a univocal modal term, whose denotation comprises at least four basic kinds: biological and characteristic artificial purposes and ad hoc purposes derived from either intentions or desires. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the relation between value and quality.

Gradability

The sense of “good” that has been of principal interest to philosophers and that is the focus of chapters 3, 4, and 5 is evaluative “good.” Hereafter, the modifier “evaluative” is dropped. “Good” is a gradable adjective. Accordingly, chapter 3 examines the semantics of gradable adjectives. The chapter argues that “good” is the unmarked member of an antonym pair of relative gradable adjectives, the marked member being (evaluative) “bad.” The lexical meaning of “good” is associated with a non-significant degree on an open scale of unspecified value. In tokenings of sentences of the form “x is good,” the degree associated with “good” is modulated to a significant degree. Significance of degree is a quantity that exceeds the upper bound of a range of numeric values based on a contextually determined comparison class.

Bare Noun Phrases

Mass nouns and plural count nouns are syntactically acceptable in argument positions without determiners; for example: “Goodness is rare”; “Dogs are common.” Contrast the syntactic unacceptability of “Dog is common.” Such so-called bare noun phrases are associated with various readings: universally, generically, and existentially quantified as well as so-called kind-denoting. Principally, two types of theory have been proposed to explained these facts: Carlsonian kind-denoting theories and ambiguity theories. Chapter 7 introduces bare noun phrases and the problem of their ambiguity and discusses the Carlsonian and ambiguity theories that have been proposed to explain them.

Dimensional Specification

Gradable properties are called “dimensions”; dimensions that are specifiable by kind are called “dimension-types.” Tokenings of “good” almost always involve specification of the dimension-type of value, that is, purpose serving associated with “good.” Dimensional specification is precisely tantamount to specification of purpose. Chapter 5 considers several explanations of dimensional specification and argues that dimensional specification is effected through so-called supplementation. That is, the adjective “good” is supplemented with an explicit or implicit adverbial or nominal expression. Implicit supplementation is semantic ellipsis. In cases of nominal supplementation, the nominal expression semantically modifies “good,” which syntactically modifies it. Such so-called reciprocal modification involves the nominal supplement N suggesting an implicit adverbial modifier of “good.” Semantically, the implicit adverbial modifier functions as an intensional predicate modifier. The meaning of the adverbial modifier plus “good” phrase is “good in the typical or at least contextually salient way that an N is good.”

Introduction

Chapter 1 introduces the governing question of the book “What is goodness?” Since ethical or moral goodness is one among many kinds of goodness, the question “What is goodness?” is not specifically an ethical or moral one. Rather, it is a question at the foundations of value theory. The question is also a metaphysical one, because of both the high generality and obscurity of goodness. The chapter proposes to pursue the metaphysical question at the foundations of value theory by linguistic means, precisely by addressing the question “What does the word ‘goodness’ mean?” Pursuit of this semantic question draws on recent theories and ideas in contemporary semantics as well as pragmatics and syntax. Chapter 1 concludes by presenting an overview of the structure of the book and its central results.