Property Rights Quality and the Economic Efficiency of Fisheries Management Regimes: Some Basic Results

2007 ◽  
pp. 32-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Arnason
Author(s):  
Erik Buisman ◽  
Hans Frost ◽  
Ayoe Hoff ◽  
Arantza Murillas ◽  
Jeffrey P. Powell

2019 ◽  
pp. 37-49
Author(s):  
Ray Hilborn ◽  
Ulrike Hilborn

Who Gets to Fish. Garrett Hardin’s “The Tragedy of the Commons” is the most important concept in managing fisheries. Simplified, it states that when a resource such as a fishery is held in common, everyone will act in their own best interest and, as long as it is profitable, will fish hard enough to deplete the resource. In Western countries, fisheries management has successively restricted who is allowed to fish. The declaration of 200-mile fishing zones around coastal countries closed coastal waters to foreign fleets. Efforts to limit access began by restricting the number of vessels and then progressed to limiting catch or days at sea. Various forms of allocation to fishing vessels, individuals, or groups have in effect privatized the fishery. While leading to generally increased economic efficiency and smaller fishing fleets, the result has often been a concentration of ownership in few hands that are often large corporations.


Author(s):  
Thomas Apolte

Creation of ownership structures under private law as well as market liberalization can be seen as central to transformation. This chapter examines how private property rights, among others, encourage economic efficiency, strengthen economic competition, make businesses subject to the discipline of the market, and create a capital market. The emergence and development of a property rights structure at a given point in time is always also the result of a conflictual history. One of the advantages of a developed market economy is that conflictual resource acquisition lies in the past and has ceased to play a significant role in the recognition of the existing distribution of wealth. It is astonishing how little conflict was caused by post-socialist privatization.


Marine Policy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 103631
Author(s):  
Eric Wade ◽  
Ana K. Spalding ◽  
Kelly Biedenweg

1994 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Emmanuel O. Nwabuzor

The modern idea of secured transactions is based on the notion of economic efficiency, which implies the minimization of transaction costs while ensuring optimal returns. The efficiency theory posits that unclear definitions and unprotected allocation of property rights inhibit the production of wealth, because they raise the transaction costs of land and impede exchange. The more precisely property rights are stated and assigned, the lower the cost of establishing ownership, and the extent of one's interest in any given piece of land.1 Proceeding from the efficiency theory, contemporary commercial practice is not willing to accommodate the ancient, unnecessarily complicated system of conveyancing, which makes the taking of security in real property expensive. Thus, an efficient regime of secured transactions should be simple, fast, cheap and predictable.


2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 413-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
ELODIE BERTRAND

Abstract:‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (Coase, 1960) asserts a normative role for the common law judge, that of taking into account the economic consequences of his decisions in allocating property rights. This position is often accused of inconsistency: Coase sees the figure of the judge as willing and able to improve economic efficiency, but criticises the actors of public intervention, particularly regulators, for being fallible, vulnerable to political pressures, and lacking information. I shall show that Coase's giving this role to the judge stems precisely from his criticism of public intervention. This means that his figure of the judge escapes the tenets of the theoretical system that first rendered it necessary. Various reasons could explain this difference of treatment as between the judge and the other figures of public intervention in Coase's system, but Coase makes too strong an opposition between common law on one side and regulatory and statutory law on the other, and leaves unexplained the motivation of judges.


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