Mental capacity and mental disorder

2016 ◽  
pp. 239-252
2013 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Freyenhagen ◽  
Tom O'Shea

AbstractMental capacity and autonomy are often understood to be normatively neutral – the only values or other norms they may presuppose are those the assessed person does or would accept. We show how mental disorder threatens normatively neutral accounts of autonomy. These accounts produce false positives, particularly in the case of disorders (such as depression, anorexia nervosa and schizophrenia) that affect evaluative abilities. Two normatively neutral strategies for handling autonomy-undermining disorder are explored and rejected: a blanket exclusion of mental disorder, and functional tests requiring consistency, expression of identity, reflective non-alienation or lack of compulsion. Finally, we suggest ways in which substantivist alternatives to neutrality can be made more promising through increased transparency, democratic contestability of conditions for capacity and autonomy, and a historically sensitive caution concerning restrictions of liberty.


Author(s):  
Kay Wheat

This chapter will examine two key areas of law relating to medical treatment and care of those with mental disorder. The question of decision-making capacity is important for health care professionals, and other carers and agents dealing with older people. The law relating to this is covered by the Mental Capacity Act 2005 supplemented by previous case law where this is still relevant, and the key aspect of the law is the ability to treat people without capacity in their best interests. However, in the case of some patients, it may be necessary to use the Mental Health Act 1983. This legislation is focussed, not on the capacity of the patient, but upon the effect that a mental disorder can have upon the patient risking damage to their own well-being, or to the well-being of others. The relationship between the two areas is not always clear.


Author(s):  
Robin Jacoby

In most Anglophone jurisdictions the mental capacity to make a Will is governed by the Banks v Goodfellow judgment of 1870. This requires a testator to know what a Will is, the extent of his estate, and who might expect to benefit from his bounty. No mental disorder may affect the disposition of his estate. Older people, especially those with dementia and delirium, are liable to change their Wills under the influence or abuse of others, which leads to acrimonious family disputes. Old age psychiatrists are increasingly called upon to assess the capacity of people about to make Wills, as well as retrospective assessments of the capacity of deceased persons whose Wills are challenged in the courts.


Author(s):  
Kay Wheat

This chapter examines two key areas of law relating to medical treatment and care of those with mental disorder. The question of decision-making capacity is important for health care professionals, as well as other carers and agents dealing with older people. The law relating to this is covered by the Mental Capacity Act 2005 supplemented by previous case law where this is still relevant, and the key aspect of the law is the ability to treat people without capacity in their best interests. However, in the case of some patients, it may be necessary to use the Mental Health Act 1983. This legislation is focused, not on the capacity of the patient, but upon the effect that a mental disorder can have upon the patient risking damage to their own wellbeing, or to the wellbeing of others. The relationship between the two areas is not always clear.


2004 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 341-351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Berney

Asperger syndrome, a form of autism with normal ability and normal syntactical speech, is associated with a variety of comorbid psychiatric disorders. The disorder is well known to child psychiatry, and we are beginning to recognise the extent of its impact in adulthood. The article reviews the diagnosis and assessment of Asperger syndrome and its links with a wide range of psychiatric issues, including mental disorder, offending and mental capacity. It also describes the broader, non-psychiatric management of Asperger syndrome itself, which includes social and occupational support and education, before touching on the implications the disorder has for our services.


Author(s):  
Aswini Weereratne

<p>In light of the plethora of new provisions safeguarding patients who might previously have been cared for and treated informally, it may be instructive to consider who may now be considered a truly informal patient, i.e. one for whom neither process nor formality is needed. When applied to an incapacitated<br />patient requiring treatment for mental disorder, the word “informal” may now seem oxymoronic and possibly redundant. Can such a patient ever be truly informal? Part IV of the model statute suggests that an informal patient is one who lacks capacity and does not object to proposed treatment which is in their best interests, or a patient who may be treated without the use of compulsory powers; but even such a patient must now be subject to some formality if their care or treatment is to be long term or they are to be deprived of their liberty in order to ensure proper safeguards are in place.</p><p>Currently the boundary between the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (“MCA”) and Mental Health Act 1983 (“MHA”) is essentially one determined by whether the patient objects to treatment and is defined with formidable complexity in schedule 1A to the MCA. A patient eligible for MCA deprivation of liberty (“DOL”) safeguards, who could be an elderly person in long term residential care, is now subject to formal<br />processes. There is little true informality for a patient lacking treatment capacity. It is questionable whether even a capacitated patient with mental disorder, who is by definition vulnerable, may be treated informally under the MHA4 if they feel suborned into consenting by the possibility of coercion. The terminology offers a slightly deceptive impression of a benign approach with concomitant levels of<br />autonomy, but while it is appropriate to highlight a difference from compulsory process and keep formality to a minimum for the sake of informality, it is also important not to overplay formality in the name of safeguards. The latter appears to be the vice in which the MCA and MHA is now arguably gripped.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 605-614
Author(s):  
Lisa Cherkassky

Abstract In Re: AB (Termination of Pregnancy), the Court of Appeal was asked to consider an assumption made about the future living arrangements of a pregnant patient, and the weight to be ascribed to her wishes and feelings when she had no real understanding of her predicament. This commentary explores the importance of taking into account the perspective of the patient, even if suffering from a mental disorder, and it will analyse the existing common law to show that the weaker the ability of the patient to form her own wishes and feelings, the more appropriate it would be to rely on the remaining evidence.


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