Abstract
This paper aims to identify the possible implications of quantity competition in markets with differentiated products on entry deterrence. If capacity commitments characterise this industry, quantities can be expected as the choice variable of rational players, even in the presence of product differentiation. Different equilibria of a static game occur depending on the degree of asymmetry of players, incumbent and entrant, which will crucially affect the shape of their best response functions. Asymmetry can stem from players’ advantage in demand and costs, their different objective functions, or the first-mover advantage. We will analyse entry where incumbent maximises the weighted average of profit and revenue while entrant is maximising profit. The reduction of asymmetry may intensify competition in the industry and, consequently, reduce entry barriers. Our findings provide an insight that could be used for practical recommendations for conducting competition policy and other sector-specific regulations, where the introduction and higher intensity of competition are desirable.
Free Riding in Noncooperative Entry Deterrence with Differentiated Products
