Capacity Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies: Entry Deterrence with Alternative Objective Functions

This paper aims to identify the possible implications of quantity competition in markets with differentiated products on entry deterrence. If capacity commitments characterise this industry, quantities can be expected as the choice variable of rational players, even in the presence of product differentiation. Different equilibria of a static game occur depending on the degree of asymmetry of players, incumbent and entrant, which will crucially affect the shape of their best response functions. Asymmetry can stem from players’ advantage in demand and costs, their different objective functions, or the first-mover advantage. We will analyse entry where incumbent maximises the weighted average of profit and revenue while entrant is maximising profit. The reduction of asymmetry may intensify competition in the industry and, consequently, reduce entry barriers. Our findings provide an insight that could be used for practical recommendations for conducting competition policy and other sector-specific regulations, where the introduction and higher intensity of competition are desirable.

Liberalism, rationality, and Pareto optimality

Rational players in game theory are neoliberal in the sense that they can choose any available action so as to maximize their payoffs. It is well known that this can result in Pareto inferior outcomes (e.g. the Prisoner's Dilemma). Classical liberalism, in contrast, argues that people should be constrained by a no-harm principle (NHP) when they act. We show, for the first time to the best of our knowledge, that rational players constrained by the NHP will produce Pareto efficient outcomes in n-person non-cooperative games. We also show that both rationality and the NHP are required for this result.

The chaotic dynamics of a quantum Cournot duopoly game with bounded rationality

This paper analyzes the chaotic dynamics of a quantum Cournot duopoly game with bounded rational players by applying quantum game theory. We investigate the impact of quantum entanglement on the stability of the quantum Nash equilibrium points and chaotic dynamics behaviors of the system. The result shows that the stability region decreases with the quantum entanglement increasing. The adjustment speeds of bounded rational players can lead to chaotic behaviors, and quantum entanglement accelerates the bifurcation and chaos of the system. Numerical simulations demonstrate the chaotic features via stability region, bifurcation, largest Lyapunov exponent, strange attractors, sensitivity to initial conditions and fractal dimensions.

Rational coordination with no communication or conventions

We study pure coordination games where in every outcome, all players have identical payoffs, ‘win’ or ‘lose’. We identify and discuss a range of ‘purely rational principles’ guiding the reasoning of rational players in such games and compare the classes of coordination games that can be solved by such players with no preplay communication or conventions. We observe that it is highly nontrivial to delineate a boundary between purely rational principles and other decision methods, such as conventions, for solving such coordination games.

Decision Making: Rational Choice or Hyper-Rational Choice

In this paper, we provide an interpretation of the rationality in game theory in which player consider the profit or loss of the opponent in addition to personal profit at the game.‎ ‎‎The goal of a game analysis with two hyper-rationality players is to provide insight into real-world situations that are often more complex than a game with two rational players where the choices of strategy are only based on individual preferences. The hyper-rationality does not mean perfect rationality but an insight toward how human decision-makers behave in interactive decisions. ‎‎The findings of this research can help to enlarge our understanding of the psychological aspects of strategy choices in games and also provide an analysis of the decision-making process with cognitive economics approach at the same time.‎ ‎‎‎

Graphical One-Sided Markets

We study the problem of allocating indivisible objects to a set of rational agents where each agent's final utility depends on the intrinsic valuation of the allocated item as well as the allocation within the agent's local neighbourhood. We specify agents' local neighbourhood in terms of a weighted graph. This extends the model of one-sided markets to incorporate neighbourhood externalities. We consider the solution concept of stability and show that, unlike in the case of one-sided markets, stable allocations may not always exist. When the underlying local neighbourhood graph is symmetric, a 2-stable allocation is guaranteed to exist and any decentralised mechanism where pairs of rational players agree to exchange objects terminates in such an allocation. We show that computing a 2-stable allocation is PLS-complete and further identify subclasses which are tractable. In the case of asymmetric neighbourhood structures, we show that it is NP-complete to check if a 2-stable allocation exists. We then identify structural restrictions where stable allocations always exist and can be computed efficiently. Finally, we study the notion of envy-freeness in this framework.

Patterns of Deceptive Communication of Social and Religious Issues in Social Media

Deception and religion have evolved over the years. Deception and belief manipulation are aspects of religious communication. The digital space revolves around fake news and indicates that humans are more susceptible than ever to mental manipulation by powerful technological tools. This chapter demonstrates patterns in deceptive narrative usage in a communication of social and religious issues (CSRI) in social media among a religious community in Mumbai. Drawing from deception theory of David Ettingery and Philippe Jehiel, the exploitation by rational players of the fundamental attribution of error (FAE) made by other players, where FAE allows for belief manipulation. The authors propose that an increased presence of social media promotes patterns in CSRI in social media. The analysis depicted patterns in the preference to the use of text visual images, audio-visual, and audio formats when communicating social and religious issues.

Solution of Traveler’s Dilemma

Aim: The aim of the article is to show: 1) that the reasoning of perfectly rational players presented in 1994 by the author of the Traveler's Dilemma Kaushik Basu is incorrect and therefore leads to wrong conclusions, 2) how the reasoning of these players should look like and what solution it leads to. Design / Research methods: Logical analysis. Conclusions / findings: Perfectly rational Traveler’s Dilemma players should use, according to game theory, so-called retrograde (iterative) induction. This is wrong, as in the set of Traveler’s Dilemma games results the principle of transitivity is not met. We believe that perfectly rational players will achieve a better result when they make a random decision from a suitably limited set of decisions. After applying this method of decision making, perfectly rational players will achieve a result similar to those obtained by real players in experiments. Thus, the paradox described in the theory of games disappears, that perfectly rational players achieve worse results than real players Originality / value of the article: A new way of making decisions in the Traveler’s Dilemma game. Implications of the research: A new way of making decisions in other games similar to the Traveler’s Dilemma may allow to find new solutions in these games. Limitations of the research: The described decision-making method can potentially be used in decision-making situations when the following five conditions are met: 1) the set of possible decisions of each player is greater than 2, 2) the winning matrix is known to both players and both know the purpose of their choices, 3) when it is played once with an unknown opponent, 4) when both players have to make their decision without knowing the opponent's choice, 5) when there is no decision, which is a stable balance point or when it is, but its choice means that the player does not achieve a satisfying result.