Endogeneity of Alternating Offers in a Bargaining Game

1997 ◽  
Vol 73 (2) ◽  
pp. 425-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard D. McKelvey ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Alternating Offers

AN n-PERSON RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING GAME

2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (01) ◽  
pp. 111-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
PÄR TORSTENSSON
Keyword(s):  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Discount Factor ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Large Discount ◽  
Alternating Offers ◽  
Rule Out

When Herrero (1985) extends Rubinstein's (1982) alternating-offers bargaining model to the case of three or more players any agreement can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcome, given a sufficiently large discount factor. We show that this is not the case when players demand shares for themselves instead of proposing agreements to each other. Although it is possible to rule out agreements, the majority remains to be SPE outcomes.

A One-Period Version of Rubinstein's Bargaining Game

2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Evans
Keyword(s):  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Infinite Horizon ◽  
Nash Bargaining Solution ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
The Other ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Small Probability ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Alternating Offers

A one-period, simultaneous-offers bargaining game is analyzed in which, for each player, there is a small probability that his or her proposal will not reach the other player. The unique pure strategy equilibrium offers are identical to those of the Rubinstein (1982) infinite-horizon, alternating-offers bargaining game. This provides a novel interpretation of Rubinstein's result, as well as a new non-cooperative implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution.

scholarly journals Bargaining over Entry with a Compulsory License Deadline: Price Spillovers and Surplus Expansion

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric W. Bond ◽  
Kamal Saggi
Keyword(s):  
Developing Country ◽  
Compulsory License ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Multinational Firm ◽  
The South ◽  
Compulsory Licensing ◽  
Patented Product ◽  
International Price ◽  
Alternating Offers

We analyze bargaining between a developing country (South) and a multinational firm over the local price of its patented product. We use an alternating offers bargaining game in which the South can resort to compulsory licensing (CL) if the two parties fail to reach agreement by a certain deadline. The presence of international price spillovers introduces two novel features into the standard bargaining problem: the surplus from entry prior to the CL deadline may be negative, and CL can yield higher surplus than entry. We establish conditions under which equilibrium may exhibit immediate entry, preemptive entry just prior to the CL deadline, or the occurrence of CL. The South necessarily gains from the threat of CL if the joint payoff under entry is higher relative to CL but can lose if it is lower. (JEL D45, F11, F23, L24, L65, O34)

Collective Risk and Distributional Equity in Climate Change Bargaining

2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272110273
Author(s):  
Aseem Mahajan ◽  
Reuben Kline ◽  
Dustin Tingley
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Characteristic Feature ◽  
Economic Loss ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Intergovernmental Panel ◽  
Climate Negotiations ◽  
Collective Risk ◽  
International Climate ◽  
Alternating Offers ◽  
International Climate Negotiations

International climate negotiations occur against the backdrop of increasing collective risk: the likelihood of catastrophic economic loss due to climate change will continue to increase unless and until global mitigation efforts are sufficient to prevent it. We introduce a novel alternating-offers bargaining model that incorporates this characteristic feature of climate change. We test the model using an incentivized experiment. We manipulate two important distributional equity principles: capacity to pay for mitigation of climate change and vulnerability to its potentially catastrophic effects. Our results show that less vulnerable parties do not exploit the greater vulnerability of their bargaining partners. They are, rather, more generous. Conversely, parties with greater capacity are less generous in their offers. Both collective risk itself and its importance in light of the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report make it all the more urgent to better understand this crucial strategic feature of climate change bargaining.

scholarly journals A Distributed and Resilient Bargaining Game for Weather-Predictive Microgrid Energy Cooperation

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (8) ◽  
pp. 4721-4730 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lu An ◽  
Jie Duan ◽  
Mo-Yuen Chow ◽  
Alexandra Duel-Hallen
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Energy Cooperation
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