A Critique of Rival Accounts of Singular Thoughts

2007 ◽  
pp. 329-356
Keyword(s):  
Singular Thoughts

Singular Thoughts

2020 ◽  
pp. 143-158
Author(s):  
John Perry
Keyword(s):  
Singular Thought ◽  
Singular Proposition ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Singular Propositions ◽  
Singular Thoughts

There seem to be good reasons for recognizing singular thought: thoughts that are about particular objects. It seems that singular propositions capture the truth-conditions of such thoughts; that is, propositions individuated by objects and not senses, intensions, descriptions, or even names. But then how do we handle cases where a person regards “Cicero was an orator” as true but regards “Tully was an orator” as false? She seems to believe and disbelieve the same singular proposition. The chapter argues that we need to “unburden” propositions. Beliefs are episodes that have truth-conditions that can be captured by a variety of propositions, and the propositions that “that” clauses refer to don’t capture everything relevant to understanding the belief. I provide some concepts and terminology for implementing these lower expectations for propositions.

On the Cognitive Role of Singular Thoughts

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 573-594
Author(s):  
Bartłomiej Czajka ◽  
Jędrzej Piotr Grodniewicz
Keyword(s):  
Singular Thoughts

Descriptive Names and Singular Thought

2020 ◽  
pp. 38-51
Author(s):  
Marga Reimer
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Singular Thought ◽  
Mental File ◽  
Gareth Evans ◽  
David Kaplan ◽  
Potential Sources ◽  
Descriptive Names ◽  
François Recanati ◽  
Apparent Disagreement ◽  
Singular Thoughts

This chapter is concerned with an apparent disagreement between Gareth Evans (1982) and David Kaplan (1989) with regard to the capacities of names introduced into the language by describing their referents. The question at issue is whether such expressions are potential sources of novel singular thought. While Evans’ response is an emphatic “no,” Kaplan’s response is an equally emphatic “yes.” The chapter attempts to resolve (or rather dissolve) this apparent dispute by suggesting that the two philosophers have importantly different phenomena in mind when they talk of “thoughts”—including (and in particular) singular thoughts. Whereas Evans construes thoughts as mental states, Kaplan construes them as semantic contents. Before concluding, it argues for the superiority of the proposed resolution of the Evans/Kaplan debate over that of Francois Recanati (2012), who invokes his Mental File Framework in an attempt to reconcile the seemingly contrary views of Evans and Kaplan.

Singular Thought and Mental Files

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Rachel Goodman ◽  
James Genone
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Content ◽  
Clear Understanding ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Singular Thought ◽  
Mental File ◽  
Mental Files ◽  
De Re ◽  
Descriptive Information ◽  
Singular Thoughts

This introduction outlines some central challenges to a clear understanding of singular (or de re) thought, and illustrates why the literature has recently turned to the notion of a mental file as a way to theorize it. It sketches three central motivations behind the claim that singular thought is file-based thought. First, file-theorists have stressed that the descriptive information contained in a file does not determine its identity conditions or semantic content. Second, it is sometimes assumed that singular thoughts are devices of de jure coreference in thought and claimed that mental files are the cognitive reality of de jure coreference in thought. Finally, the file-theoretic approach to singular thought may seem to lend empirical respectability to the notion of singular thought. The chapter ends by?introducing some basic questions proponents of this approach must address if it is to fulfill its explanatory aims.

scholarly journals Singular thoughts and de re attitude reports

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 415-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Openshaw
Keyword(s):  
De Re ◽  
Attitude Reports ◽  
Singular Thoughts
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document