Gappy Propositions and the Nature of Rigidity

<p>During the 1980s, there was much debate as to whether the potential rigidity of names allowed for such terms to refer to their objects in worlds where that object did not exist. Those who supported this idea supported an obstinate account of rigidity, and those who rejected the idea supported an account of persistent rigidity. No clear conclusion was ever reached between the two sides. In this thesis, I will raise a novel argument in support of persistent rigidity using a modern theory about singular propositions known as the gappy proposition view. My conclusion is that such a view can help resolve the earlier debate about the nature of rigidity by showing how gappy propositions may be utilised to undermine the strongest arguments once raised by the obstinate rigidity theorists.</p>

Gappy Propositions and the Nature of Rigidity

<p>During the 1980s, there was much debate as to whether the potential rigidity of names allowed for such terms to refer to their objects in worlds where that object did not exist. Those who supported this idea supported an obstinate account of rigidity, and those who rejected the idea supported an account of persistent rigidity. No clear conclusion was ever reached between the two sides. In this thesis, I will raise a novel argument in support of persistent rigidity using a modern theory about singular propositions known as the gappy proposition view. My conclusion is that such a view can help resolve the earlier debate about the nature of rigidity by showing how gappy propositions may be utilised to undermine the strongest arguments once raised by the obstinate rigidity theorists.</p>

Fragmentation and Singular Propositions

Two puzzles are described: a problem about necessary a posteriori truths and a problem about propositional attitudes with singular propositions as their contents. Two strategies for solving them are compared. The first is the diagonalization strategy, which distinguishes possible worlds that are compatible with what is actually expressed by a given sentential clause from possible worlds that are compatible with what would be expressed by the clause if that possible world were actual. The second strategy is the fragmentation strategy, which represents the intentional states described by sentential clauses as separate nonintegrated representational states. It is argued that these are complementary, not competing, strategies. Both play a role in the solutions to the problems. In conclusion, it is suggested that these strategies can also help to clarify a number of further problems—about self-locating attitudes, about the nature of computation, and about knowledge of phenomenal experience.

Descriptive Indexicals, Deferred Reference, and Anaphora

The objectives of this paper are twofold. The first is to present a differentiation between two kinds of deferred uses of indexicals: those in which indexical utterances express singular propositions (I term them deferred reference proper) and those where they express general propositions (called descriptive uses of indexicals). The second objective is the analysis of the descriptive uses of indexicals. In contrast to Nunberg, who treats descriptive uses as a special case of deferred reference in which a property contributes to the proposition expressed, I argue that examples in which a general proposition is indeed expressed by an indexical cannot be treated by assuming that the property is a deferred referent of the pronoun. I propose an analysis of descriptive uses of indexicals by means of a pragmatic mechanism of ‘descriptive anaphora’, which attempts to explain the special kind of contribution of the property retrieved from the context to the proposition that is characteristic of the descriptive interpretation.

Singular Thoughts

There seem to be good reasons for recognizing singular thought: thoughts that are about particular objects. It seems that singular propositions capture the truth-conditions of such thoughts; that is, propositions individuated by objects and not senses, intensions, descriptions, or even names. But then how do we handle cases where a person regards “Cicero was an orator” as true but regards “Tully was an orator” as false? She seems to believe and disbelieve the same singular proposition. The chapter argues that we need to “unburden” propositions. Beliefs are episodes that have truth-conditions that can be captured by a variety of propositions, and the propositions that “that” clauses refer to don’t capture everything relevant to understanding the belief. I provide some concepts and terminology for implementing these lower expectations for propositions.

Reference in Fiction

Most discussions of proper names in fiction concern the names of fictional characters, such as ‘Clarissa Dalloway’ or ‘Lilliput.’ Less attention has been paid to referring names in fiction, such as ‘Napoleon’ (in Tolstoy’s War and Peace) or ‘London’ (in Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four). This is because many philosophers simply assume that such names are unproblematic; they refer in the usual way to their ordinary referents. The alternative position, dubbed Exceptionalism by Manuel García-Carpintero, maintains that referring names make a distinctive semantic contribution in fiction. In this paper I offer a positive argument for Non-Exceptionalism, relying on the claim that works of both fiction and non-fiction can express the same singular propositions. I go on to defend my account against García-Carpintero’s objections.

What does a presentist see when she looks at photographs of dead relatives?

The objective of this paper is to bring to the foreground some metaphysical commitments present in the debate about the relation between photography and the past. I will try to answer the question: what does a presentist see when she looks at photographs of dead relatives? According to presentism, if a particular object does not exist in the present, it does not exist simpliciter. For this reason, in Priorian presentism, there can be no de re (singular) propositions about past particulars. Part of the requirement for singularity would be played by reality, which suffers metaphysical restrictions from the passage of time. After outlining the metaphysical and semantical debate about presentism, I will briefly explore some theories of photography and separate them in two groups: de re theories that accept that through photography we indirectly perceive the past object itself and de dicto theories that deny it. Then, I will connect those theories to the problem faced by presentism, showing that a presentist must limit herself, in the case of objects that no longer presently exist, to a de dicto approach of photography. In other words, a presentist cannot accept that through photography she can indirectly see the past object itself. There would be nothing in the past for her to be remotely acquainted with or to demonstratively single out. I attempt to develop a presentist theory that could account for the descriptive and causal referential elements of photography using John Zeimbekis’ theory coupled with Craig Bourne’s presentist causal theory of reference (that jettison the Millian element of the causal theory). I will show how this theory is different from Kendall Walton’s counterfactual theory (also accepted by Dominic Lopes) and explore a criticism that could be formulated from his perspective.