Determination of Exchange Rates and Capital Flows for OECD Countries

1989 ◽  
pp. 233-250
Author(s):  
Wilhelm Krelle ◽  
Heinz Welsch
1992 ◽  
Vol 64 (20) ◽  
pp. 2456-2458 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geraldine. Thevenon-Emeric ◽  
John. Kozlowski ◽  
Zhongqi. Zhang ◽  
David L. Smith

2015 ◽  
Vol 130 (3) ◽  
pp. 1369-1420 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xavier Gabaix ◽  
Matteo Maggiori

Abstract We provide a theory of the determination of exchange rates based on capital flows in imperfect financial markets. Capital flows drive exchange rates by altering the balance sheets of financiers that bear the risks resulting from international imbalances in the demand for financial assets. Such alterations to their balance sheets cause financiers to change their required compensation for holding currency risk, thus affecting both the level and volatility of exchange rates. Our theory of exchange rate determination in imperfect financial markets not only helps rationalize the empirical disconnect between exchange rates and traditional macroeconomic fundamentals, it also has real consequences for output and risk sharing. Exchange rates are sensitive to imbalances in financial markets and seldom perform the shock absorption role that is central to traditional theoretical macroeconomic analysis. Our framework is flexible; it accommodates a number of important modeling features within an imperfect financial market model, such as nontradables, production, money, sticky prices or wages, various forms of international pricing-to-market, and unemployment.


2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 732-753 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Cooley ◽  
J. C. Sharman

We present a new, more transnational, networked perspective on corruption. It is premised on the importance of professional intermediaries who constitute networks facilitating cross-border illicit finance, the blurring of legal and illegal capital flows, and the globalization of the individual via multiple claims of residence and citizenship. This perspective contrasts with notions of corruption as epitomized by direct, unmediated transfers between bribe-givers and bribe-takers, disproportionately a problem of the developing world, and as bounded within national units. We argue that the professionals in major financial centers serve to lower the transaction costs of transnational corruption by senior foreign officials. Wealthy, politically powerful individuals on the margins of the law are increasingly globalized as they secure financial access, physical residence, and citizenship rights in major OECD countries. These trends are evidenced by an analysis of the main components of the relevant transnational networks: banks, shell companies, foreign real estate, and investor citizenship programs, based on extensive interviews with key informants across multiple sites.


1987 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan C. Stockman ◽  
Lars E.O. Svensson
Keyword(s):  

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