A Nash Solution for Multilateral Bargaining

Solution uniqueness is an important property for a bargaining model. Rubinstein's (1982) seminal 2-person alternating-offer bargaining game has a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium outcome. Is it possible to obtain uniqueness results in the much enlarged setting of multilateral bargaining with a characteristic function? This paper investigates a random-proposer model first studied in Okada (1993) in which each period players have equal probabilities of being selected to make a proposal and bargaining ends after one coalition forms. Focusing on transferable utility environments and Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SSPE), we find ex ante SSPE payoff uniqueness for symmetric and convex characteristic functions, considerably expanding the conditions under which this model is known to exhibit SSPE payoff uniqueness. Our model includes as a special case a variant of the legislative bargaining model in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), and our results imply (unrestricted) SSPE payoff uniqueness in this case.

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A Sensitivity Based Approach to Determining Non-Cooperative Solutions in Nash and Stackelberg Games

Volume 4: Dynamics, Control and Uncertainty, Parts A and B ◽

10.1115/imece2012-88970 ◽

2012 ◽

Author(s):

Ehsan Ghotbi ◽

Wilkistar A. Otieno ◽

Anoop K. Dhingra

Keyword(s):

Response Surface Methodology ◽

Computational Effort ◽

Stackelberg Games ◽

Nash Solution ◽

Numerical Errors ◽

Multiobjective Problems ◽

Cooperative Solutions ◽

The One ◽

Rational Reaction Set ◽

The Nash Solution

A sensitivity based approach is presented to determine Nash solution(s) in multiobjective problems modeled as a non-cooperative game. The proposed approach provides an approximation to the rational reaction set (RRS) for each player. An intersection of these sets yields the Nash solution for the game. An alternate approach for generating the RRS based on design of experiments (DOE) combined with response surface methodology (RSM) is also explored. The two approaches for generating RRS are compared on three example problems to find Nash and Stackelberg solutions. It is seen that the proposed sensitivity based approach (i) requires less computational effort than a RSM-DOE approach, (ii) is less prone to numerical errors than the RSM-DOE approach, (iii) is able to find all Nash solutions when the Nash solution is not a singleton, (iv) is able to approximate non linear RRS, and (v) is able to find better a Nash solution on an example problem than the one reported in the literature.

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Bargaining and Justice

Social Philosophy and Policy ◽

10.1017/s0265052500003204 ◽

1985 ◽

Vol 2 (2) ◽

pp. 29-47 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

David Gauthier

Keyword(s):

Bargaining Problem ◽

Nash Solution ◽

Bargaining Process ◽

Independence Of Irrelevant Alternatives ◽

Principles Of Justice ◽

The Nash Solution

My concern in this paper is with the illumination that the theory of rational bargaining sheds on the formulation of principles of justice. I shall first set out the bargaining problem, as treated in the theory of games, and the Nash solution, or solution F. I shall then argue against the axiom, labeled “independence of irrelevant alternatives,” which distinguished solution F, and also against the Zeuthen model of the bargaining process which F formalizes.

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