NEGOTIATION ON NATURAL RESOURCES

The host government (HG) of resource-rich countries (RRC) dealing with multiple International Oil Companies (IOCs) faces a choice between making a simultaneous multilateral offer and a sequential bilateral offer on equity shares from resource value. Provided that the HG treats all its foreign partners in a simultaneous negotiation as a single entity, it is argued that the HG is predicted to gain a higher equity share from a simultaneous multilateral bargaining deal than from a sequential bilateral one with each player. Furthermore, we argue that in case of positive weak externality from a sequential bilateral game, HG would still prefer a simultaneous multilateral game due to superadditivity and efficiency properties of grand coalition.

Multilateral Trade Bargaining: A First Look at the GATT Bargaining Records

This paper empirically examines recently declassified tariff bargaining data from the GATT/WTO. Focusing on the Torquay Round (1950–1951), we document stylized facts about these interconnected high-stakes international negotiations that suggest a lack of strategic behavior among the participating governments and an important multilateral element to the bilateral bargains. We suggest that these features can be understood as emerging from a tariff bargaining forum that emphasizes the GATT pillars of MFN and multilateral reciprocity, and we offer evidence that the relaxation of strict bilateral reciprocity facilitated by the GATT multilateral bargaining forum was important to the success of the GATT approach. (JEL C78, F13)

Lessons Learned: Nuclear Reversal, International Relations, and Future Challenges

The concluding chapter summarizes the book’s findings and examines its implications for both theorists and practitioners of international relations and nuclear security. In specific, it begins by providing a brief summary of the main argument, empirical results, and insights into current proliferation challenges. It next identifies four implications of this study for further consideration: rewards for tough proliferators, nuclear latency, multilateral bargaining, and credibility. It focuses on developments regarding current counterproliferation policy and how best to engage potential nuclear proliferators in the future. The chapter concludes with a summary of the recommendations for policymakers engaging in broader international efforts at nuclear reversal. Given the threat that future nuclear proliferators can pose to international security, there is no better time to focus our attention on the politics of nuclear reversal.

Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining

This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the extensions to bargaining among asymmetric players in terms of bargaining power, voting weights, and time and risk preferences; spatial bargaining; bargaining over a stochastic surplus; bargaining over public goods; legislative bargaining with alternative bargaining protocols in which players make demands, compete for recognition, or make counterproposals; and legislative bargaining with cheap talk communication.