scholarly journals Perceptual Representation and Reasoning

1993 ◽  
pp. 67-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Chandrasekaran ◽  
N. Hari Narayanan
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Representation

Direct Realism and Illusion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Direct Realism ◽  
Perceptual Representation ◽  
Perceptual Error ◽  
Standard Response ◽  
Perceptual Representations ◽  
Ambiguous Stimuli ◽  
Physical Objects ◽  
Apparent Problem

The supposed problem of perceptual error, including illusion and hallucination, has led most theories of perception to deny formulations of direct realism. The standard response to this apparent problem adopts the mistaken presupposition that perception is indeed liable to error. However, the prevailing conditions of observation are themselves elements of perceptual representation, functioning in the manner of predicate modifiers. They ensure that the predicates applied in perceptual representations do indeed correctly attribute properties that perceived physical objects actually instantiate. Thus, perceptual representations are immune to misrepresentation of the sort misguidedly supposed by the spurious problem of perceptual misrepresentation. Granted the possibility that perceptual attribution admits of predicate modification, it is quite possible that perceptual experience permits both rudimentary and sophisticated conceptualization. Moreover, such treatment of perceptual predication rewards by providing an account of aspect alteration exemplified by perception of ambiguous stimuli.

Intentionalism, Cognition, and Representation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental Representation ◽  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Conscious Perception ◽  
Perceptual Representation ◽  
Perceptual State ◽  
Content Of Experience

This chapter continues consideration of reductive intentionalism without embracing the doctrine, framing it in the context of cognitive science. Cognition, including perception, is representation. An agent’s cognitive, perhaps perceptual, state is a relation binding the agent to a proposition by means of her mental representation. Intentionalism would explicate the phenomenal character of a perceiver's experience in terms of the content of her prevailing perceptual representation. While minimal intentionalism maintains that the phenomenal character of the perceiver's experience merely supervenes on her representation's content, maximal intentionalism would reduce character to content. For maximal intentionalism maintains that phenomenal character is simply what introspection finds. Yet, according to maximal intentionalism, introspection, when tuned to conscious perception, detects only the content of experience. Hence, the maximalist identifies phenomenal character with the content carried by perceptual representation.

Methodological issues in assessing perceptual representation of consonant sounds in Thai

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charturong Tantibundhit ◽  
Chutamanee Onsuwan ◽  
P. Phienphanich ◽  
Chai Wutiwiwatchai
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Representation ◽  
Methodological Issues ◽  
Consonant Sounds

The Effect of Loudness on the Perceptual Representation of Sounds With Similar Timbre

2015 ◽  
Vol 101 (6) ◽  
pp. 1174-1184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Susini ◽  
Olivier Houix ◽  
Guillaume Saint Pierre
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Representation

The Relationship between Texture Gradient and Perceived Slant-in-Depth: Direct or Mediated?

Perception ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 695-702 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Epstein
Keyword(s):  
Surface Texture ◽  
Direct Perception ◽  
Texture Gradient ◽  
Textured Surface ◽  
Perceptual Representation ◽  
Rectangular Grid ◽  
Optical Texture ◽  
Rectangular Grids ◽  
Interstimulus Intervals ◽  
The Relationship

Judgments were obtained of the surface texture and rotation in depth of a briefly-exposed monocularly-viewed rectangular grid rotated in depth and a set of projective equivalents of the grid presented in the frontalparallel plane. The judgments were secured when the grids were presented alone and when they were followed by a masking textured surface after interstimulus intervals (ISIs) ranging from 0 to 120 ms. In the absence of the mask judged texture varied corresponding to the variations of optical texture both for the rotated rectangular grids and the frontalparallel projections. Judgements of orientation in the absence of the mask varied corresponding to the variations in objective orientation for the rectangular grid and corresponding to the projective equivalent rotations for the frontalparallel projections. Introduction of the mask at ISI = 0 led to disruption of discriminative gradient and orientation judgments. The degree of disruption decreased as ISI increased. These findings were interpreted as supporting a mediational hypothesis of the relationship between optical texture and perceived slant-in-depth. In contrast to the direct perception hypothesis advanced by Gibson, the mediational hypothesis assigns an important role to the perceptual representation of the optical gradient. When the formation of this representation is arrested by processing of the mask, the relationship between optical texture and perceived slant-in-depth is disrupted.

The perceptual representation of voice gender

1995 ◽  
Vol 98 (6) ◽  
pp. 3080-3095 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Mullennix ◽  
Keith A. Johnson ◽  
Meral Topcu‐Durgun ◽  
Lynn M. Farnsworth
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Representation

XIII—The Flow of Time in Experience

2019 ◽  
Vol 119 (3) ◽  
pp. 275-293
Author(s):  
Thomas Sattig
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Representation ◽  
Temporal Experience ◽  
Change Over Time ◽  
Initial Characterization ◽  
Flow Of Time ◽  
Over Time

Abstract Our perceptual experiences as of change over time seem to be accompanied by the sense that time flows. The sense of flow is widely regarded as one of the most elusive aspects of temporal experience. In this paper, I develop a novel account of its nature. I give an initial characterization of the sense of flow as the sense that the present changes—in short, as the sense of replacement. Further, I specify the type of account of the sense of replacement to be developed: since the sense that the present changes will be assumed to be grounded in the perceptual representation that the present changes, my focus will be to explain the perceptual representation that the present changes. I develop an account of the synchronic perceptual representation of the present. Finally, I develop an account of the diachronic perceptual representation of the present as changing.

Importance of perceptual representation in the visual control of action

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack M. Loomis ◽  
Andrew C. Beall ◽  
Jonathan W. Kelly ◽  
Kristen L. Macuga
Keyword(s):  
Visual Control ◽  
Perceptual Representation
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