An Optimal Stopping Game in a Restricted Market

Author(s):  
Charles G. Bird
2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 397-403 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladimir Mazalov ◽  
Anna Ivashko

In this article we consider a noncooperative n-person optimal stopping game of Showcase Showdown, in which each player observes the sum of independent and identically distributed random variables uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. Players can decide to stop the draw in each moment. The objective of a player is to get the maximal number of scores that does is not exceeded level 1. If the scores of all players exceed 1, then the winner is the player whose score is closest to 1. We derive the equilibrium in this game on the basis of the dynamic programming approach.


Author(s):  
Mark Whitmeyer

AbstractThis paper explores a multi-player game of optimal stopping over a finite time horizon. A player wins by retaining a higher value than her competitors do, from a series of independent draws. In our game, a cutoff strategy is optimal, we derive its form, and we show that there is a unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in symmetric cutoff strategies. We establish results concerning the cutoff value in its limit and expose techniques, in particular, use of the Budan-Fourier Theorem, that may be useful in other similar problems.


Author(s):  
Tiziano De Angelis ◽  
Erik Ekström ◽  
Kristoffer Glover

We study the value and the optimal strategies for a two-player zero-sum optimal stopping game with incomplete and asymmetric information. In our Bayesian setup, the drift of the underlying diffusion process is unknown to one player (incomplete information feature), but known to the other one (asymmetric information feature). We formulate the problem and reduce it to a fully Markovian setup where the uninformed player optimises over stopping times and the informed one uses randomised stopping times in order to hide their informational advantage. Then we provide a general verification result that allows us to find the value of the game and players’ optimal strategies by solving suitable quasi-variational inequalities with some nonstandard constraints. Finally, we study an example with linear payoffs, in which an explicit solution of the corresponding quasi-variational inequalities can be obtained.


2020 ◽  
Vol 81 (7) ◽  
pp. 1192-1210
Author(s):  
O.V. Zverev ◽  
V.M. Khametov ◽  
E.A. Shelemekh

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 534
Author(s):  
F. Thomas Bruss

This paper presents two-person games involving optimal stopping. As far as we are aware, the type of problems we study are new. We confine our interest to such games in discrete time. Two players are to chose, with randomised choice-priority, between two games G1 and G2. Each game consists of two parts with well-defined targets. Each part consists of a sequence of random variables which determines when the decisive part of the game will begin. In each game, the horizon is bounded, and if the two parts are not finished within the horizon, the game is lost by definition. Otherwise the decisive part begins, on which each player is entitled to apply their or her strategy to reach the second target. If only one player achieves the two targets, this player is the winner. If both win or both lose, the outcome is seen as “deuce”. We motivate the interest of such problems in the context of real-world problems. A few representative problems are solved in detail. The main objective of this article is to serve as a preliminary manual to guide through possible approaches and to discuss under which circumstances we can obtain solutions, or approximate solutions.


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