EQUILIBRIUM IN n-PERSON GAME OF SHOWCASE SHOWDOWN
2010 ◽
Vol 24
(3)
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pp. 397-403
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Keyword(s):
Level 1
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In this article we consider a noncooperative n-person optimal stopping game of Showcase Showdown, in which each player observes the sum of independent and identically distributed random variables uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. Players can decide to stop the draw in each moment. The objective of a player is to get the maximal number of scores that does is not exceeded level 1. If the scores of all players exceed 1, then the winner is the player whose score is closest to 1. We derive the equilibrium in this game on the basis of the dynamic programming approach.
2012 ◽
Vol E95-B
(2)
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pp. 551-562
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Keyword(s):
2013 ◽
Vol 65
(4)
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pp. 634-645
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