A Competitive Optimal Stopping Game
2017 ◽
Vol 18
(1)
◽
Keyword(s):
AbstractThis paper explores a multi-player game of optimal stopping over a finite time horizon. A player wins by retaining a higher value than her competitors do, from a series of independent draws. In our game, a cutoff strategy is optimal, we derive its form, and we show that there is a unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in symmetric cutoff strategies. We establish results concerning the cutoff value in its limit and expose techniques, in particular, use of the Budan-Fourier Theorem, that may be useful in other similar problems.
2004 ◽
Vol 41
(2)
◽
pp. 313-326
◽
Keyword(s):
2010 ◽
Vol 48
(8)
◽
pp. 5193-5213
◽
Keyword(s):
2004 ◽
Vol 41
(02)
◽
pp. 313-326
◽
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
Importance measure on finite time horizon and application to Markovian multistate production systems
2008 ◽
Vol 222
(3)
◽
pp. 449-461
Keyword(s):