The Syllogistic Reasoning Task: Reasoning Principles and Heuristic Strategies in Modeling Human Clusters

Author(s):  
Emmanuelle-Anna Dietz Saldanha ◽  
Steffen Hölldobler ◽  
Richard Mörbitz
2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 633-648 ◽  
Author(s):  
LUÍS MONIZ PEREIRA ◽  
EMMANUELLE-ANNA DIETZ ◽  
STEFFEN HÖLLDOBLER

AbstractThe belief bias effect is a phenomenon which occurs when we think that we judge an argument based on our reasoning, but are actually influenced by our beliefs and prior knowledge. Evans, Barston and Pollard carried out a psychological syllogistic reasoning task to prove this effect. Participants were asked whether they would accept or reject a given syllogism. We discuss one specific case which is commonly assumed to be believable but which is actually not logically valid. By introducing abnormalities, abduction and background knowledge, we adequately model this case under the weak completion semantics. Our formalization reveals new questions about possible extensions in abductive reasoning. For instance, observations and their explanations might include some relevant prior abductive contextual information concerning some side-effect or leading to a contestable or refutable side-effect. A weaker notion indicates the support of some relevant consequences by a prior abductive context. Yet another definition describes jointly supported relevant consequences, which captures the idea of two observations containing mutually supportive side-effects. Though motivated with and exemplified by the running psychology application, the various new general abductive context definitions are introduced here and given a declarative semantics for the first time, and have a much wider scope of application. Inspection points, a concept introduced by Pereira and Pinto, allows us to express these definitions syntactically and intertwine them into an operational semantics.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maryam Ziaei ◽  
Mohammad Reza Bonyadi ◽  
David C. Reutens

AbstractReasoning requires initial encoding of the semantic association between premises or assumptions, retrieval of these semantic associations from memory, and recombination of information to draw a logical conclusion. Currently-held beliefs can interfere with the content of the assumptions if not congruent and inhibited. This study aimed to investigate the role of the hippocampus and hippocampal networks during logical reasoning tasks in which the congruence between currently-held beliefs and assumptions varies. Participants of younger and older age completed a series of syllogistic reasoning tasks in which two premises and one conclusion were presented and they were required to decide if the conclusion logically followed the premises. The belief load of premises was manipulated to be either congruent or incongruent with currently-held beliefs. Our whole-brain results showed that older adults recruited the hippocampus during the premise integration stage more than their younger counterparts. Functional connectivity using a hippocampal seed revealed that older, but not younger, adults recruited a hippocampal network that included anterior cingulate and inferior frontal regions when premises were believable. Importantly, this network contributed to better performance in believable inferences, only in older adults group. Further analyses suggested that, in older adults group, the integrity of the left cingulum bundle was associated with the higher correct rejection of believable premises more than unbelievable ones. Using multimodal imaging, this study highlights the importance of the hippocampus during premise integration and supports the compensatory role of the hippocampal network during a logical reasoning task among older adults.


2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kinga Morsanyi ◽  
Simon J. Handley

2009 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 513-530 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Reverberi ◽  
Patrice Rusconi ◽  
Eraldo Paulesu ◽  
Paolo Cherubini

2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 654-664 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vinod Goel ◽  
Milan Makale ◽  
Jordan Grafman

It has recently been shown that syllogistic reasoning engages two dissociable neural systems. Reasoning about familiar situations engages a frontal-temporal lobe system, whereas formally identical reasoning tasks involving unfamiliar situations recruit a frontal-parietal visuospatial network. These two systems may correspond to the “heuristic” and “formal” methods, respectively, postulated by cognitive theory. To determine if this dissociation generalizes to reasoning about transitive spatial relations, we studied 14 volunteers using event-related fMRI, as they reasoned about landmarks in familiar and unfamiliar environments. Our main finding is a task (reasoning and baseline) by spatial content (familiar and unfamiliar) interaction. Modulation of reasoning toward unfamiliar landmarks resulted in bilateral activation of superior and inferior parietal lobules (BA 7, 40), dorsal superior frontal cortex (BA 6), and right superior and middle frontal gyri (BA 8), regions widely implicated in visuospatial processing. By contrast, modulation of the reasoning task toward familiar landmarks, engaged the right inferior/orbital frontal gyrus (BA 11/47), bilateral occipital (BA 18, 19), and temporal lobes. The temporal lobe activation included the right inferior temporal gyrus (BA 37), posterior hippocampus, and parahippocampal gyrus, regions implicated in spatial memory and navigation tasks. These results provide support for the generalization of dual mechanism theory to transitive reasoning and highlight the importance of the hippocampal system in reasoning about familiar spatial environments.


Author(s):  
Bastien Trémolière ◽  
Marie-Ève Gagnon ◽  
Isabelle Blanchette

Abstract. Although the detrimental effect of emotion on reasoning has been evidenced many times, the cognitive mechanism underlying this effect remains unclear. In the present paper, we explore the cognitive load hypothesis as a potential explanation. In an experiment, participants solved syllogistic reasoning problems with either neutral or emotional contents. Participants were also presented with a secondary task, for which the difficult version requires the mobilization of cognitive resources to be correctly solved. Participants performed overall worse and took longer on emotional problems than on neutral problems. Performance on the secondary task, in the difficult version, was poorer when participants were reasoning about emotional, compared to neutral contents, consistent with the idea that processing emotion requires more cognitive resources. Taken together, the findings afford evidence that the deleterious effect of emotion on reasoning is mediated by cognitive load.


1980 ◽  
Author(s):  
Per-Hakan S. Ekberg ◽  
Lola L. Lopes

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