Main Issues in Belief Revision, Belief Merging and Information Fusion

Author(s):  
Didier Dubois ◽  
Patricia Everaere ◽  
Sébastien Konieczny ◽  
Odile Papini
2004 ◽  
Vol 19 (9) ◽  
pp. 837-857 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriele Kern-Isberner ◽  
Wilhelm Rödder

2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 445-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Gabbay ◽  
O. Rodrigues ◽  
G. Pigozzi

2018 ◽  
Vol 61 ◽  
pp. 807-834 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadia Creignou ◽  
Raïda Ktari ◽  
Odile Papini

Belief change within the framework of fragments of propositional logic is one of the main and recent challenges in the knowledge representation research area. While previous research works focused on belief revision, belief merging, and belief contraction, the problem of belief update within fragments of classical logic has not been addressed so far. In the context of revision, it has been proposed to refine existing operators so that they operate within propositional fragments, and that the result of revision remains in the fragment under consideration. This approach is not restricted to the Horn fragment but also applicable to other propositional fragments like Krom and affine fragments. We generalize this notion of refinement to any belief change operator. We then focus on a specific belief change operation, namely belief update. We investigate the behavior of the refined update operators with respect to satisfaction of the KM postulates and highlight differences between revision and update in this context.


2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Oscar Chávez-Bosquez ◽  
Pilar Pozos-Parra ◽  
Jianbing Ma

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Bonawitz ◽  
Patrick Shafto ◽  
Yue Yu ◽  
Sophie Elizabeth Colby Bridgers ◽  
Aaron Gonzalez

Burgeoning evidence suggests that when children observe data, they use knowledge of the demonstrator’s intent to augment learning. We propose that the effects of social learning may go beyond cases where children observe data, to cases where they receive no new information at all. We present a model of how simply asking a question a second time may lead to belief revision, when the questioner is expected to know the correct answer. We provide an analysis of the CHILDES corpus to show that these neutral follow-up questions are used in parent-child conversations. We then present three experiments investigating 4- and 5-year-old children’s reactions to neutral follow-up questions posed by ignorant or knowledgeable questioners. Children were more likely to change their answers in response to a neutral follow-up question from a knowledgeable questioner than an ignorant one. We discuss the implications of these results in the context of common practices in legal, educational, and experimental psychological settings.


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