Ordinary Morality and Its Detractors

2019 ◽  
pp. 23-67
Author(s):  
Christopher B. Kulp
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
pp. 131-160
Author(s):  
Gerald Lang
Keyword(s):  

This chapter tackles Bernard Williams’s argument in his ‘Moral Luck’. Despite some relatively superficial similarities between him and Nagel, Williams’s critical targets differ from Nagel and those who have continued to worry about resultant luck, because Williams is mainly concerned about an agent’s prospects for escaping a Kantian version of morality that he described as the ‘morality system’ by undertaking projects whose success depends on luck. It is suggested that it is difficult to find an interpretation of Williams’s position that does full justice to his various desiderata. Seven interpretations are considered, and the most promising of them makes an agent a beneficiary of moral luck if her acts succeed in transforming her perspective in such a way that she is immune to a certain form of regret for the consequences of what she has done. It is contended that this interpretation does not provide a convincing assault on the morality system, as Williams does not have enough to say about the differences between agents who have genuinely escaped the authority of ordinary morality and agents who have simply decided to ignore morality. Williams’s arguments can be interpreted as providing a model of responsibility which rivals the Restricted Account, but it is argued here that the Restricted Account provides the better way forward.


Utilitas ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 465-487 ◽  
Author(s):  
FEDERICO ZUOLO

Singer has argued against the permissibility of killing people (and certain animals) on the grounds of the distinction between conscious and self-conscious animals. Unlike conscious animals, which can be replaced without a loss of overall welfare, there can be no substitution for self-conscious animals. In this article, I show that Singer's argument is untenable, in the cases both of the preference-based account of utilitarianism and of objective hedonism, to which he has recently turned. In the first case, Singer cannot theoretically exclude that a self-conscious being's stronger preferences may only be satisfied by killing another self-conscious being. In the second case, he fails to demonstrate that the rules of ordinary morality, demanding that killing be strictly forbidden, could not frequently be overruled by the principles of esoteric morality. In both cases, his theory cannot solve the classical utilitarian problem of prohibiting the killing of people in secret.


Food Ethics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1-2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tjidde Tempels ◽  
Vincent Blok ◽  
Marcel Verweij

AbstractFood and beverage firms are frequently criticised for their impact on the spread of non-communicable diseases like obesity and diabetes type 2. In this article we explore under what conditions the sales and marketing of unhealthy food and beverage products is irresponsible. Starting from the notion of ordinary morality we argue that firms have a duty to respect people’s autonomy and adhere to the principle of non-maleficence in both market and non-market environments. We show how these considerations are relevant when thinking about immoral behaviour in the food and beverage industry, and identify under what conditions sales and marketing of unhealthy foods and beverages to adults and children is wrong. Based on this analysis we argue that firms should take into account: whether consumers are able to identify manipulative marketing, the degree of manipulation, as well as the negative impact a product has on health. We hold that for the food industry to act responsible it should re-evaluate the marketing of unhealthy products to adults and refrain from marketing to children. We conclude this study by making several recommendations on how the food industry should interact with consumers and highlight what changes need to be made in corporate practice.


2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nien-hê Hsieh

ABSTRACT:In this address, I outline a “back to basics” approach to specifying the responsibilities and role of business in relation to society. Three “basics” comprise the approach. The first is arguing that basic principles of ordinary morality, such as a duty not to harm, provide an adequate basis for specifying the responsibilities of business managers. The second is framing the role of business in society by looking to the values realized by the basic building blocks of contemporary economic activity, i.e., markets and firms. The third is making explicit the basic institutions that structure the background against which business operates. The aim is to develop a plausible framework for managerial decision making that respects the fact of value pluralism in a global economy and that fosters meaningful criticism of current business practices while remaining sufficiently grounded in contemporary circumstances so as to be relevant for managers.


1970 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-98
Author(s):  
Rob Lovering

Stephen Maitzen has recently argued that ordinary morality implies atheism. In the following, I argue that the soundness of Maitzen's argument depends on a principle that is implausible, what I call the recipient's Benefit Principle: All else being equal, if an act a produces a net benefit for the individual on the receiving end of a, then one cannot have a moral obligation to prevent a. Specifically, the recipient's Benefit Principle (RBP) must be true if premise (2) of Maitzen's argument is to be true. But, RBP is likely false, as it generates counterintuitive implications as well as conflicts with another principle both plausible and seemingly adopted by most of us, what I call the Preventing Immorality Principle: All else being equal, if an act A is seriously immoral, then one has a moral obligation to prevent A.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antoine Marie

Whitehouse [target article] makes no room for evolutionary approaches to extreme behaviors based on partner choice and mutualism, which have been convincingly invoked to make sense of ordinary morality. Extended to intergroup warfare, these evolutionary mechanisms may play a pivotal role in explaining the existence of extreme – though not functionally sacrificial – behaviors, benefiting non-kin fellow fighters, together with the distinctive phenomenology those behaviors display.


Utilitas ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 377-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEX RAJCZI

Consequentialism is enticing but also seems overly demanding. As a result, many non-consequentialists try to explain why we aren't required to maximize the good. One explanation is the Integrity Explanation: we are not required to maximize the good because morality must make room for us to pursue our projects and interests. Some people hope that the Integrity Explanation will not just explain why consequentialism is false, but simultaneously vindicate the common-sense permission to generally refrain from promoting the good of other people and instead spend our time on non-harmful actions of our choice. I argue that this hope is unrealistic, because if any version of the Integrity Explanation is correct, morality will not contain broad permissions to refrain from promoting the good of others and do as we choose.


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