Lorsch, Jay W.: The Academic Who Changed the Corporate Board Room

2021 ◽  
pp. 987-997
Author(s):  
Brett A. Geier ◽  
Aamir Hasan
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Halil Kaya ◽  
Gaurango Banerjee

The paper examines the Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) Acts immediate impact on board composition and characteristics as well as possible reversals in its impact over time. Effects on directors age and tenure are analyzed over the 2001-06 sample period. Female participation in corporate boards is also studied in the pre-SOX and post-SOX periods. The dual roles of directors in being a member of the board as well as serving as either CEO, CFO, Chairman, Co-Chair, Founder, or Lead Director of their respective companies is also examined. We observe a short-term impact of SOX on board compositions due to changes seen in board characteristics between 2001 (pre-SOX), and 2003-05 short-term period (post-SOX). Also, we observe a reversal of board characteristics in 2006 to pre-SOX levels implying that the effects of SOX on board composition were short-lived, and needs to be monitored over time to ensure adherence to corporate accountability guidelines over the long-term.


Author(s):  
Matthias Raddant ◽  
Hiroshi Takahashi

AbstractWe analyze the ties between 4000 Japanese corporations in the time period from 2004 until 2013. We combine data about the board composition with ownership relationships and indicators of corporate profitability. The board network exhibits some clustering, which can partly be explained by ownership relations, and a tendency to form ties to other corporations from the same sector. Connectivity in the board network (corporate board interlocks) and ownership network (shareholdings) does have an influence profitability. Firms that are linked to peers with above average profitability are more profitable than firms in other relationships. Hence, network effects partly explain why board interlocks and ownership ties are not always beneficial.


Author(s):  
David A. Carter ◽  
Frank P. D'Souza ◽  
Betty J. Simkins ◽  
W. Gary Simpson

2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 513-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean SK Lee ◽  
Luh Luh Lan ◽  
Chris Rowley
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anton Leopold Nußbaum

The internal liability of managers of large associations is becoming increasingly relevant in the context of their growing economic importance, especially considering the stricter compliance obligations. The book develops de lege lata with the help of corporate principles a liability regime for board members and association managers with and without corporate board positions that is in line with common interests. At the same time, the author uses a practical analysis of various association structures to indicate the problems that exist in the realization of liability and recommends de lege ferenda for a mandatory supervisory board for large associations based on the model of stock corporation law. The work addresses equally academics and legal practice as well as the associations themselves.


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