The Spatiotemporal Dimension of Singular Reference

2020 ◽  
pp. 281-293
Author(s):  
Carlos Mario Márquez Sosa
Keyword(s):  
Singular Reference

Relative identity, singular reference, and the Incarnation: a response to Le Poidevin

2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER HUGHES CONN
Keyword(s):  
Formal Logic ◽  
Relative Identity ◽  
Regress Argument ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Singular Reference ◽  
Direct Theory ◽  
The Trinity

AbstractIn this article I object to Le Poidevin's (2009) contention that relative identity is beset with an infinite metaphysical regress. I argue, first, that since Le Poidevin's regress argument presupposes a direct theory of reference, it does not apply to accounts of relative identity which reject this account of reference. I argue, second, that Le Poidevin's regress is not inevitable for one who accepts a direct account of reference, since it does not apply to the formal logic of relative identity which van Inwagen uses to articulate and defend the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation.

scholarly journals Indexical Sinn: Fregeanism versus Millianism

2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (39) ◽  
pp. 465
Author(s):  
João Branquinho
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Proper Names ◽  
Direct Reference ◽  
Cognitive Significance ◽  
De Re ◽  
General Conception ◽  
Attitude Reports ◽  
Singular Reference ◽  
Reference Theory ◽  
Careful Assessment

This paper discusses two notational variance views with respect to indexical singular reference and content: the view that certain forms of Millianism are at bottom notational variants of a Fregean theory of reference, the Fregean Notational Variance Claim; and the view that certain forms of Fregeanism are at bottom notational variants of a direct reference theory, the Millian Notational Variance Claim. While the former claim rests on the supposition that a direct reference theory could be easily turned into a particular version of a neo-Fregean one by showing that it is bound to acknowledge certain senselike entities, the latter claim is based upon the supposition that a neo-Fregean theory could be easily turned into a particular version of a Millian one by showing that De Re senses are theoretically superfluous and hence eliminable. The question how many accounts of singular reference and content are we confronted with here — Two different (and mutually antagonistic) theories? Or just two versions of what is in essence the same theory? — is surely of importance to anyone interested in the topic. And this question should be answered by means of a careful assessment of the soundness of each of the above claims. Before trying to adjudicate between the two accounts, one would naturally want to know whether or not there are indeed two substantially disparate accounts. Grosso modo, if the Fregean Claim were sound then we would have a single general conception of singular reference to deal with, viz. Fregeanism; likewise, if the Millian Claim were sound we would be facing a single general conception of singular reference, viz. Millianism. My view is that both the Fregean Notational Variance Claim and its Millian counterpart are wrong, though naturally on different grounds. I have argued elsewhere that the Fregean Notational Variance Claim - considered in its application to the semantics of propositional-attitude reports involving proper names — is unsound. I intend tosupplement in this paper such a result by trying to show that the Millian Claim - taken in its application to the semantics of indexical expressions — should also be rated as incorrect. I focus on a certain set of arguments for the Millian Claim, arguments which I take as adequately representing the general outlook of the Millian theorist with respect to neo-Fregeanism about indexicals and which involve issues about the cognitive significance of sentences containing indexical terms.

Puzzles of Coreference

2021 ◽  
pp. 87-141
Author(s):  
Kenneth A. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Significance ◽  
Singular Reference

This chapter deals with coreference puzzles, long regarded as bedrock data against which the adequacy of any theory of singular reference must ultimately be tested. The chapter argues that two-factor referentialism, introduced in Chapter 2, does the best job of solving them. It considers a number of coreference problems, old ones from Frege; newer ones from Kripke, Saul, Richard, and others; and some entirely new ones. It discusses some relevant syntactic issues and distinguishes intrinsic coreference from coincidental coreference. The view that names are individuated by spelling and pronunciation, such as the theory of “nambiguity” put forward by Perry and Korta, is rejected. It criticizes views that treat names as indexicals, as conflating importantly different instruments of reference. It criticizes the view that names are predicates, as having no reasons in its favor other than a misplaced desire for unity. It then develops the two-factor theory by comparing its treatment of cognitive significance with Frege’s views, and more recent views of Perry, Recanati, Fiengo, and May.

Singular reference and pragmatically incomplete meaning

2010 ◽  
pp. 279-358
Author(s):  
Marie Duží ◽  
Bjørn Jespersen ◽  
Pavel Materna
Keyword(s):  
Singular Reference

Inferentialism and Singular Reference

2005 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark McCullagh
Keyword(s):  
Singular Terms ◽  
Inferential Role ◽  
Robert Brandom ◽  
Binary Partition ◽  
Singular Reference

In Making It Explicit (1994) Robert Brandom claims that we may distinguish those linguistic expressions with object-representational purport — the singular terms — from others merely by the structure of their inferential relations. A good part of his inferentialist program rests on this claim. At first blush it can seem implausible: linguistic expressions stand in inferential relations to each other, so how could we appeal to those relations to decide on the obtaining of what seems to be relation between linguistic expressions and objects in general (viz., x purports to represent y)? It is perhaps not surprising then that Brandom's proposal fails. But it definitely is surprising how it fails. The problem is that in order to specify the sort of generality there is to an expression's inferential role, one must appeal to some version of the traditional distinction between extensional and nonextensional occurrences of expressions, and there appears to be no way to draw anything like that distinction in inferentialist terms. For the inferential proprieties governing the different occurrences an expression can have are so varied that they do not determine a binary partition of those occurrences.

scholarly journals Bare Singular Reference to Kinds

2003 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edit Doron
Keyword(s):  
Singular Reference

No abstract.

Evans, Gareth (1946–80)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John McDowell
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Direct Reference ◽  
Major Work ◽  
Gareth Evans ◽  
Singular Reference ◽  
The Way

Frege’s notion of sense is a conception of content whose application is controlled by the idea of rationality. A Fregean outlook is often taken to imply that singular reference is always mediated by descriptions, and hence to be inconsistent with the insights that have motivated proponents of ‘direct reference’. But in his major work, The Varieties of Reference (1982), Gareth Evans showed how a treatment of singular reference on Fregean lines can accommodate those insights. This means that the semantics of singular reference need not be distanced from the philosophy of mind, in the way that proponents of ‘direct reference’ typically suppose. Within the framework provided by this synthesis, Evans gave detailed treatments of the different ways in which thought and speech are directed at particular objects. Particularly notable are his discussions of demonstrative thinking, which exploits the perceptible presence to the thinker of the object it concerns; of first-personal thinking; and of singular statements of nonexistence.

Reference and Representation in Thought and Language

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Medical Doctor ◽  
Singular Terms ◽  
Language And Thought ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Demonstrative Pronouns ◽  
Singular Reference ◽  
Key Topics ◽  
Singular Representation

The chapters in this volume deal with our devices for singular reference and singular representation, taking them in different ways. The precise relation between using a linguistic expression to refer to an object and our mental representation of it has always been, and still is, one of the key topics of debate in philosophy of language, linguistics, and the cognitive sciences. Most essays focus specifically on singular terms, that is, linguistic expressions that, at least prima facie, are used to refer to particular objects, persons, places, and so on. They include proper names (“Mary,” “John”), indexicals (“I,” “tomorrow”), demonstrative pronouns (“this,” “that”) and perhaps (some uses of) definite and indefinite descriptions (“the queen of England,” “a medical doctor”), as well as complex demonstratives (“that woman”). Some of the essays do not directly deal with reference but with representation: the ways we represent objects in thought, especially the first-person perspective and a particular object of representation—the self. And there is also an essay that explores a notion common to reference and representation: salience. Salience is a pervasive notion in language and thought, and it is approached here from an intercultural perspective. The volume includes the latest views on these complex topics, expounded by some of the most prominent authors in linguistics and philosophy of language.

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