Puzzles of Coreference

Referring to the World ◽

10.1093/oso/9780195144741.003.0004 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 87-141

Author(s):

Kenneth A. Taylor

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Significance ◽

Singular Reference

This chapter deals with coreference puzzles, long regarded as bedrock data against which the adequacy of any theory of singular reference must ultimately be tested. The chapter argues that two-factor referentialism, introduced in Chapter 2, does the best job of solving them. It considers a number of coreference problems, old ones from Frege; newer ones from Kripke, Saul, Richard, and others; and some entirely new ones. It discusses some relevant syntactic issues and distinguishes intrinsic coreference from coincidental coreference. The view that names are individuated by spelling and pronunciation, such as the theory of “nambiguity” put forward by Perry and Korta, is rejected. It criticizes views that treat names as indexicals, as conflating importantly different instruments of reference. It criticizes the view that names are predicates, as having no reasons in its favor other than a misplaced desire for unity. It then develops the two-factor theory by comparing its treatment of cognitive significance with Frege’s views, and more recent views of Perry, Recanati, Fiengo, and May.

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Indexical Sinn: Fregeanism versus Millianism

Revista de Filosofia Aurora ◽

10.7213/aurora.26.039.ds01 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 26 (39) ◽

pp. 465

Author(s):

João Branquinho

Keyword(s):

Propositional Attitude ◽

Proper Names ◽

Direct Reference ◽

Cognitive Significance ◽

De Re ◽

General Conception ◽

Attitude Reports ◽

Singular Reference ◽

Reference Theory ◽

Careful Assessment

This paper discusses two notational variance views with respect to indexical singular reference and content: the view that certain forms of Millianism are at bottom notational variants of a Fregean theory of reference, the Fregean Notational Variance Claim; and the view that certain forms of Fregeanism are at bottom notational variants of a direct reference theory, the Millian Notational Variance Claim. While the former claim rests on the supposition that a direct reference theory could be easily turned into a particular version of a neo-Fregean one by showing that it is bound to acknowledge certain senselike entities, the latter claim is based upon the supposition that a neo-Fregean theory could be easily turned into a particular version of a Millian one by showing that De Re senses are theoretically superfluous and hence eliminable. The question how many accounts of singular reference and content are we confronted with here — Two different (and mutually antagonistic) theories? Or just two versions of what is in essence the same theory? — is surely of importance to anyone interested in the topic. And this question should be answered by means of a careful assessment of the soundness of each of the above claims. Before trying to adjudicate between the two accounts, one would naturally want to know whether or not there are indeed two substantially disparate accounts. Grosso modo, if the Fregean Claim were sound then we would have a single general conception of singular reference to deal with, viz. Fregeanism; likewise, if the Millian Claim were sound we would be facing a single general conception of singular reference, viz. Millianism. My view is that both the Fregean Notational Variance Claim and its Millian counterpart are wrong, though naturally on different grounds. I have argued elsewhere that the Fregean Notational Variance Claim - considered in its application to the semantics of propositional-attitude reports involving proper names — is unsound. I intend tosupplement in this paper such a result by trying to show that the Millian Claim - taken in its application to the semantics of indexical expressions — should also be rated as incorrect. I focus on a certain set of arguments for the Millian Claim, arguments which I take as adequately representing the general outlook of the Millian theorist with respect to neo-Fregeanism about indexicals and which involve issues about the cognitive significance of sentences containing indexical terms.

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THE ROLE OF METAPHOR IN HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE

Cultural code ◽

10.36945/2658-3852-2020-3-30-37 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 30-37

Author(s):

MARIYA PETROVNA LAPTEVA ◽

Keyword(s):

Semantic Content ◽

Cognitive Significance ◽

Historical Knowledge ◽

Positive Sense

The article continues the author's series of publications on the terminological apparatus of the historian. The problems of humanitarian science cannot have "final solutions". F.R.Ankersmith paid attention to the fact that the attitude to the role of metaphors knows not onli "ups" but also "downs". Exploring aspects of the conceptual arsenal associated with the explicit use of the metaphor. "Implicit use" refers to those semantic situations when a historian or another humanist enters into a kind of dialogue with other sciences, carrying out terminological borrowing. Since the semantic content of the term changes in this case, then, in essence, a metaphorical action takes place that does not require a special name. The article contains, the author's reflection on the circumstances and features of the use of metaphors. The author finds out how and why historiography becomes metaphorical. Referring to specialists who developed the cognitive basis of the theory of metaphor, the author analyzes different traditions of understanding what metaphor is. There is a search for a positive sense of metaphor usage with some ambiguity. Since the metaphor creates a new meaning of the word, its cognitive significance becomes unquestionable. By citing examples of various uses of metaphors in the texts of historians, the author shows how a metaphor helps clarify the uniqueness of historical situations.

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Comments on Professor Hempel's "The Concept of Cognitive Significance"

Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences ◽

10.2307/20023636 ◽

1951 ◽

Vol 80 (1) ◽

pp. 78

Author(s):

Gustav Bergmann

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Significance

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Relative identity, singular reference, and the Incarnation: a response to Le Poidevin

Religious Studies ◽

10.1017/s0034412511000035 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 48 (1) ◽

pp. 61-82 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

CHRISTOPHER HUGHES CONN

Keyword(s):

Formal Logic ◽

Relative Identity ◽

Regress Argument ◽

Van Inwagen ◽

Singular Reference ◽

Direct Theory ◽

The Trinity

AbstractIn this article I object to Le Poidevin's (2009) contention that relative identity is beset with an infinite metaphysical regress. I argue, first, that since Le Poidevin's regress argument presupposes a direct theory of reference, it does not apply to accounts of relative identity which reject this account of reference. I argue, second, that Le Poidevin's regress is not inevitable for one who accepts a direct account of reference, since it does not apply to the formal logic of relative identity which van Inwagen uses to articulate and defend the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation.

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Representation of Solutions of Some Boundary Value Problems of Elasticity by a Sum of the Solutions of Other Boundary Value Problems

Georgian Mathematical Journal ◽

10.1515/gmj.2003.257 ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 10 (2) ◽

pp. 257-270

Author(s):

N. Khomasuridze

Keyword(s):

Boundary Value Problems ◽

Boundary Value ◽

Cognitive Significance ◽

Cylindrical Coordinates ◽

Classical Elasticity ◽

Representation Of Solutions ◽

Elasticity Problems ◽

Lamé Coefficients

Abstract Basic static boundary value problems of elasticity are considered for a semi-infinite curvilinear prism Ω = {ρ 0 < ρ < ρ 1, α 0 < α < α 1, 0 < 𝑧 < ∞} in generalized cylindrical coordinates ρ, α, 𝑧 with Lamé coefficients ℎ ρ = ℎ α = ℎ(ρ, α), ℎ𝑧 = 1. It is proved that the solution of some boundary value problems of elasticity can be reduced to the sum of solutions of other boundary value problems of elasticity. Besides its cognitive significance, this fact also enables one to solve some non-classical elasticity problems.

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Two‐Dimensional Semantics

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.003.0024 ◽

2009 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

David J. Chalmers

Keyword(s):

External World ◽

Two Dimensions ◽

Two Dimensional ◽

Cognitive Significance ◽

Dimensional Approach ◽

Truth Conditions ◽

Semantic Value ◽

Sense And Reference ◽

Semantic Values ◽

Distinctive Role

Two-dimensional approaches to semantics, broadly understood, recognize two ‘dimensions’ of the meaning or content of linguistic items. On these approaches, expressions and their utterances are associated with two different sorts of semantic values, which play different explanatory roles. Typically, one semantic value is associated with reference and ordinary truth-conditions, while the other is associated with the way that reference and truth-conditions depend on the external world. The second sort of semantic value is often held to play a distinctive role in analyzing matters of cognitive significance and/or context-dependence. In this broad sense, even Frege's theory of sense and reference might qualify as a sort of two-dimensional approach.

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