Relative identity, singular reference, and the Incarnation: a response to Le Poidevin

2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER HUGHES CONN
Keyword(s):  
Formal Logic ◽  
Relative Identity ◽  
Regress Argument ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Singular Reference ◽  
Direct Theory ◽  
The Trinity

AbstractIn this article I object to Le Poidevin's (2009) contention that relative identity is beset with an infinite metaphysical regress. I argue, first, that since Le Poidevin's regress argument presupposes a direct theory of reference, it does not apply to accounts of relative identity which reject this account of reference. I argue, second, that Le Poidevin's regress is not inevitable for one who accepts a direct account of reference, since it does not apply to the formal logic of relative identity which van Inwagen uses to articulate and defend the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation.

scholarly journals Identical Legal Entities and the Trinity: Relative-Social Trinitarianism

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 128-146
Author(s):  
James Goetz
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Identity ◽  
Relative Identity ◽  
Social Trinitarianism ◽  
The Trinity ◽  
Legal Entities

Goetz outlined legal models of identical entities that include natural persons who are identical to a coregency and natural persons who are identical to a general partnership. Those entities cohere with the formula logic of relative identity. This essay outlines the coexistence of relative identity and numerical identity in the models of identical legal entities, which is an account of impure relative identity. These models support the synthesis of Relative Trinitarianism and Social Trinitarianism, which I call Relative-Social Trinitarianism.

scholarly journals La coherencia de la doctrina trinitaria desde la noción de función de Gottlob Frege

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vicente Vide-Rodríguez
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Theology ◽  
Gottlob Frege ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Peter Van Inwagen ◽  
The Social ◽  
Triune God ◽  
The One ◽  
Social Trinitarianism ◽  
Critical Overview ◽  
The Trinity

En este artículo se pretende mostrar la coherencia de los enunciados sobre el Dios uno y trino en la teología analítica, a partir de su formulación en el llamado credo atanasiano. Se ofrece un panorama crítico sobre la discusión acerca de la inteligibilidad del misterio de la Trinidad en la teología filosófica analítica reciente, así como las diversas soluciones en algunos de sus más destacados representantes: la del trinitarianismo social (William Hasker), la del trinitarianismo latino (Brian Leftow) y la identidad relativa aplicada a la teoría trinitaria (Peter van Inwagen). Para superar las dificultades que tienen estas posiciones, derivadas, sobre todo, de su problemática noción de persona, se presenta una contribución a esta discusión con un novedoso análisis de la Trinidad, basado en la noción de función de Gottlob Frege. Con este análisis se explica por qué no hay contradicción entre los enunciados trinitarios, y así se justifica la consistencia y, en consecuencia, la coherencia de la doctrina trinitaria. Abstract: This article aims to show the coherence of the statements about the one and triune God in analytic theology, starting from their formulation in the so-called Athanasian Creed. It offers a critical overview of the discussion about the intelligibility of the mystery of the Trinity in recent analytic philosophical theology, as well as the various solutions in some of its most prominent representatives: the social trinitarianism (William Hasker), the Latin trinitarianism (Brian Leftow) and the relative identity applied to trinitarian theory (Peter van Inwagen). In order to overcome the difficulties with these positions, derived, above all, from their problematic notion of personhood, a contribution to this discussion is presented with a novel analysis of the Trinity, based on Gottlob Frege's notion of function. This analysis explains why there is no contradiction between trinitarian statements, and thus justifies the consistency and, consequently, the coherence of trinitarian doctrine.  

scholarly journals The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Logic of Relative Identity

1989 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Cain
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Relative Identity ◽  
Doctrine Of The Trinity ◽  
The Trinity ◽  
Father And Son

The doctrine of the Trinity says that there is just one God and three distinct divine persons, each of whom is God. This would seem to imply that there are three divine persons, each a different person the other persons but the same God as the other persons. If we accept what I believe is the most popular account of identity current among logicians then we must hold that this apparent consequence is contradictory. We see this as follows (it will suffice to consider just the relation of Father and Son): logicians generally treat relativized identity expressions of the form ‘is the same A as’ (here ‘A’ stands in for a term which relativizes the identity) as being analysable in terms of absolute (or unrelativized) identity according to the following equivalence schema, (E):(E) a is the same A as b if and only if a is identical to b and a is an A and b is an A.The view under consideration affirms the following three sentences:(1) The Father and the Son are persons.(2) The Father is not the same person as the Son.(3) The Father is the same God as the Son.

Relative Identity and the Doctrine of the Trinity

2020 ◽  
pp. 185-200
Author(s):  
Michael C. Rea
Keyword(s):  
Holy Spirit ◽  
Philosophical Problem ◽  
The Other ◽  
Relative Identity ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Doctrine Of The Trinity ◽  
The One ◽  
The Trinity

The doctrine of the Trinity maintains that there are exactly three divine Persons (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) but only one God. The philosophical problem raised by this doctrine is well known. On the one hand, the doctrine seems clearly to imply that the divine Persons are numerically distinct. How else could they be ‘three’ rather than one? On the other hand, it seems to imply that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are identical. If each Person is divine, how else could there be exactly ‘one’ God? But the divine Persons can’t be both distinct and identical. Thus, the doctrine appears to be incoherent. Some try to solve this problem by appeal to the view that identity is sortal-relative. This chapter argues that this strategy is unsuccessful as a stand-alone solution to the problem of the Trinity.

Relative Identity and the Doctrine of the Trinity

2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 431-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael C. Rea ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Relative Identity ◽  
Doctrine Of The Trinity ◽  
The Trinity

Trinity, generality, and dominance

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 435-449
Author(s):  
H. E. BABER
Keyword(s):  
Holy Spirit ◽  
Relative Identity ◽  
Doctrine Of The Trinity ◽  
Absolute Identity ◽  
The Trinity

AbstractI defend a relative identity solution to the identity puzzle posed by the doctrine of the Trinity. It has been argued that relative identity theories which admit absolute identity, such as the account proposed here, do not succeed in saving the doctrine of the Trinity from logical incoherence. I show that this argument fails. Relative identity theories that admit absolute identity are logically conservative, metaphysically innocent, and unproblematic. And, given the account I propose we can, without incurring any logical or metaphysical costs, hold that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are the same being but not the same trinitarian person.

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