A Poly-log Competitive Posted-Price Algorithm for Online Metrical Matching on a Spider

2021 ◽  
pp. 67-84
Author(s):  
Max Bender ◽  
Jacob Gilbert ◽  
Kirk Pruhs
Keyword(s):  
2013 ◽  
Vol 44 ◽  
pp. 61-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramon Lopes ◽  
Vitor A.A. Souza ◽  
Alexandre Salles da Cunha

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 345-371
Author(s):  
Frédéric Koessler ◽  
Vasiliki Skreta

We study the informed‐principal problem in a bilateral asymmetric information trading setting with interdependent values and quasi‐linear utilities. The informed seller proposes a mechanism and voluntarily certifies information about the good's characteristics. When the set of certifiable statements is sufficiently rich, we show that there is an ex ante profit‐maximizing selling procedure that is an equilibrium of the mechanism proposal game. In contrast to posted price settings, the allocation obtained when product characteristics are commonly known (the unravelling outcome) may not be an equilibrium allocation, even when all buyer types agree on the ranking of product quality. Our analysis relies on the concept of strong Pareto optimal allocation, which was originally introduced by Maskin and Tirole (1990) in private value environments.


2015 ◽  
Vol 90 ◽  
pp. 81-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sajid Anwar ◽  
Mingli Zheng
Keyword(s):  

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