Islamic Market Mechanism According to Abu Yusuf and His Willingness to The Panorama Market Mechanism of Bengkulu City

The Islamic Market Mechanism According to Abu Yusuf and its Relevance to the Panorama Market in Bengkulu City, the research method used in this study is library research, the research approach, and data collection techniques used are qualitative data (qualitative research) and documentation. The analysis technique used is inductive deductive, and descriptive. Based on the specific fission and style that applies to the character, the inductive method is better understood than general conclusions are drawn. The deductive method is collecting, analyzing, and researching general data to draw specific conclusions. The descriptive method is the regular description of all conceptions of the characters regarding the topic or research discussion. From the results of this study, it was found that the market and price mechanism according to Abu Yusuf is a practice that provides general problems (al-mashlahah al'-ammah), both from the producer (seller) and the buyer, while the relevance of the Islamic Market mechanism at the Panorama Market in Bengkulu City irrelevant and can not be fully implemented as the Islamic market mechanism according to the thought of Abu Yusuf.

Piguvianism vs. Coasianism: Who Wins?

The main characteristics of approaches to the discussion of the sufficiency of grounds for the introduction / cancellation of state regulation due to the identification of failures in the price mechanism are revealed. The comparison of approaches is presented on the basis of the problem of externalities. In this regard, the provisions from the theory of externalities have been clarified in terms of their definition and correlation with the conditions for optimal allocation of resources, and certain types of external effects are presented. The key types of correction of price mechanism failures are considered, including regulatory intervention, setting up the price mechanism (including the creation of missing markets), maintaining the status quo with externalities. On this basis, the main properties of the Pigouvian and Coasian approaches in economics are determined in relation to the problems of this form of market failure. The features of Coasianism as a functionalist approach to research in contrast to fundamental liberalism are revealed. Taking into account the importance of values, the opportunities for designing of compensatory transactions and the supply and demand of economic knowledge, assessments of the prospects of functionalism and fundamentalisms are presented as a guide to action in the field of discussion and political decision-making. The comparative advantages of functionalism and fundamentalisms in the intellectual traditions of discussing the role of the state in the economy are shown.

INDIA GAS EXCHANGE TODAY’S REALITY AND PATH AHEAD

This research aims to study structure, functioning and operational mechanism of India’s first gas exchange i.e. Indian Gas Exchange (IGX) which is a subsidiary of Indian Energy Exchange (IEX). Exploratory research is used to study and investigate conceptual framework and operational mechanism of IGX. The results of the study show that IEX has unveiled the nation’s first automated natural gas exchange trading platform called IGX for well organized and hefty Gas market and to stimulate gas trading in the country. IGX would lead India towards Gas Based Economy by designing and providing robust solution for natural gas trading and access. So far as price mechanism at IGX is concerned, it is dynamic and market driven which is based on Double-sided closed auction with uniform price mechanism. IGX plays an extremely important and fundamental role towards capitalizing a free market for gas. Clearing and Settlement system at IGX is structured and transparent. As IGX is purely electronic trading platform for natural gas which is considered as barometer of the India’s progressive policy as it integrates the entire energy value chain from gas production.

Institutions, ideas and economic change: some reflections on Geoffrey Hodgson's ‘Culture and Institutions’

Professor Hodgson in his review of my A Culture of Growth (Princeton University Press, 2016) raises a number of important issues. One of them is the usefulness of the concept of a ‘market for ideas’ as an analytical tool in discussing the way cultural change affects economic change. Even though there is no price mechanism that clears the market, many basic components of the economic analysis of markets carry through and enriched by evolutionary concepts. A second question is the importance of cultural entrepreneurs, who play an important role in my book. It should be stressed that such ‘Vital Few’ were rarely indispensable, yet their influence on subsequent events may have imparted a direction on events and accelerated them. In any event, the success of such entrepreneurs was an indication of an intellectual environment sufficiently open to new ideas to be consistent with major new ideas such as the possibility and desirability of sustained economic progress.

Bidding behavior in auctions versus posted prices: comparisons of mean and marginal effects

Economic experiments have been widely used to elicit individuals' evaluation for various commodities. Common elicitation methods include auction and posted price mechanisms. A field experiment is designed to compare willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates between these two mechanisms. Despite both of these formats being theoretically incentive compatible and demand revealing, results from 115 adult consumers indicate that WTP estimates obtained from an auction are 32–39 percent smaller than those from a posted price mechanism. A comparison in statistical significance shows that auctions require a smaller sample size than posted price mechanisms in order to detect the same preference change. Nevertheless, the signs of marginal effects for different product characteristics are consistent in both mechanisms.

Penalty Electricity Price-Based Optimal Control for Distribution Networks

With the integration of large-scale renewable energy and the implementation of demand response, the complexity and volatility of distribution network operations are increasing. This has led to the inconsistency between the actual net power consumption of power users and their optimal dispatching orders. As a result, the distribution networks cannot operate according to their optimization strategy. The study proposed a penalty electricity price mechanism and the optimal control method based on this electricity price mechanism for distribution networks. First, we established the structure of the distribution network optimal control system. Second, aiming at the actual net power consumption (including power generation and consumption) of power users tracking their dispatching orders, we established a penalty electricity price mechanism. Third, we designed an optimal control strategy and process of distribution networks based on the penalty electricity price. Finally, we verified the proposed method by taking the IEEE-33 node system as an example. The verification results showed that the penalty electricity price could effectively limit the net power consumption fluctuations of power users to achieve optimal control of distribution networks.

Posted Price Mechanisms and Optimal Threshold Strategies for Random Arrivals

The classic prophet inequality states that, when faced with a finite sequence of nonnegative independent random variables, a gambler who knows the distribution and is allowed to stop the sequence at any time, can obtain, in expectation, at least half as much reward as a prophet who knows the values of each random variable and can choose the largest one. In this work, we consider the situation in which the sequence comes in random order. We look at both a nonadaptive and an adaptive version of the problem. In the former case, the gambler sets a threshold for every random variable a priori, whereas, in the latter case, the thresholds are set when a random variable arrives. For the nonadaptive case, we obtain an algorithm achieving an expected reward within at least a 0.632 fraction of the expected maximum and prove that this constant is optimal. For the adaptive case with independent and identically distributed random variables, we obtain a tight 0.745-approximation, solving a problem posed by Hill and Kertz in 1982. We also apply these prophet inequalities to posted price mechanisms, and we prove the same tight bounds for both a nonadaptive and an adaptive posted price mechanism when buyers arrive in random order.