Supply Chain Coordination in Case of Asymmetric Information: Information Sharing and Contracting in a Just-in-Time Environment

2013 ◽  
pp. 27-31
Author(s):  
Guido Voigt
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Just In Time

scholarly journals Information Asymmetry in Supply Chain Coordination: State of the Art

2020 ◽  
pp. 38-43
Author(s):  
Mohammadali Vosooghidizaji ◽  
◽  
Atour Taghipour ◽  
Béatrice Canel-Depitre
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Literature Review ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
State Of The Art ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Coordination State ◽  
Strategic Information ◽  
Comprehensive Literature Review

Supply chains consist of several actors from supplier, manufacturer, distributer, wholesaler and retailers connected to each other by financial, material and informational flows. Optimal performance of supply chains requires set of actions that coordinate the members’ decisions [1], [2]. In many cases, members are trying to optimize their own objectives which can lead to asymmetric information by keeping some strategic information private. Although, this information asymmetry is a challenge affecting the coordination of supply chain, but it is achievable if proper set of coordinating mechanism executed. This paper presents a comprehensive literature review of supply chain coordination under asymmetric information and tries to analyze the trend in the context and address the evolution and gaps in existing literature.

scholarly journals Emergency Coordination Model of Fresh Agricultural Products’ Three-Level Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Yang ◽  
Haorui Liu ◽  
Xuedou Yu ◽  
Fenghua Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Nonlinear Function ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
Coordination Model ◽  
Emergency Events

In consideration of influence of loss, freshness, and secret retailer cost of products, how to handle emergency events during three-level supply chain is researched when market need is presumed to be a nonlinear function with retail price in fresh agricultural product market. Centralized and decentralized supply chain coordination models are studied based on asymmetric information. Optimal strategy of supply chain in dealing with retail price perturbation is caused by emergency events. The research reveals robustness for optimal production planning, wholesale price for distributors, wholesale price for retailers, and retail price of three-level supply chain about fresh agricultural products. The above four factors can keep constant within a certain perturbation of expectation costs for retailers because of emergency events; the conclusions are verified by numerical simulation. This paper also can be used for reference to the other related studies in how to coordinate the supply chain under asymmetric and punctual researches information response to disruptions.

COORDINATION OF A BUYER-VENDOR SUPPLY CHAIN FOR A PERISHABLE PRODUCT UNDER SYMMETRIC AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

2011 ◽  
Vol 28 (05) ◽  
pp. 673-688 ◽  
Author(s):  
QIN-HONG ZHANG ◽  
JIAN-WEN LUO
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Quantity Discount ◽  
Perishable Product ◽  
Symmetric Information ◽  
Holding Cost ◽  
Optimal Quantity ◽  
Dependent Demand

We consider a two-level supply chain for a perishable product with stock dependent demand, and study the supply chain coordination issues with quantity discount contract under both symmetric and asymmetric information. We design an optimal quantity discount contract for the vendor, and show that the quantity discount contract can coordinate the supply chain under symmetric information. However, the vendor is not able to realize supply chain coordination with only quantity discount contract if the buyer's holding cost is private information since the buyer may keep this information private for bargaining a higher price discount. Nevertheless, quantity discount contract is still beneficial to the vendor as compared to the case without quantity discount. Numerical experiments are conducted to demonstrate the theoretical results.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document