Issues in Fuzzy Multi-dimensional Public Choice Models

Author(s):  
Peter C. Casey ◽  
Michael B. Gibilisco ◽  
Carly A. Goodman ◽  
Kelly Nelson Pook ◽  
John N. Mordeson ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

The two volume Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the Public Choice literature. Volume 1 covers rational choice models of elections, interest groups, rent seeking, and public choice contributions to normative political economy. It begins with introductory chapters on rational choice politics, the founding of public choice, and the evaluation and selection of constitutions. The chapters were all written for this handbook by scholars who are well known for their contributions to research in the areas discussed.


Author(s):  
Daniel A. Farber

This article asks what public choice can teach about legal institutions and their governing framework of public law. It begins with an overview and assessment of two important components of public choice: social choice theory (stemming from Arrow's Theorem) and interest group theory. It then considers the use of public choice models to explain the behaviour of legislatures, agencies, and courts. The core public choice insight is that institutional structures are responses to fundamental problems relating to collective action. However, the normative use of specific public choice models should be undertaken with caution. The models are likely to be most useful when they are informed by deep familiarity with specific institutional contexts; reforms are context-specific; and proposed changes are at the margin rather than involving major structural changes.


Author(s):  
Peter C. Casey ◽  
Michael B. Gibilisco ◽  
Carly A. Goodman ◽  
Kelly Nelson Pook ◽  
John N. Mordeson ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Peter C. Casey ◽  
Michael B. Gibilisco ◽  
Carly A. Goodman ◽  
Kelly Nelson Pook ◽  
John N. Mordeson ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

Daedalus ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 148 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leanne S. Son Hing ◽  
Anne E. Wilson ◽  
Peter Gourevitch ◽  
Jaslyn English ◽  
Parco Sin

Why is there not more public outcry in the face of rising income inequality? Although public choice models predict that rising inequality will spur public demand for redistribution, evidence often fails to support this view. We explain this lack of outcry by considering social-psychological processes contextualized within the spatial, institutional, and political context that combine to dampen dissent. We contend that rising inequality can activate the very psychological processes that stifle outcry, causing people to be blind to the true extent of inequality, to legitimize rising disparities, and to reject redistribution as an effective solution. As a result, these psychological processes reproduce and exacerbate inequality and legitimize the institutions that produce it. Finally, we explore ways to disrupt the processes perpetuating this cycle.


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