Congestion Externalities

2014 ◽  
pp. 35-72
Author(s):  
Günter Knieps
Keyword(s):  
Congestion Externalities

Subdivision Exactions and Congestion Externalities

1976 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard P. Adelstein ◽  
Noel M. Edelson
Keyword(s):  
Congestion Externalities

scholarly journals Henry George and Mohring–Harwitz Theorems: Lessons for Financing Smart Cities in Developing Countries*

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alok Kumar Mishra
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Smart City ◽  
Urban Economics ◽  
Smart Cities ◽  
Urban Infrastructure ◽  
Henry George ◽  
Transport Economics ◽  
Financing Infrastructure ◽  
Congestion Externalities

Developing countries are embarking on ‘smart city’ programmes to rejuvenate their cities as engines of economic growth, applying smart solutions and managerial innovations. However, they ignore the powerful externalities of cities and are far from adopting ‘smart’ ways of financing urban infrastructure and services based on known theories and international practices. This article combines the Henry George Theorem (HGT) from Urban Economics and Mohring–Harwitz Theorem (MHT) from Transport Economics to suggest a robust strategy of financing infrastructure in cities. While the HGT emphasizes the taxation of urban land value, the MHT advocates the pricing of congestion externalities. The article suggests that if ‘beneficiaries pay’ and ‘congesters pay’ principles are combined, cities in developing countries like India can generate adequate revenues to service long-tenor debt incurred for core infrastructure facilities. It presents a toolbox of instruments to finance urban infrastructure.

scholarly journals Pigouvian Tolls and Welfare Optimality with Parallel Servers and Heterogeneous Customers

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tejas Bodas ◽  
Ayalvadi Ganesh ◽  
D. Manjunath
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Communication Networks ◽  
User Equilibrium ◽  
Heterogeneous Servers ◽  
Pigouvian Tax ◽  
User Charge ◽  
Parallel Servers ◽  
Finite Set ◽  
Increasing Function ◽  
Congestion Externalities

AbstractCongestion externalities are a well-known phenomenon in transportation and communication networks, healthcare etc. Optimization by self-interested agents in such settings typically results in equilibria which are sub-optimal for social welfare. Pigouvian taxes or tolls, which impose a user charge equal to the negative externality caused by the marginal user to other users, are a mechanism for combating this problem. In this paper, we study a non-atomic congestion game in which heterogeneous agents choose amongst a finite set of heterogeneous servers. The delay at a server is an increasing function of its load. Agents differ in their sensitivity to delay. We show that, while selfish optimisation by agents is sub-optimal for social welfare, imposing admission charges at the servers equal to the Pigouvian tax causes the user equilibrium to maximize social welfare. In addition, we characterize the structure of welfare optimal and of equilibrium allocations.

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