Epistemic Pluralism, Epistemic Relativism and ‘Hinge’ Epistemology

2017 ◽  
pp. 229-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Adam Carter
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Relativism ◽  
Hinge Epistemology ◽  
Epistemic Pluralism

Replies to Commentators

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 281-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annalisa Coliva
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Justification ◽  
Epistemic Relativism ◽  
Hinge Epistemology

The paper contains the replies to the comments made by Alan Millar, Yuval Avnur, Giorgio Volpe, and Maria Baghramian on my Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology. It addresses, in particular, the nature of perceptual justification, the truth of hinges, my response to Humean skepticism and the issue of epistemic relativism.

Précis of Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 217-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annalisa Coliva
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Justification ◽  
Epistemic Relativism ◽  
Closure Principle ◽  
Hinge Epistemology ◽  
Constitutive Response

The paper presents the key themes of my Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology. It focuses, in particular, on the moderate account of perceptual justification, the constitutive response put forward against Humean skepticism, epistemic relativism, the closure principle, the transmission of warrant principle, as well as on the applications of the extended rationality view to the case of the principle of the uniformity of nature, testimony, and the justification of basic laws of inference.

scholarly journals Contrastive Hinge Epistemology

Theoria ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giorgio Volpe
Keyword(s):  
Hinge Epistemology

True Knowledge

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-461
Author(s):  
Peter Baumann ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Long Time ◽  
The One ◽  
True Knowledge ◽  
Epistemic Pluralism

That knowledge is factive, that is, that knowledge that p requires that p, has for a long time typically been treated as a truism. Recently, however, some authors have raised doubts about and arguments against this claim. In a recent paper in this journal, Michael Shaffer presents new arguments against the denial of the factivity of knowledge. This article discusses one of Shaffer’s objections: the one from “inconsistency and explosion.” I discuss two potential replies to Shaffer’s problem: dialetheism plus paraconsistency and epistemic pluralism. This is not to be understood so much as a criticism of Shaffer’s view but rather as a request to develop his very promising objection from inconsistency and explosion further.

Pure Epistemic Pluralism

2017 ◽  
pp. 47-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Pluralism

scholarly journals Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology

Synthese ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 197 (11) ◽  
pp. 4975-5007
Author(s):  
Chris Ranalli
Keyword(s):  
World Views ◽  
Epistemic Relation ◽  
Entitlement Theory ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
Hinge Epistemology ◽  
Epistemic Theory ◽  
Deep Disagreements ◽  
Rational Evaluation

Abstract This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general ‘presuppositions’ of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreements over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about deep disagreement, the thesis that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, and ask whether the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement—according to which such disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments—provides adequate support for pessimism. I argue that the answer to this question depends on what hinge commitments are and what our epistemic relation to them is supposed to be. I argue for two core claims. First, that non-epistemic theories of hinge commitments provide adequate support for pessimism. Nevertheless, such theories have highly implausible consequences in the context of deep disagreement. Secondly, at least one epistemic theory of hinge commitments, the entitlement theory, permits optimism about such disagreements. As such, while hinge epistemology is mainly pessimistic about deep disagreement, it doesn’t have to be.

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