Hinges, Deep Disagreement and Fixed Points in the Argumentation Logic

In his treatise ‘On Certainty’ (1969) L. Wittgenstein compared the propositions ex- pressing basic principles to the hinges enabling both doubting and justifying knowledge. In 1985 Robert Fogelin proposed the conception of deep disagreement in argumentation analysis and in his description of it he referred to the hinges. We continue Wittgenstein’s hinges metaphor and compare pulling and pushing the door of knowledge to adopting contrary standings about principal issues, which can result in the deep disagreements. We suggest looking at the hinges enabling those door moves as at the fixed points in the extension semantic of the argumen- tation logic. Interpreting the hinges as the fixed points allows viewing rejected arguments as isolated deadlocks of the deep disagreements, or anti-extensions, and opens a possibility for a compromise on the basis of certain extensions. В трактате «О достоверности» (1969) Л. Витгенштейн сравнил предложения, выражающие ключевые принципы знаний людей, с дверными петлями, без которых невозможно ни обосновывать знание, ни сомневаться в нём. В 1985 году Роберт Фогелин предложил понятие глубокого несогласия для анализа аргументации и, описывая его свойства, сослался на дверные петли Витгенштейна. Если продолжить метафору дверных петель Витгенштейна, то, если дверь познания толкают или тянут, это ведет к глубоким разногласиям по принципиальным вопросам. В русле этого мы предлагаем посмотреть на дверные петли как на неподвижные точки в семантике расширения логики аргументации. Это позволяет рассматривать отклоненные аргументы как изолированные тупики глубоких разногласий и открывает возможность для компромисса на основе определённых расширений.

Analytical categories to describe deficit attributions in deep disagreements between citizens and experts

Disagreements often arise from citizen–expert collaboration, as both agents share a different epistemic worldview. Fogelin, following Wittgenstein, proposed that some disagreements (i.e. deep disagreements) cannot be rationally solved when participants share different forms of life. Citizen–expert is an exemplar of this sort of disagreement. Moreover, deep disagreements are often followed by deficit attributions from one of the agents to the other, regarding their epistemic understanding, credibility, and motives. Articulating the notions of deep disagreements and deficit attributions, as well as reviewing the complementary concept of epistemic injustice, we have constructed analytical categories that allow us to understand two things: (1) how deficit attributions operate in dialogical contexts of deep disagreements and (2) what types of deficit attributions we can find. We expect that this characterization can serve to analyze citizen–expert dialogues and the pursuit of more modest and inclusive forms of conversation.

Deep Disagreements and Political Polarization

In deep disagreements, parties disagree about relatively fundamental underlying moral or epistemic principles and therefore see each other as less than fully rational or morally subpar. The chapter argues that deep disagreements lead to both cognitive and practical polarization, especially when they concern matters that are central to people’s social identities: deeply disagreeing parties will think less of each other and tend to treat each other worse. This, in turn, entrenches their disagreement even further, resulting in a vicious feedback loop. Support for the claims made here comes from both conceptual connections between deep disagreement and polarization as well as widely established empirical results in psychology and political science.

Lectures on Religious Belief and the epistemology of disagreements

The influence of Wittgenstein’s work in the study of deep disagreements has been dominated by On Certainty. Since the metaphor of ‘hinges’ plays a central role in the scholarship of On Certainty, a Wittgensteinian theory of deep disagreements is assumed to be based on hinge epistemology. This means that a disagreement would be deep because it concerns parties with conflicting hinges. When we shift our attention to a different part of Wittgenstein’s oeuvre, however, another picture of deep disagreements emerges. This article proposes a new Wittgensteinian approach to disagreements through the analysis of the Lectures on Religious Belief. Some of the disagreements that Wittgenstein and his pupils discuss in these lectures are deep, but not because they are grounded in different hinges, but because they are disagreements about pictures. This article is an extension of a paper presented at the 41st International Wittgenstein Symposium. It was published in the proceedings of the symposium with the title: “Pictures in Wittgenstein’s Treatment of Disagreements in the so-called Lectures on Religious Belief” (Lavorerio, 2018b). I would like to thank the audience at that presentation for their comments, as well as Dejan Makovec, Martin Kusch and an anonymous reviewer for their comments on previous drafts of this paper.

Resolution of Deep Disagreement: Not Simply Consensus

Robert Fogelin has argued that in deep disagreements, resolution cannot be achieved by rational argumentation. In response, Richard Feldman has claimed that deep disagreements can be resolved in a similar way to more everyday disagreements. I argue that Feldman’s claim is based on a relatively superficial notion of “resolution” of a disagreement whereas the notion at stake in Fogelin’s argument is more substantive. Furthermore, I argue that Feldman’s reply is based on a particular reading of Fogelin’s argument. There is an alternative reading, which takes the central concern to be the role of common ground in argumentation. Engaging with this version of Fogelin’s argument is also a worthwhile endeavour.

Deep Disagreement, Hinge Commitments, and Intellectual Humility

Why is it that some instances of disagreement appear to be so intractable? And what is the appropriate way to handle such disagreements, especially concerning matters about which there are important practical and political needs for us to come to a consensus? In this paper, I consider an explanation of the apparent intractability of deep disagreement offered by hinge epistemology. According to this explanation, at least some deep disagreements are rationally unresolvable because they concern ‘hinge’ commitments that are unresponsive to rational considerations. This explanation, if correct, seems to have troubling implications for how we should respond to deep disagreement. If my position on a topic is not responsive to rational considerations, then what choice have I but to dogmatically hold to that position, and simply dismiss the views of those with whom I disagree? I address this problem by identifying an attitude of intellectual humility that is appropriate to have towards one's hinge commitments, and suggest that this attitude provides the basis for a non-rational, constructive way to resolve deep disagreement.

Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Foundations of Free Speech and Toleration

What do Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd v Colorado Civil Rights Commission, other leading cases from the USA, Canada, and the UK, and Teresa Bejan’s concept of ‘mere civility’, teach us about free speech and toleration? This article seeks to answer that question and suggest a path forward that allows people with deep disagreements about fundamental social and moral issues to live peaceably together despite their differences. This article defends two primary claims: First, ‘mere civility’ is complimentary to a broader legal argument for protecting the freedom of all members of a society to espouse and live out their views within the context of the public square and marketplace; and Second, compelling speech (or agreement) under the guise of civility endangers liberty and genuine equality. When freedom is properly protected, ‘mere civility’ is the natural result, while attempts to achieve something more than ‘mere civility’ invariably jeopardize freedom.