Epistemic pluralism and the justification of conceptual strategies in science

In recent years, epistemic pluralism has received considerable endorsement as an approach to constructing scientific explanations and pursuing empirical research programs. In this article, we briefly discuss the advantages of an epistemically pluralist approach before outlining our own model of epistemic pluralism. The model we present emphasizes the specific considerations that occur when determining and justifying the selection of conceptual strategies and how conceptual strategies work together to provide task-relevant insights. By clarifying these constraint relationships, we highlight the kinds of systematic considerations that must be taken into account when selecting conceptual strategies for research tasks. We present a case study based on gang research to demonstrate how such considerations occur and the epistemic and pragmatic benefits of doing so.

‘Decolonising the Medical Curriculum‘: Humanising medicine through epistemic pluralism, cultural safety and critical consciousness

The Decolonising the Curriculum movement in higher education has been steadily gaining momentum, accelerated by recent global events calling for an appraisal of the intersecting barriers of discrimination that ethnic minorities can encounter. While the arts and humanities have been at the forefront of these efforts, medical education has been a ‘late starter’ to the initiative. In this article, we describe the pioneering efforts to decolonise the undergraduate medical curriculum at UCL Medical School (UCLMS), London, by a group of clinician educators and students, with the aim of training emerging doctors to treat diverse patient populations equitably and effectively. Throughout this process, students, faculty and members of the public acted as collaborative ‘agents of change’ in co-producing curricula, prompting the implementation of several changes in the UCLMS curriculum and rubric. Reflecting a shift from a diversity-oriented to a decolonial framework, we outline three scaffolding concepts to frame the process of decolonising the medical curriculum: epistemic pluralism, cultural safety and critical consciousness. While each of these reflect a critical area of power imbalance within medical education, the utility of this framework extends beyond this, and it may be applied to interrogate curricula in other health-related disciplines and the natural sciences. We suggest how the medical curriculum can privilege perspectives from different disciplines to challenge the hegemony of the biomedical outlook in contemporary medicine – and offer space to perspectives traditionally marginalised within a colonial framework. We anticipate that through this process of re-centring, medical students will begin to think more holistically, critically and reflexively about the intersectional inequalities within clinical settings, health systems and society at large, and contribute to humanising the practice of medicine for all parties involved.

True Knowledge

That knowledge is factive, that is, that knowledge that p requires that p, has for a long time typically been treated as a truism. Recently, however, some authors have raised doubts about and arguments against this claim. In a recent paper in this journal, Michael Shaffer presents new arguments against the denial of the factivity of knowledge. This article discusses one of Shaffer’s objections: the one from “inconsistency and explosion.” I discuss two potential replies to Shaffer’s problem: dialetheism plus paraconsistency and epistemic pluralism. This is not to be understood so much as a criticism of Shaffer’s view but rather as a request to develop his very promising objection from inconsistency and explosion further.

The COVID-19 pandemic: a case for epistemic pluralism in public health policy

This paper uses the example of the COVID-19 pandemic to analyse the danger associated with insufficient epistemic pluralism in evidence-based public health policy. Drawing on certain elements in Paul Feyerabend’s political philosophy of science, it discusses reasons for implementing more pluralism as well as challenges to be tackled on the way forward.

Perception and Conflict in Conservation: The Rashomon Effect

Conflict is a common feature in conservation and resource management. Environmental conflicts are frequently attributed to differences in values; however, variability in the perception of facts, rooted in social and cultural differences also underlies conflicts. Such differences in perception have been termed the Rashomon effect after the Kurosawa film. In the present article, we explore a conservation Rashomon effect—a phenomenon that results from a combination of differences in perspective, plausible alternative perspectives of a conservation issue, and the absence of evidence to elevate one perspective above others. As a remedy to the Rashomon effect, policy-makers have turned to scientists as honest brokers who share a common environmental reality. We evaluate this supposition and suggest that scientists, themselves, display Rashomon effects. We suggest that Rashomon effects can be reduced by acknowledging the plurality of reality, embracing epistemic pluralism, and prioritizing an inclusive process of resource management.

Race, Empire, and Epistemic Exclusion: Or the Structures of Sociological Thought

This essay analyzes racialized exclusions in sociology through a focus on sociology’s deep epistemic structures. These structures dictate what counts as social scientific knowledge and who can produce it. A historical analysis of their emergence and persistence reveals their connections to empire. Due to sociology’s initial emergence within the culture of American imperialism, early sociological thought embedded the culture of empire’s exclusionary logics. Sociology’s epistemic structures were inextricably racialized, contributing to exclusionary modes of thought and practice along the lines of race, ethnicity, and social geography that persist into the present. Overcoming this racialized inequality requires problematizing and unsettling these epistemic structures by (1) provincializing the canon to create a transformative epistemic pluralism and (2) reconsidering common conceptions of what counts as “theory” in the first place.

Pluralism as an antidote to epistemic violence in psychological research

The debate on objectivist versus relativist epistemologies in psychology and their relation to “othering” should consider a third stance that espouses epistemic pluralism. In order to understand the human experience, we must simultaneously explore the universal–humanistic, cultural, and idiographic aspects of the individual. Each of these aspects entails a different epistemic stance (objective, intersubjective, and subjective) and each assigns different meanings to “othering.” In addition, a pragmatic epistemology that posits “progressivism” as its sole agenda risks the epistemic violence of discounting other sets of values and moral foundations that matter to many (often othered) people. Additional steps are needed in order to truly diversify psychological study.