Why Epistemic Pluralism Does not Entail Relativism: Collingwood’s Hinge Epistemology

Author(s):  
Giuseppina D’Oro
Theoria ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giorgio Volpe
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-461
Author(s):  
Peter Baumann ◽  

That knowledge is factive, that is, that knowledge that p requires that p, has for a long time typically been treated as a truism. Recently, however, some authors have raised doubts about and arguments against this claim. In a recent paper in this journal, Michael Shaffer presents new arguments against the denial of the factivity of knowledge. This article discusses one of Shaffer’s objections: the one from “inconsistency and explosion.” I discuss two potential replies to Shaffer’s problem: dialetheism plus paraconsistency and epistemic pluralism. This is not to be understood so much as a criticism of Shaffer’s view but rather as a request to develop his very promising objection from inconsistency and explosion further.


2017 ◽  
pp. 47-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen
Keyword(s):  

Synthese ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 197 (11) ◽  
pp. 4975-5007
Author(s):  
Chris Ranalli

Abstract This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general ‘presuppositions’ of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreements over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about deep disagreement, the thesis that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, and ask whether the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement—according to which such disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments—provides adequate support for pessimism. I argue that the answer to this question depends on what hinge commitments are and what our epistemic relation to them is supposed to be. I argue for two core claims. First, that non-epistemic theories of hinge commitments provide adequate support for pessimism. Nevertheless, such theories have highly implausible consequences in the context of deep disagreement. Secondly, at least one epistemic theory of hinge commitments, the entitlement theory, permits optimism about such disagreements. As such, while hinge epistemology is mainly pessimistic about deep disagreement, it doesn’t have to be.


2021 ◽  
pp. 095935432110638
Author(s):  
Daniel Wegerhoff ◽  
Tony Ward ◽  
Louise Dixon

In recent years, epistemic pluralism has received considerable endorsement as an approach to constructing scientific explanations and pursuing empirical research programs. In this article, we briefly discuss the advantages of an epistemically pluralist approach before outlining our own model of epistemic pluralism. The model we present emphasizes the specific considerations that occur when determining and justifying the selection of conceptual strategies and how conceptual strategies work together to provide task-relevant insights. By clarifying these constraint relationships, we highlight the kinds of systematic considerations that must be taken into account when selecting conceptual strategies for research tasks. We present a case study based on gang research to demonstrate how such considerations occur and the epistemic and pragmatic benefits of doing so.


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