Nash Equilibrium of Capacity Allocation Game for Autonomic Multi-domain Software Defined Networks

In this paper, we study capacity allocation under seasonal demand in two-echelon supply chain. In this supply chain the supply and demand is seriously out-off-balance. In detail the capactiy of the supplier decreases in high-demand state while the capacity can be fully released in low-demand state. Hence a game-theoretical capacity allocation scheme is proposed to increase retailers’ orders in low-demand state. This allocation scheme based on turn-and-earn uses orders in low-demand state to allocate capacity in high-demand state. Our competitive game is base on Nash equilibrium. A contract based on Nash equilibrium is designed to guarantee a reasonable allocation of interests between the supplier and retailers by changing incentives. We show that turn-and-earn allocation does coordinate the system and with cooperation both the supplier and the retailer can both benefit from it. A numerical study is conducted.

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CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND INVENTORY POLICY IN A DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

Asia Pacific Journal of Operational Research ◽

10.1142/s0217595906001054 ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 23 (04) ◽

pp. 543-571 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

YUE DAI ◽

XIULI CHAO ◽

SHU-CHERNG FANG ◽

HENRY L. W. NUTTLE

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Nash Equilibrium ◽

Inventory Control ◽

Distribution System ◽

Optimal Allocation ◽

Capacity Allocation ◽

Channel Coordination ◽

Unique Nash Equilibrium ◽

The Impact ◽

Centralized System

We consider a single-period distribution system with one supplier and two retailers. The supplier may have infinite or finite capacity. The demand at each retailer is random. When a stockout occurs at one retailer the customer may go to the other retailer. We study both the decentralized and centralized inventory control problems. For the decentralized problem we show that a unique Nash equilibrium exists when the capacity at the supplier is infinite. However, when the capacity is finite, only under certain conditions does the Nash equilibrium exist. For centralized inventory control we obtain the optimal allocation that maximizes the expected profit of the entire supply chain. For the case of decentralized controls we also design channel coordination mechanisms, i.e., a decentralized cost structure resulting in a Nash equilibrium with chain-wide profits equal to those achieved under a fully centralized system. We compare the performance of two retailers in the decentralized and centralized controls and analyze the impact of channel coordination on the whole supply chain.

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Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium in capacity allocation game for self-managed networks

Computer Networks ◽

10.1016/j.comnet.2013.06.012 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 57 (14) ◽

pp. 2817-2832 ◽

Cited By ~ 11

Author(s):

Dariusz Gąsior ◽

Maciej Drwal

Keyword(s):

Nash Equilibrium ◽

Capacity Allocation ◽

Pareto Optimal

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A Theory of Patronized Goods: Inefficient and Efficient Equilibria

Voprosy Ekonomiki ◽

10.32609/0042-8736-2011-3-65-87 ◽

2011 ◽

pp. 65-87 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

A. Rubinstein

Keyword(s):

Nash Equilibrium ◽

Social Policy ◽

Nash Equilibria ◽

Institutional Environment ◽

Social Motivation ◽

Pareto Optimal ◽

Market Failures ◽

Equilibrium Conditions ◽

Policy Issues

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.

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