scholarly journals Frege, the Normativity of Logic, and the Kantian Tradition

Author(s):  
Anssi Korhonen
Keyword(s):  
dialectica ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 587-609 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catarina Dutilh Novaes

2013 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gila Sher

AbstractThe construction of a systematic philosophical foundation for logic is a notoriously difficult problem. In Part One I suggest that the problem is in large part methodological, having to do with the common philosophical conception of “providing a foundation”. I offer an alternative to the common methodology which combines a strong foundational requirement (veridical justification) with the use of non-traditional, holistic tools to achieve this result. In Part Two I delineate an outline of a foundation for logic, employing the new methodology. The outline is based on an investigation of why logic requires a veridical justification, i.e., a justification which involves the world and not just the mind, and what features or aspect of the world logic is grounded in. Logic, the investigation suggests, is grounded in the formal aspect of reality, and the outline proposes an account of this aspect, the way it both constrains and enables logic (gives rise to logical truths and consequences), logic's role in our overall system of knowledge, the relation between logic and mathematics, the normativity of logic, the characteristic traits of logic, and error and revision in logic.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-492 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Pettigrew ◽  

2016 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Friedrich Reinmuth ◽  
Geo Siegwart

AbstractWe outline a pragmatic-normative understanding of logic as a discipline that is completely anchored in the sphere of action, rules, means and ends: We characterize inferring as a speech act which is in need of regulation and we connect inferential rules with consequence relations. Furthermore, we present a scenario which illustrates how one actually assesses or can in principle assess the quality of logical rules with respect to justificatory questions. Finally, we speculate on the origin of logical rules as a means of supporting our practice of inferring.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-230 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huaping Lu-Adler
Keyword(s):  

Mind ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 125 (498) ◽  
pp. 385-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Steinberger
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 160-175
Author(s):  
Gala Maksudova-Eliseeva

This paper is concerned with Frege’s logical aliens argument against psychologism in logic. The paper argues that this argument becomes too radical in the context of current philosophy in logic. The possible answer to Frege’s argument could be inspirited by the philosophical ideas of later Wittgenstein: we play different language games, and some of them are logical games. However, different people have different criteria of certainty and not all of them can play logical games. This gives new comprehension of the normativity of logic that shows that there are no logical aliens in absolute sense. This view can give in turn a new understanding of what rationality is and show why logic and psychology should interact.


2021 ◽  
pp. 281-314
Author(s):  
Alex Worsnip

This chapter explores and draws out the consequences of both the dualist view of rationality defended in Part I and the theory of structural rationality defended in Part II for a series of standing debates in (meta)ethics and epistemology—including debates about moral rationalism, rational choice theory, higher-order evidence, the normativity of logic, epistemic permissivism, and conditionalization. It also considers and criticizes some popular ways of trying to account for the existence and force of coherence requirements in the formally inclined philosophical literature—namely, Dutch book and money pump arguments and accuracy dominance arguments.


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