scholarly journals On Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Symmetric Submodular Objectives

2017 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georgios Amanatidis ◽  
Georgios Birmpas ◽  
Evangelos Markakis
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Budget Feasible

scholarly journals A Financial Incentive Mechanism for Truthful Reporting Assurance in Online Crowdsourcing Platforms

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 2014-2030
Author(s):  
Alireza Mohammadi ◽  
Seyyed Alireza Hashemi Golpayegani
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Financial Incentive ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
High Volume ◽  
Effective Strategy ◽  
Budget Management ◽  
Management Mechanism ◽  
Price Management ◽  
Budget Feasible

In today’s world, crowdsourcing is regarded as an effective strategy to deal with a high volume of small issues whose solutions can have their own complexities in systems. Moreover, requesters are currently providing hundreds of thousands of tasks in online job markets and workers need to perform these tasks to earn money. Thus far, various aspects of crowdsourcing including budget management, mechanism design for price management, forcing workers to behave truthfully in bidding prices, or maximized gains of crowdsourcing have been considered in different studies. One of the main existing challenges in crowdsourcing is how to ensure truthful reporting is provided by contributing workers. Since the amount of pay to workers is directly correlated with the number of tasks performed by them over a period of time, it can be predicted that strong incentives encourage them to carry out more tasks by giving untruthful answers (providing the first possible answer without examining it) in order to increase the amount of pay. However, crowdsourcing requesters need to obtain truthful reporting as an output of tasks assigned to workers. In this study, a mechanism was developed whose implementation in crowdsourcing could ensure truthful reporting by workers. The mechanism provided in this study was evaluated as more budget feasible and it was also fairer for requesters and workers due to its well-defined procedure.

scholarly journals Budget feasible mechanism design

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaohui Bei ◽  
Ning Chen ◽  
Nick Gravin ◽  
Pinyan Lu
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Budget Feasible

scholarly journals Simple and Efficient Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Monotone Submodular Valuations

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Pooya Jalaly ◽  
Éva Tardos
Keyword(s):  
Approximation Algorithm ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Design Problem ◽  
Optimization Problem ◽  
Submodular Function ◽  
Individual Item ◽  
Large Market ◽  
Total Budget ◽  
Approximation Guarantee ◽  
Budget Feasible

We study the problem of a budget limited buyer who wants to buy a set of items, each from a different seller, to maximize her value. The budget feasible mechanism design problem requires the design a mechanism that incentivizes the sellers to truthfully report their cost and maximizes the buyer’s value while guaranteeing that the total payment does not exceed her budget. Such budget feasible mechanisms can model a buyer in a crowdsourcing market interested in recruiting a set of workers (sellers) to accomplish a task for her. This budget feasible mechanism design problem was introduced by Singer in 2010. We consider the general case where the buyer’s valuation is a monotone submodular function. There are a number of truthful mechanisms known for this problem. We offer two general frameworks for simple mechanisms, and by combining these frameworks, we significantly improve on the best known results, while also simplifying the analysis. For example, we improve the approximation guarantee for the general monotone submodular case from 7.91 to 5 and for the case of large markets (where each individual item has negligible value) from 3 to 2.58. More generally, given an r approximation algorithm for the optimization problem (ignoring incentives), our mechanism is a r + 1 approximation mechanism for large markets, an improvement from 2 r 2 . We also provide a mechanism without the large market assumption, where we achieve a 4 r + 1 approximation guarantee. We also show how our results can be used for the problem of a principal hiring in a Crowdsourcing Market to select a set of tasks subject to a total budget.

scholarly journals Budget-feasible Procurement Mechanisms in Two-sided Markets

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weiwei Wu ◽  
Xiang Liu ◽  
Minming Li
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Design Problem ◽  
Public Value ◽  
Random Mechanism ◽  
Private Cost ◽  
Budget Feasible ◽  
Two Sided Markets

This paper considers the mechanism design problem in two-sided markets where multiple strategic buyers come with budgets to procure as much value of items  as possible from the strategic sellers. Each seller holds an item with public value and is allowed to bid its private cost.  Buyers could claim their budgets, not necessarily the true ones.  The goal is to seek budget-feasible mechanisms that ensure sellers are rewarded enough payment and buyers' budgets are not exceeded.  Our main contribution  is a random  mechanism  that guarantees various desired theoretical guarantees like the budget feasibility,  the truthfulness on the sellers' side and the buyers' side simultaneously, and constant approximation to the optimal total procured value of buyers. 

scholarly journals Budget feasible mechanism design

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 24-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yaron Singer
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Budget Feasible

Bayesian Mechanism Design

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aranyak Mehta
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design

Combined Blocking Contours Concept for a Single-Row Planetary Mechanism Design

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 393
Author(s):  
Olga V. Egorova ◽  
Gennady A. Timofeev ◽  
Marina V. Samoilova
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Single Row ◽  
Planetary Mechanism
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