Incentive mechanism design for citizen reporting application using Stackelberg game

<p>The growing utilization of smartphones equipped with various sensors to collect and analyze information around us highlights a paradigm called mobile crowdsensing. To motivate citizens’ participation in crowdsensing and compensate them for their resources, it is necessary to incentivize the participants for their sensing service. There are several studies that used the Stackelberg game to model the incentive mechanism, however, those studies did not include a budget constraint for limited budget case. Another challenge is to optimize crowdsourcer (government) profit in conducting crowdsensing under the limited budget then allocates the budget to several regional working units that are responsible for the specific city problems. We propose an incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsensing based on several identified incentive parameters using the Stackelberg game model and applied the MOOP (multi-objective optimization problem) to the incentive model in which the participant reputation is taken into account. The evaluation of the proposed incentive model is performed through simulations. The simulation indicated that the result appropriately corresponds to the theoretical properties of the model.</p>

Topic-aware Incentive Mechanism for Task Diffusion in Mobile Crowdsourcing through Social Network

Crowdsourcing has become an efficient paradigm to utilize human intelligence to perform tasks that are challenging for machines. Many incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing systems have been proposed. However, most of existing incentive mechanisms assume that there are sufficient participants to perform crowdsourcing tasks. In large-scale crowdsourcing scenarios, this assumption may be not applicable. To address this issue, we diffuse the crowdsourcing tasks in social network to increase the number of participants. To make the task diffusion more applicable to crowdsourcing system, we enhance the classic Independent Cascade model so the influence is strongly connected with both the types and topics of tasks. Based on the tailored task diffusion model, we formulate the Budget Feasible Task Diffusion ( BFTD ) problem for maximizing the value function of platform with constrained budget. We design a parameter estimation algorithm based on Expectation Maximization algorithm to estimate the parameters in proposed task diffusion model. Benefitting from the submodular property of the objective function, we apply the budget-feasible incentive mechanism, which satisfies desirable properties of computational efficiency, individual rationality, budget-feasible, truthfulness, and guaranteed approximation, to stimulate the task diffusers. The simulation results based on two real-world datasets show that our incentive mechanism can improve the number of active users and the task completion rate by 9.8% and 11%, on average.

INCENTIVE MECHANISM FOR PERFORMANCE-BASED PAYMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE PPP PROJECTS: COUPLING OF REPUTATION AND RATCHET EFFECTS

The performance-based payment PPP model has been widely used in the infrastructure projects. However, the ratchet effect derived from performance-based reputation incentives has been largely overlooked. To overcome this shortcoming, ratchet effect is considered in the performance-based payment incentive process. A multi-period dynamic incentive mechanism is developed by coupling the reputation and ratchet effect. The main results show that: (1) Under the coupling of reputation and ratchet effects, the optimal incentive coefficient in the last performance assessment period is always greater than that of the first period. The bargaining power can replace part of the incentive effect; (2) Due to the ratchet effect, if the government improve performance targets through performance adjustment coefficients, it needs to increase incentives to overcome the decreasing effort of the private sector; (3) When the bargaining power and punishment coefficient are small, the reputation incentive is replacing the explicit incentive. The increasing incentive coefficient would make the ratchet effect dominant the reputation effect; (4) To prevent the incentive incompatibility derived from the ratchet effect, the government should increase the incentive while increasing the punishment to achieve the “penalties and rewards”. This study provides theoretical and methodological guidance to design incentive contracts for infrastructure PPP projects.

Analysis on the Practical Application of Multiple Incentive Mechanism in Educational Management

In the new era, China’s education industry was ushered in a high-quality development stage. On the one hand, it is necessary to set a goal of education management on the all-round development of students. On the other hand, we should innovate some practical application schemes of diversified incentive mechanism consistent with the needs of educational management. Taking this as the starting point, this paper summarizes the connotation of incentive mechanism and diversified incentive mechanism, and analyzes the practical problems of single incentive standard, issues on incentive timeliness, and reduced participation of incentive objects at the current stage. On this basis, this paper puts forward some corresponding measures from three angles: opening up thinking, updating in time and emphasizing the target.

Tax Minimization Pemoderisasi Tunnelling Incentive, Mechanism Bonus dan Debt Covenant dalam Pengambilan Keputusan Transfer Pricing

ABSTRACT This study aims to determine the effect of income tunneling incentive, mechanism bonus and debt covenant on transfer pricing indications with tax minimization moderitation variables. This study is conducted using a case study with a qualitative research method. The data used is secondary data in form of evidence, historical records or reports that have been compiled in published and unpublished archives (documentary data). The research population uses manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2018-2020. The sampling technique was carried out by purposive sampling method. The study uses 505 observational data. Logistic regression is a data analysis technique used in this study. The result of the research that tunnelling incentives, mechanism bonus and debt covenant with tax minimization variable moderating have an effect on transfer pricing indications. ABSTRAK Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh tunneling incentive, mekanisme bonus dan debt covenant terhadap indikasi transfer pricing dengan tax minimization sebagai variabel moderisasi. Strategi penelitian yang digunakan adalah studi kasus dengan metode penelitian kualitatif. Data yang digunakan adalah data sekunder berupa bukti, catatan atau laporan historis yang telah tersusun dalam arsip (data dokumenter) yang dipublikasikan dan yang tidak dipublikasikan. Populasi penelitian menggunakan perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) tahun 2018-2020. Teknik pengambilan sampel dilakukan dengan metode purposive sampling. Penelitian menggunakan 505 data observasi. Regresi logistik merupakan teknik analisis data yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa tunnelling incentive, mechanism bonus dan debt covenant dengan tax minimization sebagai variabel pemoderisasi berpengaruh terhadap keputusan melakukan transfer pricing.

A Monetary Incentive DTN Routing For Wireless Sensor Networks

The DTN (Delay/Interrupt Tolerant Network) protocol that relies on nodes to handle network interruptions is one of the important components of the wireless sensor network (WSN) routing protocol. However, due to resource consumption, nodes may be unable to unconditionally relay data. To address this issue, several incentive mechanisms have recently been proposed to encourage node participation. However, the existing solutions either do not fully consider the sender’s budget or do not consider the relay cost limitation, which violated the practical incentive mechanism requirements of the DTN protocol. In this paper, we focus on developing a new incentive mechanism for DTN routing that specifically address the challenges brought up by budget and relay cost limitation. Our core idea is to define the payoff functions of the sender and the next hops, then optimize the strategies under the constraints of the sender’s budget and the relay’s cost. Our experimental results demonstrate that the maximized social welfare for all participants can be realized under these constraints.