An Ant Colony Approach for the Winner Determination Problem

2018 ◽  
pp. 174-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abhishek Ray ◽  
Mario Ventresca
Keyword(s):  
Ant Colony ◽  
Winner Determination Problem ◽  
Winner Determination

A Graph-Based Ant Algorithm for the Winner Determination Problem in Combinatorial Auctions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abhishek Ray ◽  
Mario Ventresca ◽  
Karthik Kannan
Keyword(s):  
Exact Algorithms ◽  
Combinatorial Auctions ◽  
Ant Colony ◽  
Superior Performance ◽  
Winner Determination Problem ◽  
Winner Determination ◽  
Anytime Algorithm ◽  
Open Test ◽  
Valid Solution ◽  
Graph Pruning

Iterative combinatorial auctions are known to resolve bidder preference elicitation problems. However, winner determination is a known key bottleneck that has prevented widespread adoption of such auctions, and adding a time-bound to winner determination further complicates the mechanism. As a result, heuristic-based methods have enjoyed an increase in applicability. We add to the growing body of work in heuristic-based winner determination by proposing an ant colony metaheuristic–based anytime algorithm that produces optimal or near-optimal winner determination results within specified time. Our proposed algorithm resolves the speed versus accuracy problem and displays superior performance compared with 20 past state-of-the-art heuristics and two exact algorithms, for 94 open test auction instances that display a wide variety in bid-bundle composition. Furthermore, we contribute to the literature in two predominant ways: first, we represent the winner determination problem as one of finding the maximum weighted path on a directed cyclic graph; second, we improve upon existing ant colony heuristic–based exploration methods by implementing randomized pheromone updating and randomized graph pruning. Finally, to aid auction designers, we implement the anytime property of the algorithm, which allows auctioneers to stop the algorithm and return a valid solution to the winner determination problem even if it is interrupted before computation ends.

scholarly journals Winner determination problem with loss-averse buyers in reverse auctions

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaohu QIAN ◽  
Min HUANG ◽  
Yangyang YU ◽  
Xingwei WANG
Keyword(s):  
Reverse Auctions ◽  
Winner Determination Problem ◽  
Winner Determination

Quantity-Contingent Auctions and Allocation of Airport Slots

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 858-881 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael O. Ball ◽  
Alexander S. Estes ◽  
Mark Hansen ◽  
Yulin Liu
Keyword(s):  
Integer Programming ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Road Network ◽  
Programming Model ◽  
Continuous Model ◽  
Winner Determination Problem ◽  
Single Product ◽  
Winner Determination ◽  
Multiple Units ◽  
Airport Slots

In this paper, we define and investigate quantity-contingent auctions. Such auctions can be used when there exist multiple units of a single product and the value of a set of units depends on the total quantity sold. For example, a road network or airport will become congested as the number of users increase so that a permit for use becomes more valuable as the total number allocated decreases. A quantity-contingent auction determines both the number of items sold and an allocation of items to bidders. Because such auctions could be used by bidders to gain excessive market power, we impose constraints limiting market power. We focus on auctions that allocate airport arrival and departure slots. We propose a continuous model and an integer programming model for the associated winner determination problem. Using these models, we perform computational experiments that lend insights into the properties of the quantity-contingent auction.

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