Congestion Avoidance Control through Non-cooperative Games between Customers and Service Providers

2009 ◽  
pp. 53-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dimitris E. Charilas ◽  
Athanasios D. Panagopoulos ◽  
Panagiotis Vlacheas ◽  
Ourania I. Markaki ◽  
Philip Constantinou
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Congestion Avoidance ◽  
Avoidance Control ◽  
Non Cooperative Games

scholarly journals Weak Berge Equilibrium in Finite Three-person Games: Conception and Computation

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-134
Author(s):  
Konstantin Kudryavtsev ◽  
Ustav Malkov
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Hippocratic Oath ◽  
The Other ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Finite Games ◽  
Moral Basis ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Berge Equilibrium ◽  
Do No Harm ◽  
Non Cooperative Games

AbstractThe paper proposes the concept of a weak Berge equilibrium. Unlike the Berge equilibrium, the moral basis of this equilibrium is the Hippocratic Oath “First do no harm”. On the other hand, any Berge equilibrium is a weak Berge equilibrium. But, there are weak Berge equilibria, which are not the Berge equilibria. The properties of the weak Berge equilibrium have been investigated. The existence of the weak Berge equilibrium in mixed strategies has been established for finite games. The weak Berge equilibria for finite three-person non-cooperative games are computed.

A positive approach to non-cooperative games

1986 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 235-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
James W. Friedman ◽  
Robert W. Rosenthal
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Positive Approach ◽  
Non Cooperative Games

scholarly journals A computational model of outguessing in two-player non-cooperative games

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-88
Author(s):  
Tamás László Balogh ◽  
János Kormos
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Simulation ◽  
Computational Model ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Behavioral Game Theory ◽  
Equilibrium Concept ◽  
Zero Sum Games ◽  
Simulation Based ◽  
Behavioral Game ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Non Cooperative Games

Abstract Several behavioral game theory models aim at explaining why “smarter“ people win more frequently in simultaneous zero-sum games, a phanomenon, which is not explained by the Nash equilibrium concept. We use a computational model and a numerical simulation based on Markov chains to describe player behavior and predict payoffs.

Experimental Neuroeconomics and Non-cooperative Games

2009 ◽  
pp. 47-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Houser ◽  
Kevin McCabe
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Non Cooperative Games
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