The Three Versions of the Ultimatum Game

We examine the 1914-1918 creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as a form of the ultimatum game. The negotiations among the Serbian Cabinet and the yugoslav Committee representatives of the Habsburg Souths Slavs from 1914-1918 exemplify three versions of this game. The first version is a typical (rational choice) type of the ultimatum game in which the receiver is satisfied with any offer by the Proposer. The second version is an instance of behavioral game theory. When the Proposer gives an unfair offer, it provokes an emotional reaction in the receiver who will reject it at the cost of harming themselves. We observe this behavior in the emotional behavior of frano Supilo, a Croat and one of the leaders of the yugoslav Committee. The third version of the behavioral ultimatum game can be observed in the behavior of Serbian Prime minister nikola Pašić who opposed any concessions to the yugoslav Committee, thus giving an ultimatum to the Croat side to accept the Serbian offer or remain with nothing, which was harmful to the Serbian side, too. This example is important because it produces two conclusions. first, historical games are often a mixture of several versions. Second, Proposers, too, can have an emotional reaction and give an offer that can hurt themselves. This aspect of the ultimatum game is less mentioned because it is difficult to simulate in experiments.

Republicans treated Chinese-born US residents relatively worse than US-born US residents, compared to non-Republicans throughout the COVID-19 pandemic

Asian Americans became targets of increasingly hostile behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic. What motivated this? Fears of contagion arising from a behavioral immune system (BIS) may have motivated differential treatment towards Chinese-born US residents, especially early in the pandemic and among those vulnerable to COVID-19. On the other hand, rhetoric from right-wing media figures may have legitimated anti-Asian behavior. We explore these questions using a behavioral game with a representative sample of Americans at two points: in spring and fall 2020. Participants were partnered with a US- or Chinese-born US resident. The average American treated Chinese-born US residents worse compared to US-born residents in the spring but not the fall, when China was no longer a COVID-19 hotspot. But among Republicans, likely more receptive to right-wing rhetoric, unequal treatment was both stronger in the spring and persisted into the fall.

Game Awareness: A Questionnaire

This paper deals with one of the possible methodological approaches to an empirical examination of game awareness. Such an outline should enable the gathering of a deeper understanding of individuals’ awareness. The questionnaire is based on a scenario technique, and it is focused on game awareness in situations with possible strategic interactions. The goal is to assess the instrument regarding its reliability and validity. Internal reliability is assessed using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. A k-nn analysis was used to estimate divergent construct validity and criterion validity, and nonparametric factor analysis was used to estimate convergent construct validity. The questionnaire satisfies the requirements of reliability and validity. Moreover, there is an indication that each of the eight scenarios may be used separately, as they also meet the criteria for reliability and validity. Possible practical and theoretical implications involve questionnaire use as a basis for educational intervention, other instruments’ development, as well as for the collection and publication of behavioral insights about game awareness. Behavioral insights should enrich the theory and incite behavioral game theory models of game awareness and its implications.

M Equilibrium: A Theory of Beliefs and Choices in Games

We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered unrelated. M equilibrium is empirically robust and, despite being set-valued, falsifiable. Results from a series of experiments that compare M equilibrium to leading behavioral game theory models demonstrate its virtues in predicting observed choices and stated beliefs. Data from experimental games with a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and multiple M equilibria exhibit coordination problems that could not be anticipated through the lens of existing models. (JEL C72, C90, D83)

Artificial Shortage in Agricultural Supply Chains

Problem definition: Price surge of essential commodities despite inventory availability, due to artificial shortage, presents a serious threat to food security in many countries. To protect consumers’ welfare, governments intervene reactively with either (i) cash subsidy, to increase consumers’ purchasing power by directly transferring cash; or (ii) supply allocation, to increase product availability by importing the commodity from foreign markets and selling it at subsidized rates. Academic/practical relevance: This paper develops a new behavioral game-theoretic model to examine the supply chain and market dynamics that engender artificial shortage as well as to analyze the effectiveness of various government interventions in improving consumer welfare. Methodology: We analyze a three-stage dynamic game between the government and the trader. We fully characterize the market equilibrium and the resulting consumer welfare under the base scenario of no government intervention as well as under each of the interventions being studied. Results: The analysis demonstrates the disparate effects of different interventions on artificial shortage; whereas supply allocation schemes often mitigate shortage, cash subsidy can inadvertently aggravate shortage in the market. Furthermore, empirical analysis with actual data on onion prices in India shows that the proposed model explains the data well and provides specific estimates on the implied artificial shortage. A counterfactual analysis quantifies the potential impacts of government interventions on market outcomes. Managerial implications: The analysis shows that reactive government interventions with supply allocation schemes can have a preemptive effect to reduce the trader’s incentive to create artificial shortage. Although cash subsidy schemes have recently gained wide popularity in many countries, we caution governments to carefully consider the strategic responses of different stakeholders in the supply chain when implementing cash subsidy schemes.

Variable strategies to solve risk–reward tradeoffs in carnivore communities

Mesopredator release theory suggests that dominant predators suppress subordinate carnivores and ultimately shape community dynamics, but the assumption that subordinate species are only negatively affected ignores the possibility of facilitation through scavenging. We examined the interplay within a carnivore community consisting of cougars, coyotes, black bears, and bobcats using contemporaneous Global Positioning System telemetry data from 51 individuals; diet analysis from 972 DNA-metabarcoded scats; and data from 128 physical investigations of cougar kill sites, 28 of which were monitored with remote cameras. Resource provisioning from competitively dominant cougars to coyotes through scavenging was so prolific as to be an overwhelming determinant of coyote behavior, space use, and resource acquisition. This was evident via the strong attraction of coyotes to cougar kill sites, frequent scavenging of cougar-killed prey, and coyote diets that nearly matched cougars in the magnitude of ungulate consumption. Yet coyotes were often killed by cougars and used space to minimize encounters, complicating the fitness benefits gained from scavenging. We estimated that 23% (95% CI: 8 to 55%) of the coyote population in our study area was killed by cougars annually, suggesting that coyote interactions with cougars are a complex behavioral game of risk and reward. In contrast, we found no indication that bobcat space use or diet was influenced by cougars. Black bears avoided cougars, but there was no evidence of attraction to cougar kill sites and much lower levels of ungulate consumption and carcass visitation than for coyotes. Interspecific interactions among carnivores are multifaceted, encompassing both suppression and facilitation.

The pitfalls associated with more intensive engagement in collaborative forums: The role of behavioral spillovers and cognitive load

Polycentric governance systems feature numerous decision-making venues (“forums”) where policy actors repeatedly interact to address a subset of policy problems. Previous studies find that forums where actors dedicate greater time and cognitive resources tend to be perceived as more effective. Drawing on behavioral game theory and the Ecology of Games, we argue that the improvements afforded to any one forum vis-à-vis more intensive participation may come at a cost: lower levels of perceived effectiveness in linked forums. We use survey data collected in the Tampa Bay (FL) and California Delta (CA) water governance systems to examine our contention. Using a series of spatial Durbin models, we find that perceived effectiveness of a given forum is directly impacted by the intensiveness by which actors participate in that forum (positive association). However, there are also behavioral spillovers: the intensity with which actors participate in other forums in the system has indirect negative consequences for perceived forum effectiveness.

Games of risk and reward in carnivore communities

Mesopredator release theory suggests that dominant predators suppress subordinate carnivores and ultimately shape community dynamics, but the assumption that subordinate species are only negatively affected ignores the possibility of facilitation through scavenging. We examined the interplay within a carnivore community consisting of cougars, coyotes, black bears, and bobcats using contemporaneous Global Positioning System telemetry data from 51 individuals, diet analysis from 972 DNA-metabarcoded scats, and data from 128 physical investigations of cougar kill sites, 28 of which were monitored with remote cameras. Resource provisioning from competitively-dominant cougars to coyotes through scavenging was so prolific as to be an overwhelming determinant of coyote behavior, space use, and resource acquisition. This was evident via strong attraction of coyotes to cougar kill sites, frequent scavenging of cougar-killed prey, and coyote diets that nearly matched cougars in the magnitude of ungulate consumption. Yet coyotes were often killed by cougars and used space to minimize encounters, complicating the fitness benefits gained from scavenging. We estimated that 23% (95% CI: 8–55%) of the coyote population in our study area was killed by cougars annually suggesting that coyote interactions with cougars are a complex behavioral game of risk and reward. In contrast, we found no indication that bobcat space use or diet was influenced by cougars. Black bears avoided cougars, but there was no evidence of attraction to cougar kill sites, and much lower levels of ungulate consumption and carcass visitation than for coyotes. Interspecific interactions among carnivores are multifaceted encompassing both suppression and facilitation.Significance StatementAn incomplete understanding of the total influence top predators exert on subordinate species hinders our ability to anticipate the effects that changing carnivore populations will have in ecological communities. Here we show that cougars are the architects of a complex behavioral game of risk and reward, as subordinate or co-occurring carnivores are both provisioned and preyed on by the top predators. Each co-occurring carnivore species considered here employed a different strategy to approach the risk-reward tradeoff suggesting there are multiple viable solutions to the game. By not considering the multitude of effects top predators have on other carnivores, we are missing important linkages in terrestrial food webs.