Monetary Policy Credibility and Coordination

Author(s):  
Kevin Clinton ◽  
Jean-Claude Chouraqui
2003 ◽  
pp. 1.000-34.000
Author(s):  
Diego Valderrama ◽  
◽  
Mark M. Spiegel ◽  

1994 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 355-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali al-Nowaihi ◽  
Paul Levine

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Carriere-Swallow ◽  
Bertrand Gruss ◽  
Nicolas E. Magud ◽  
Fabian V. Valencia

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (201) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thitipat Chansriniyom ◽  
Natan Epstein ◽  
Valeriu Nalban

The paper extends a standard semi-structural model to account for nonlinear and asymmetric effects of monetary policy credibility. In our setting, central bank credibility is proportional to the deviation of inflation expectations from the announced inflation target, with positive deviations being more costly compared to negative ones. A loss in policy credibility as a result of shocks leads to a more persistent, backward-looking inflation process, and is associated with lower output. We find that the extended model with credibility effects matches well the key macroeconomic data over specific past episodes for Indonesia and Philippines and consider its adaptation to integrated policy frameworks as an area for further exploration.


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