Politically Robust Financial Regulation

The deferred recognition of COVID-induced losses at banks in many countries has reignited the debate on regulatory forbearance. This paper presents a model where the public's own political pressure drives regulatory policy astray, because the public is poorly informed. Using probabilistic game stages, the model parameterizes how time consistent policy is. The interaction between political motivations and time consistency is novel and complex: increased policy credibility can entice the politically-motivated regulator to act in the public's best interest, or instead repel it from doing so. Considering several regulatory instruments, the paper probes the nexus of political pressure, perverse bank incentives and time inconsistent policy.

Long-run inflation expectations in the ECB survey of professional forecasters: what do the survey responses tell us?

Research background: At the background, there are issues related to policy credibility and policy targets. For these issues, long-term forecasts can provide important information. Of course, long-term forecasts are needed also e.g. for evaluation of real returns. Purpose of the article: This paper tries to find out how informative the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters data on long-term inflation prospects are from the point of view of the overall quality of the survey and on the other hand from the point of view of monetary policy credibility. Methods: The analysis makes use of individual forecaster level quarterly panel data for the period 1999Q1?2018Q4. Conventional panel econometrics tools are used to find out whether forecasts are sensitive to changes in actual inflation and other relevant variables. Findings & Value added: We find some weaknesses considering the size of the survey, the selection of the sample (more precisely the participation to the survey) and the inertial responses of forecasters which suggest that the survey values are not actively updated. Moreover, we find that towards the end of the sample period, the survey values are related to actual inflation and to short-term expectations, which is not consistent with the credibility of the official inflation target.

The Monetary Policy Credibility Channel and the Amplification Effects in a Semi-structural Model

The paper extends a standard semi-structural model to account for nonlinear and asymmetric effects of monetary policy credibility. In our setting, central bank credibility is proportional to the deviation of inflation expectations from the announced inflation target, with positive deviations being more costly compared to negative ones. A loss in policy credibility as a result of shocks leads to a more persistent, backward-looking inflation process, and is associated with lower output. We find that the extended model with credibility effects matches well the key macroeconomic data over specific past episodes for Indonesia and Philippines and consider its adaptation to integrated policy frameworks as an area for further exploration.

Turkey

Following the sharp lira depreciation and associated recession in late-2018, growth has improved, helped by policy stimulus and favorable market conditions. The lira recovered and the current account has seen a remarkable adjustment. Turkey remains susceptible to external and domestic risks, however, and prospects for strong and sustainable growth over the medium term look challenging without reforms to address vulnerabilities, strengthen policy credibility, and boost productivity.