The Generalized Exchange Perspective on the Evolution of Altruism

Author(s):  
Eiji Takagi
Keyword(s):  
Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 50
Author(s):  
Georg Kanitsar

Peer punishment is widely lauded as a decentralized solution to the problem of social cooperation. However, experimental evidence of its effectiveness primarily stems from public good structures. This paper explores peer punishment in another structural setting: a system of generalized exchange. In a laboratory experiment, a repeated four-player prisoner’s dilemma is arranged either in a public good structure or in a circular network of generalized exchange. The experimental results demonstrate that the merits of peer punishment do not extend to generalized exchange. In the public good, peer punishment was primarily altruistic, was sensitive to costs, and promoted cooperation. In generalized exchange, peer punishment was also altruistic and relatively frequent, but did not increase cooperation. While the dense punishment network underlying the public good facilitates norm enforcement, generalized exchange decreases control over norm violators and reduces the capacity of peer punishment. I conclude that generalized exchange systems require stronger forms of punishment to sustain social cooperation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 000312242110074
Author(s):  
Monica M. Whitham

This study examines the potential for small-scale acts of giving that are not directly reciprocated, or generalized generosities, to build social bonds and promote contributions to the group. Social exchange theorists define such acts as generalized exchange. The potential for generalized exchange to build strong social bonds relative to other forms of exchange is the subject of theoretical debate. In this article, I build on two prominent theories of social exchange—affect theory and the theory of reciprocity—to propose that a strong norm of generalized reciprocity may bridge the connective benefits of generalized exchange with the connective benefits of productive exchange, which is a collaborative form of social exchange that involves sharing pooled resources. I argue that a strong norm of generalized reciprocity will activate mechanisms theorized to build strong social bonds in generalized and productive exchange systems, and will promote additional behavioral investments into the group. I test my argument with a controlled laboratory experiment, finding strong support for the proposed causal model. The results of this study have implications for research on generosity, collective action, collaboration, sense of community, and social capital.


Man ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 463 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan Strenski
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 117 (5) ◽  
pp. 2378-2384 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenji Itao ◽  
Kunihiko Kaneko

The family unit and kinship structures form the basis of social relationships in indigenous societies. Families constitute a cultural group, a so-called clan, within which marriage is prohibited by the incest taboo. The clan attribution governs the mating preference and descent relationships by certain rules. Such rules form various kinship structures, including generalized exchange, an indirect exchange of brides among more than two clans, and restricted exchange, a direct exchange of brides with the flow of children to different clans. These structures are distributed in different areas and show different cultural consequences. However, it is still unknown how they emerge or what conditions determine different structures. Here, we build a model of communities consisting of lineages and family groups and introduce social cooperation among kin and mates and conflict over mating. Each lineage has parameters characterizing the trait and mate preference, which determines the possibility of marriage and the degree of cooperation and conflict among lineages. Lineages can cooperate with those having similar traits to their own or mates’, whereas lineages with similar preferences compete for brides. In addition, we introduce community-level selection by eliminating communities with smaller fitness and follow the so-called hierarchical Moran process. We numerically demonstrate that lineages are clustered in the space of traits and preferences, resulting in the emergence of clans with the incest taboo. Generalized exchange emerges when cooperation is strongly needed, whereas restricted exchange emerges when the mating conflict is strict. This may explain the geographical distribution of kinship structures in indigenous societies.


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