Self-Governance in Generalized Exchange. A Laboratory Experiment on the Structural Embeddedness of Peer Punishment

Peer punishment is widely lauded as a decentralized solution to the problem of social cooperation. However, experimental evidence of its effectiveness primarily stems from public good structures. This paper explores peer punishment in another structural setting: a system of generalized exchange. In a laboratory experiment, a repeated four-player prisoner’s dilemma is arranged either in a public good structure or in a circular network of generalized exchange. The experimental results demonstrate that the merits of peer punishment do not extend to generalized exchange. In the public good, peer punishment was primarily altruistic, was sensitive to costs, and promoted cooperation. In generalized exchange, peer punishment was also altruistic and relatively frequent, but did not increase cooperation. While the dense punishment network underlying the public good facilitates norm enforcement, generalized exchange decreases control over norm violators and reduces the capacity of peer punishment. I conclude that generalized exchange systems require stronger forms of punishment to sustain social cooperation.

Generalized Generosity: How the Norm of Generalized Reciprocity Bridges Collective Forms of Social Exchange

This study examines the potential for small-scale acts of giving that are not directly reciprocated, or generalized generosities, to build social bonds and promote contributions to the group. Social exchange theorists define such acts as generalized exchange. The potential for generalized exchange to build strong social bonds relative to other forms of exchange is the subject of theoretical debate. In this article, I build on two prominent theories of social exchange—affect theory and the theory of reciprocity—to propose that a strong norm of generalized reciprocity may bridge the connective benefits of generalized exchange with the connective benefits of productive exchange, which is a collaborative form of social exchange that involves sharing pooled resources. I argue that a strong norm of generalized reciprocity will activate mechanisms theorized to build strong social bonds in generalized and productive exchange systems, and will promote additional behavioral investments into the group. I test my argument with a controlled laboratory experiment, finding strong support for the proposed causal model. The results of this study have implications for research on generosity, collective action, collaboration, sense of community, and social capital.

An Interaction Ritual Theory of Social Resource Exchange: Evidence from a Silicon Valley Accelerator

Recent research on start-up accelerators has drawn attention to the central importance of social resource exchange among peers for entrepreneurial success. But such peer relationships contain both cooperative and competitive elements, making accelerators a prime example of a mixed-motive context in which successful generalized exchange—unilateral giving without expectations of direct reciprocity—is not a given. In our ethnographic study of a Silicon Valley accelerator, we sought to explore how generalized exchange emerges and evolves over time. Employing an abductive, sequential mixed-methods approach, we develop a process model that helps explain how a system of generalized exchange may or may not emerge. At the core of this model are the interaction rituals within social events that come to create distinct exchange expectations, which are either aligned or incompatible with generalized exchange, resulting in fulfilled or failed exchanges in subsequent encounters. Whereas fulfilled exchanges can kickstart virtuous exchange dynamics and a thriving generalized exchange system, failed exchanges trigger vicious exchange dynamics and an unstable social order. These findings bring clarity to the puzzle of how some generalized exchange systems overcome the social dilemma in mixed-motive contexts by highlighting the central role of alignment between structure and process.

The Logic of Attraction: Outline of a Theory of Soft Power

This paper refines and further develops the concept of soft power with the aim of exploring the ways human power works and the assets that give rise to soft power. To this end, the paper will answer three central questions: What is soft power? Where does soft power come from? How does soft power works?Answering these questions requires fundamentally a global and systematic mapping of the power behaviors. This paper maps the power behaviors by identifying the basic ways of power, which include a hard way and a soft way of power-over and a hard way and a soft way of power-with. Soft power results from the soft way of power-with. The assets that give rise to soft power are positive agential qualities, not intangible resources as many assume. These positive agential qualities include not just kindness but also competence and commitment. This paper outlines the process that generates soft power and sheds light on the causal mechanisms, both at the behavioral and the psychological levels, through which soft power works.The paper benefits greatly from research in multiple disciplines, including biology, psychology, economics, anthropology, sociology, and political science. It involves substantially and links together various phenomena discussed in different fields of study: signaling, indirect reciprocity, generalized exchange, prestige, status, and leadership. With the integration of these phenomena into a theory of soft power, the paper is able to provide a better explanation of indirect reciprocity, a more comprehensive explanation of the strategic logic of prestige-seeking, and a deeper explanation of charisma, among others.

On GE-Algebras

Hilbert algebras are important tools for certain investigations in intuitionistic logic and other non-classical logic and as a generalization of Hilbert algebra a new algebraic structure, called a GE-algebra (generalized exchange algebra), is introduced and studied its properties. We consider filters, upper sets and congruence kernels in a GE-algebra. We also characterize congruence kernels of transitive GE-algebras.

How Do Low-Income People Form Survival Networks? Routine Organizations as Brokers

While supportive social ties help to buffer against the consequences of poverty, few researchers have examined how people form such ties. New ties are often formed in routine organizations such as businesses, churches, and childcare centers, which, beyond being places to work, shop, or receive services, are institutionally governed spaces of social interaction. Based on the notion of organizational brokerage, we introduce a perspective that specifies when routine organizations contribute to tie formation and use it to reexamine data from existing qualitative studies of such organizations among the poor. We argue that successful brokerage will depend on the degree to which an organization’s institutional norms render interaction among participants frequent, long-lasting, focused on others, and centered on joint tasks; and that the ensuing networks may differ from other supportive ties in the sense of belonging they may cultivate, the form of generalized exchange they may engender, and the organizational connections they may create.