scholarly journals Spread Worlds, Plenitude and Modal Realism: A Problem for David Lewis

2012 ◽  
pp. 155-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles R. Pigden ◽  
Rebecca E. B. Entwisle
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Modal Realism

scholarly journals Necessitism, Contingentism, and Lewisian Modal Realism

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Nencha
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Timothy Williamson ◽  
Restricted Quantification

AbstractNecessitism is the controversial thesis that necessarily everything is necessarily something, namely that everything, everywhere, necessarily exists. What is controversial about necessitism is that, at its core, it claims that things could not have failed to exist, while we have a pre-theoretical intuition that not everything necessarily exists. Contingentism, in accordance with common sense, denies necessitism: it claims that some things could have failed to exist. Timothy Williamson is a necessitist and claims that David Lewis is a necessitist too. The paper argues that, granted the assumptions that lead to interpret the Lewisian as a necessitist, she can preserve contingentist intuitions, by genuinely agreeing with the folk that existence is contingent. This is not just the uncontroversial claim that the Lewisian, as a result of the prevalence of restricted quantification in counterpart theoretic regimentations of natural language, can agree with the folk while disagreeing with them in the metaphysical room. Rather, this is the claim that it is in the metaphysical room that the Lewisian can endorse the intuitions lying behind contingentism.

Lewis' Indexical Argument for World-Relative Actuality

Dialogue ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard M. Gale
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
The Other ◽  
Abstract Entity ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Possible World ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Systematic Analysis ◽  
Reductio Ad Absurdum ◽  
Critical Scrutiny

David Lewis has shocked the philosophical community with his original version of extreme modal realism according to which “every way that a world could possibly be is a way that some world is”. Logical Space is a plenitude of isolated physical worlds, each being the actualization of some way in which a world could be, that bear neither spatiotemporal nor causal relations to each other. Lewis has given independent, converging arguments for this. One is the argument from the indexicality of actuality, the other an elaborate cost-benefit argument of the inference-to-the-best explanation sort to the effect that a systematic analysis of a number of concepts, including modality, causality, propositions and properties, fares better under his theory than under any rival one that takes a possible world to be either a linguistic entity or an ersatz abstract entity such as a maximal compossible set of properties, propositions or states of affairs. Lewis' legion of critics have confined themselves mostly to attempts at a reductio ad absurdum of his theory or to objections to his various analyses. The indexical argument, on the other hand, has not been subject to careful critical scrutiny. It is the purpose of this paper to show that this argument cannot withstand such scrutiny. Its demise, however, leaves untouched his argument from the explanatory superiority for his extreme modal realism.

Reply to Cameron

2009 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
PAUL SHEEHY
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Abstract Entity ◽  
Intrinsic Properties ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Divine Nature

AbstractRoss Cameron has argued that the modal realism of David Lewis furnishes the theist with the resources to explain divine necessity. Cameron is successful in identifying two theistic strategies, but neither is attractive in light of a commitment to modal realism. The first theistic strategy is to treat God as an abstract entity in the same way that the modal realist treats pure sets. This is undermotivated in light of the nominalistic spirit of modal realism. The second strategy is to regard God as enjoying trans-world identity because the divine nature can possess no accidental intrinsic properties. This approach raises a problem of how one is to understand the notion of actuality.

Classical theism and modal realism are incompatible

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 561-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHAD VANCE
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Intrinsic Properties ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Special Case

AbstractThe classical conception of God is that of a necessary being. On a possible worlds semantics, this entails that God exists at every possible world. According to the modal realist account of David Lewis, possible worlds are understood to be real, concrete worlds – no different in kind from the actual world. But, modal realism is equipped to accommodate the existence of a necessary being in only one of three ways: (1) By way of counterpart theory, or (2) by way of a special case of trans-world identity for causally inert necessary beings (e.g. pure sets), or else (3) causally potent ones which lack accidental intrinsic properties. I argue that each of these three options entails unacceptable consequences – (1) and (2) are incompatible with theism, and (3) is incompatible with modal realism. I conclude that (at least) one of these views is false.

scholarly journals The Metaphysics of Theism: A Classical and Neo-Classical Synthesis

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (11) ◽  
pp. 967
Author(s):  
Joshua Reginald Sijuwade
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Ontological Pluralism ◽  
Classical Theism

This article aims to provide a metaphysical elucidation of the notion of Theism and a coherent theological synthesis of two extensions of this notion: Classical Theism and Neo-Classical Theism. A model of this notion and its extensions is formulated within the ontological pluralism framework of Kris McDaniel and Jason Turner, and the (modified) modal realism framework of David Lewis, which enables it to be explicated clearly and consistently, and two often raised objections against the elements of this notion can be successfully answered.

Whole New People of the Book

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 24-27
Author(s):  
Aaron Ricker
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Harvard University

A. David Lewis and Martin Lund, eds. 'Muslim Superheroes: Comics, Islam, and Representation'. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017. 264 pp., 15 illustrations. $24.95, paper.

Intentionalist Strategies of Interpretation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen Stock
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Authorial Intention ◽  
Gregory Currie ◽  
Ordinary Case ◽  
Unreliable Narration ◽  
Fictional Truth

This chapter addresses the complaint that extreme intentionalism standardly forces the reader who engages in interpretation to posit private, or hidden, authorial intentions, for which she has little or no evidence. It is first argued that there are no automatic strategies of interpretation of fictional content: at every stage, whether or not a given interpretative strategy is to be appropriately applied depends on the presence of relevant authorial intention as a sanction. (This section includes a discussion, and rejection, of the views of David Lewis and Gregory Currie about fictional truth; a discussion of the relevance of genre to fictional content; and a consideration of the issue of unreliable narration for an intentionalist view.) The foregoing material on strategies of interpretation is then used to show that it is false to think of the extreme intentionalist as being committed to ‘hidden’ or ‘secret’ meanings in the ordinary case.

Only Imagine

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen Stock
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Strong Argument ◽  
Fictional Truth

This book begins with a detailed description and defence of a controversial theory of fictional content (or ‘fictional truth’) known as ‘extreme intentionalism’. On this view, roughly, the fictional content of a particular text is equivalent to exactly what the author of the text intended the reader to imagine. The book situates this theory in relation to its competitors including hypothetical intentionalism, value-maximizing theory, and the influential anti-intentionalism view of David Lewis—and puts forward a strong argument for its superiority, despite its many detractors. In the second half of the book, some consequences of extreme intentionalism are explored as they affect questions such as: the relation of fiction to testimony and belief; whether there are any limits to what we can imagine, and what explains those limits; what is the nature of fiction; to what extent imagination resembles belief; and to what extent the imagination can contribute to the provision of counterfactual and modal knowledge.

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