The Meaning of Freedom and the Kingdom of God: A Struggle against the Fetishization of Our Present World

In their respective contexts of Roman empire and global neoliberal capitalism, the Jesus movement and the Zapatistas announce that another world is possible and that this world has irrupted in the struggle for that other possible world. This article argues that the practical and theoretical work of the Zapatistas offers to theologians a way to articulate the meaning of the kingdom of God as a world of hope and struggle that is actualized in and informed by struggles to resist fetishization.

Crossworld Predication in Natural Language

Некоторые предложения естественного языка, такие как «Джон мог быть выше, чем Мэри, как она есть», не допускают адекватного анализа в терминах стандартной семантики возможных миров, поскольку содержат кросс-мировую предикацию, которая в стандартной семантике не отображается. Для логического анализа такого рода предложений автором была разработана (и представлена в других публикациях) логика для кросс-мировой предикации (СРL). В статье приведен ряд примеров, демонстрирующих широкую распространенность феномена кросс-мировой предикации в естественном языке и описаны главные особенности семантики СРL (кросс-мировая интерпретация предикатов и использование частичных функций от переменных к возможным мирам в истинностной оценке формул), а также охарактеризована специфика синтаксиса СРL и онтологии, лежащей в ее основе. Some sentences of natural language cannot be adequately analyzed in terms of standard possible world semantics because they involve cross-world predication that cannot be reflected by means of standard semantics. An instance is ‘John might be taller than Mary is’. In some other papers the author proposed a logic for cross-word predication (CPL) that can be used to logically analyze sentences of this sort. In this paper, some examples are adduced that show that cross-world predication is highly widespread in natural language. The main features of the semantics of CPL are described, namely cross-world interpretation of predicates, and using partial functions from variables to possible worlds in the evaluation of formulas. Finally, the specificity of the syntax of CPL, and the ontology behind the semantics of CPL is characterized.

ANTICRITERIALISM AND FUZZINESS OF WORLDS. CONCERNING EVGENY BORISOV’S CROSS-WORLD SEMANTICS

Рассматриваются главным образом две проблемы, решение которых может быть особенно важным для кросс-мировой семантики: антикритериализм (представление о том, что идентичность не может до конца определяться какими бы то ни было критериями) и нечёткость миров (возможные миры, границы между которыми нечёткие). Эти проблемы важны, в частности, для таких приложений кросс-мировой семантики, как логика образований непрямых значений в естественном языке и логика нарратива. The study is focused on two problems related to cross-world semantics: anticriterialism (the idea that identity cannot be defined by any criteria whatsoever) and fuzziness of possible worlds (possible world semantics where the worlds are fuzzy). These two problems are important, in particular, for the logic of indirect meanings in natural language and the logic of narrative.

Posybilizm metafzyczny w filmie i serialu najnowszym

The article focuses on the reading of Waldemar Frąc’s film theory in the context of the newest film examples. In the first part, the author presents the most important features of the “possible cinema” and expands it with a philosophical possible worlds theory, and also gives the context of mind-game films. In the second part, the author proposes an interpretation of two films: Annihilation and Arrival, and the Dark series in the face of the presented theoretical solutions. The main point of the analysis is to show how the worlds presented in the given films exist, how the concept of possibility/the possible world is manifested, and what changes occur at the level of the film narrative itself. Interpretation of the film examples leads the author to the conclusion that metaphysical possibilism in the film and series reveals not only ontological themes, but also has significant intercultural value and moves existential reflection.

HOW TO NOT MIX WORDS AND OBJECTS

В статье я излагаю свои соображения по поводу статьи Евгения Борисова, помещённой в этом выпуске журнала. Попутно я излагаю своё видение проблем кросс-мировой предикации и кросс-идентификации. Я полагаю, что межмировое тождество невозможно и что главная задача состоит в обеспечении идентификации. Для этого можно использовать либо метод поддержания когнитивного контакта либо метод двойников, отождествляемых по набору существенных признаков. Он определяется прагматически. Метод жёстких десигнаторов также ведёт к интенсиональной логике, поскольку в языке-объекте должны присутствовать релятивизованные к мирам имена объектов. Борисов пытается построить логику кросс-мировой предикации сразу на нескольких основаниях, которые плохо совместимы друг с другом. Он квантифицирует по возможным индивидам, но при этом пытается опереться на метаязыковые имена индивидов как на основание для кросс-идентификации, метаязыковое имя индивида становится аргументом для функции значения, хотя не является жёстким десигнатором. Ключевая операция системы Борисова - назначение двойника в возможном мире - спрятана за функцией f, которая выступает в роли условия идентификации, т. е. прочерчивает кросс-мировую линию. На мой взгляд, система имеет потенциал, но нуждается в додумывании и уточнении. In this article, I present my comments on the article by Evgeny Borisov, which is included in this issue of the journal. Along the way, I set out my vision of the problems of cross-world predication and cross-identification. I believe that cross-world identity is impossible, and that the main task is to provide identification. To do this, you can use either the method of keeping cognitive contact, or the method of counterparts identified by a set of essential features, which is defined pragmatically. The method of rigid designators leads to intensional logic, since the object language must contain object names that are relativized to worlds. Borisov is trying to build the logic of cross-world predication on several bases at once, which are poorly compatible with each other. He quantifies over the domain of possible individuals, but at the same time he tries to rely on the metalinguistic names of individuals as a basis for cross-identification, the metalinguistic name of an individual becomes an argument for the value function, although it is not a rigid designator. The key operation of Borisov’s system is the appointment of a counterpart in a possible world. It is hidden behind the function f, which acts as a condition for identification, that is, it draws a cross-world line. In my opinion, the system has some good prospects, but it needs to be thought out and refined.

Crisis and Dystopia in the Current Spanish Novel Un incendio invisible, by Sara Mesa and Por si se va la Luz, by Lara Moreno

Europe in general and Spain in particular are still experiencing the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis. Spanish cultural narratives have imagined other possible scenarios around a financial crisis that has not only been an economic one, but also a social one. In that context, Spanish literature was used not only as a means to elaborate coherent narratives in times of crisis but also as a space to create other possible worlds. The novels Un incendio invisible (2011), by Sara Mesa, and Por si se ve la Luz (2013), by Lara Moreno, are both set in imaginary places in which their protagonists – sometimes driven by desire and other times by necessity – survive in hostile, abandoned and primitive places. The article attempts to analyse the dominance of the construction of dystopian places and the creation of ‘another possible world’ as a consequence of the financial crisis of 2008.

Projectability and Heritage Management of Design Knowledge: A Grass-Roots Artefact Perspective of a Longitudinal Research Project for Knowledge Management System Innovation

This article expands on design science-research (DSR) publications which—based on current knowledge management systems (KM/KMS) and practices—are conceptualizing and prototyping a novel more generative and knowledge-worker-centric approach just presented as a desirable sustainable KMS vision. The perspective taken follows up on recent systematic literature reviews and content analysis studies reporting on the poor knowledge accumulation and evolution in the design, information science, and KM disciplines. Proposed remedies and initiatives are pitched against the novel KMS development case with its longitudinal stream of research output. As the design and creation of complex innovative artefacts facing ‘wicked’ challenges are seldom complemented by concurrent research papers, rare insights are offered of how similar longitudinal DSR or KMS projects may be structured and of how the related domain’s heritage knowledge base and its fitness-for-use-and-evolution may be strengthened. Due to the cycles and progression of its prior publications, this case study is particularly suited to contribute to cumulative research synthesis and, hence, further focusses on the recently proposed notions of projecting and projectability for evaluating distances between actual real-world environments and future possible-world application-ecosystems—a perspective which may become essential acceptance criteria for publishing in DSR-related conferences and journal publishing outlets.

Locke, Leibniz and the State Space

The chapter explores the relationship between Locke and Leibniz's account of space and how this impacts on their understanding of possibility, and particularly practical choices between possibilities within a modal space. Using Borges' short story 'Pierre Menard, author of the Quixote' it argues that Locke's acquiescence to absolute space severly restricts his account of the power to do things. Leibniz's retention of relative space permits a much richer account of possible, yet he binds these worlds together under a universal set of principles which are morally true in every possible world. He calls these morally impossible (prohibited), echoing the Scholastic language of repugnance. 'Menard' is employed to critique this resort to universality, before an alternative possible truth structure is sketched as a response to the 'self-evident' truths defended by Leibniz.

Something Rather Than Nothing

Peter van Inwagen (2001) has given a probabilistic answer to the fundamental question ‘why is there something rather than nothing?’: There is something, because the probability of there being nothing is 0. Some philosophers have recently examined van Inwagen's argument and concluded that it does not really work. Three points are central in their criticism: (i) the premise which states that there is only one empty possible world is false, (ii) the premise which states that all possible worlds have the same probability is not plausible and (iii) the argument is not significant for the question it sets out to answer. In this paper, I shall show that (i) even if there are many empty worlds, this does not necessarily invalidate the argument in its general lines, (ii) the examples they offer to support the intuition that possible worlds may have different probabilities fail, and (iii) even if the conclusion of the argument does not really answer the question van Inwagen sets out to answer, it is still not an insignificant response to the question.

Subjective Reasons

Objective reasons depend on how things are. Subjective reasons depend on how things seem. Subjective reasons determine what it is rational to do. This chapter develops and defends a new account of subjective reasons, and thereby of practical rationality, in part via critical reflection on the leading alternative. The positive proposal is a modal one, which builds on the theories of objective and possessed reasons. Roughly, what appears to a person to be the case is a subjective reason for them to act when, in some nearby epistemically possible world in which it obtains, it is right in some way for them to act. The chapter concludes by showing how the framework might be further extended to capture the idea that rationality depends on credences, desires, and normative beliefs.