Only Imagine
This book begins with a detailed description and defence of a controversial theory of fictional content (or ‘fictional truth’) known as ‘extreme intentionalism’. On this view, roughly, the fictional content of a particular text is equivalent to exactly what the author of the text intended the reader to imagine. The book situates this theory in relation to its competitors including hypothetical intentionalism, value-maximizing theory, and the influential anti-intentionalism view of David Lewis—and puts forward a strong argument for its superiority, despite its many detractors. In the second half of the book, some consequences of extreme intentionalism are explored as they affect questions such as: the relation of fiction to testimony and belief; whether there are any limits to what we can imagine, and what explains those limits; what is the nature of fiction; to what extent imagination resembles belief; and to what extent the imagination can contribute to the provision of counterfactual and modal knowledge.