The Economic Transformation of Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland

The theory of the dilemma of simultaneity is empirically based on the transformations of post-socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe. The transformations after the collapse of the socialist bloc were without precedent with regards to breadth and depth. The dilemma of simultaneity consists of three parallel transition processes on three dimensions. The first part of this chapter explores the three dimensions of the transitions: nation building, political transformation, and economic transformation. The second part discusses the three levels of transformation: (1) ethno-national identity and territory, (2) polity, and (3) socio-economic distribution. The third part highlights the complexity and challenges of multidimensional simultaneous transformation processes. The fourth and fifth parts discuss the role of international actors and socio-economic structures on the transitions in Central and Eastern Europe. The chapter concludes with an account of Elster’s and Offe’s critics and their response.

Download Full-text

Competitive Rent-Seeking, Socioeconomic Infrastructures, and Post-Communist Transition in Central and Eastern Europe

Chinese Journal of International Review ◽

10.1142/s2630531319500057 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 01 (02) ◽

pp. 1950005

Author(s):

Jia Chen ◽

Ge Xin

Keyword(s):

Eastern Europe ◽

Central And Eastern Europe ◽

Rent Seeking ◽

Economic Transformation ◽

Economic Liberalization ◽

Market Mechanism ◽

Comparative Case Study ◽

Soviet Bloc ◽

Market Interaction ◽

Regime Types

The political and economic transformation of former Soviet Bloc Europe has been far-reaching in the last 30 years. Although most former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe abandoned the Communist ancien régime, not all of them managed to fully integrate liberal democracy and market economy into society. Some scholars explained this divergence in development through the dichotomous regime types. From the perspective of what propels the retreat of political power from market and with the theory of competitive rent-seeking, we demonstrate that the retreating logic is underlain by the competition between rent-seekers. A competitive rent-seeking regime dissipates the rent through distorting market mechanism and dampens both political authority and rent-seeker’s enthusiasm, providing a better prospect for economic liberalization. Through a comparative case study of transitional experiences of Hungary and Belarus, we find that countries with pre-existing socioeconomic infrastructures that facilitate the formation of competitive rent-seeking regime are more successful in economic liberalization. We suggest that the academic interest previously paid to dichotomous regime-type argument should be diverted into a deeper inquiry of the evolution of socioeconomic institutions that shape the state–market interaction.

Download Full-text