Divine Omniscience and Future Contingents in Alfarabi and Avicenna

1985 ◽  
pp. 81-94
Author(s):  
Michael E. Marmura
Keyword(s):  
Future Contingents ◽  
Divine Omniscience

God, Suffering, and Omniscience

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. M. Rudavsky
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Theology ◽  
Human Suffering ◽  
Basic Fact ◽  
Future Contingents ◽  
Divine Omniscience ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Suffering God

The topic of divine predication leads more broadly to issues surrounding divine omniscience, freedom, and evil. The question of why the righteous suffer remains one of the most intractable issues in philosophical theology. More generally, the very concept of a caring deity who is both omniscient and omnipotent gives rise to a logical dilemma: if God is omniscient, then God knows past, present, and future contingents; if God is omnipotent, then God can actualize any state of affairs; if God is benevolent, then presumably God wishes the best possible state of affairs for God’s creatures; and yet we cannot help but recognize the basic fact that the righteous suffer. And so, given the ineluctable reality of human suffering, God is either not omniscient, or not omnipotent, or not benevolent. Jewish philosophers struggle to address these problems.

Partial and paraconsistent approaches to future contingents in tense logic

Synthese ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 193 (11) ◽  
pp. 3639-3649
Author(s):  
Seiki Akama ◽  
Tetsuya Murai ◽  
Yasuo Kudo
Keyword(s):  
Tense Logic ◽  
Future Contingents

scholarly journals IS an Open Infinite Future Impossible? A Reply to Pruss

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 363-369
Author(s):  
Elijah Hess ◽  
Alan Rhoda
Keyword(s):  
Future Contingents

Alexander Pruss has recently argued on probabilistic grounds that Christian philosophers should reject Open Futurism—roughly, the thesis that there are no true future contingents—on account of this view’s alleged inability to handle certain statements about infinite futures in a mathematically or religiously adequate manner. We argue that, once the distinction between being true and becoming true is applied to such statements, it is evident that they pose no problem for Open Futurists.

The Assertion Problem

2021 ◽  
pp. 181-202
Author(s):  
Patrick Todd
Keyword(s):  
Future Contingents ◽  
Open Future ◽  
Ordinary Life ◽  
The Open Future

In this chapter, the author responds to a family of related objections to the doctrine of the open future—roughly, problems stemming from the observation that what are plausibly future contingents are often nevertheless properly assertible (despite being, on the author’s view, false). He responds to this family of problems by developing several related themes: (i) even if the author’s view is true, it is properly ignored in ordinary life; (ii) an assertion may assert what is false but nevertheless communicate what is true, and this can explain the appropriateness of that assertion; (iii) there is plausibly replacement talk that we could use that would enable us, if we wished, to avoid saying what is false, but would nevertheless allow us to communicate in satisfactory ways. In the end, then, there is no compelling “assertion problem” for the view defended in this book.

Three Models of the Undetermined Future

2021 ◽  
pp. 21-49
Author(s):  
Patrick Todd
Keyword(s):  
Universal Quantifier ◽  
Future Contingents ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Future

This chapter articulates three models of the undetermined future. Assuming that there are multiple future histories consistent with the past and the laws, we can maintain that (I) there is a unique actual future history, and it is determinate which history that is; (II) there is a unique actual future history, but it is indeterminate which history that is; (III) there is no such thing as the “unique actual future history”. Models (I) and (II) are united in terms of there being a unique actual course of history; models (II) and (III) are united in terms of there being no privileged history in the model. The author defends model (III). He further argues that will is a universal quantifier over all the causally possible histories consistent with the future directed facts. The author shows how this view combined with model (III) generates the view that future contingents are all false.

Omniscience

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas P. Flint
Keyword(s):  
Religious Tradition ◽  
Western Philosophy ◽  
Divine Attributes ◽  
Middle Knowledge ◽  
Divine Omniscience ◽  
The Future ◽  
History Of

The concept of omniscience has received great attention in the history of Western philosophy, principally because of its connections with the Western religious tradition, which views God as perfect in all respects, including as a knower. Omniscience has often been understood as knowledge of all true propositions, and though several objections to any simple propositional account of omniscience have been offered, many philosophers continue to endorse such an analysis. Advocates of divine omniscience have discussed many problems connected with both the extent of omniscience and the relation between this property and other alleged divine attributes. Three such issues are: Can an omniscient being properly be viewed as immutable? Would an omniscient being have knowledge of the future, and is such knowledge consistent with our future actions’ being genuinely free? And should omniscience be thought of as including middle knowledge? That is, would an omniscient being know (but have no control over) what other free beings would in fact freely do if placed in various different situations?

Eternity

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleonore Stump ◽  
Norman Kretzmann
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Greek Philosophy ◽  
Medieval Philosophy ◽  
Divine Omniscience ◽  
History Of ◽  
Necessary Truths ◽  
Temporal Location

The distinctive, philosophically interesting concept of eternity arose very early in the history of philosophy as the concept of a mode of existence that was not only beginningless and endless but also essentially different from time. It was introduced into early Greek philosophy as the mode of existence required for fundamental reality (being) contrasted with ordinary appearance (becoming). But the concept was given its classic formulation by Boethius, who thought of eternity as God’s mode of existence and defined God’s eternality as ‘the complete possession all at once of illimitable life’. As defined by Boethius the concept was important in medieval philosophy. The elements of the Boethian definition are life, illimitability (and hence duration), and absence of succession (or timelessness). Defined in this way, eternality is proper to an entity identifiable as a mind or a person (and in just that sense living) but existing beginninglessly, endlessly and timelessly. Such a concept raises obvious difficulties. Some philosophers think the difficulties can be resolved, but others think that in the light of such difficulties the concept must be modified or simply rejected as incoherent. The most obvious difficulty has to do with the combination of atemporality and duration. Special objections have arisen in connection with ascribing eternality to God. Some people have thought that an eternal being could not do anything at all, especially not in the temporal world. But the notion of an atemporal person’s acting is not incoherent. Such acts as knowing necessary truths or willing that a world exist for a certain length of time are acts that themselves take no time and require no temporal location. An eternal God could engage in acts of cognition and of volition and could even do things that might seem to require a temporal location, such as answering a prayer. The concept of God’s eternality is relevant to several issues in philosophy of religion, including the apparent irreconcilability of divine omniscience with divine immutability and with human freedom.

Bradwardine, Thomas (c.1300–49)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edith Dudley Sylla
Keyword(s):  
Fourteenth Century ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Future Contingents ◽  
Standard Set

Thomas Bradwardine was a leading figure in fourteenth-century philosophy and theology from 1328, when he completed De proportionibus velocitatum in motibus (On the Ratios of Velocities in Motions), until his death in 1349, shortly after becoming Archbishop of Canterbury. His theory of ratios of velocities in motions was an important reinterpretation of Aristotle and was influential throughout Europe. The author of numerous mathematical and logical works, Bradwardine helped to initiate a style of natural philosophical analysis using a standard set of logical and mathematical tools. On the Continent, Nicole Oresme, Albert of Saxony and many others wrote works on the ratios of velocities in motions following Bradwardine’s lead. In his De futura contingentibus (On Future Contingents) and De causa Dei Pelagium (On the Cause of God Against the Pelagians), Bradwardine staked positions emphasizing the symmetry of God’s omniscience with respect to past, present and future.

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