Providence, Divine Omniscience and Possibility: The Case of Maimonides

Author(s):  
Alfred L. Ivry
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Thomas P. Flint

The concept of omniscience has received great attention in the history of Western philosophy, principally because of its connections with the Western religious tradition, which views God as perfect in all respects, including as a knower. Omniscience has often been understood as knowledge of all true propositions, and though several objections to any simple propositional account of omniscience have been offered, many philosophers continue to endorse such an analysis. Advocates of divine omniscience have discussed many problems connected with both the extent of omniscience and the relation between this property and other alleged divine attributes. Three such issues are: Can an omniscient being properly be viewed as immutable? Would an omniscient being have knowledge of the future, and is such knowledge consistent with our future actions’ being genuinely free? And should omniscience be thought of as including middle knowledge? That is, would an omniscient being know (but have no control over) what other free beings would in fact freely do if placed in various different situations?


Author(s):  
Eleonore Stump ◽  
Norman Kretzmann

The distinctive, philosophically interesting concept of eternity arose very early in the history of philosophy as the concept of a mode of existence that was not only beginningless and endless but also essentially different from time. It was introduced into early Greek philosophy as the mode of existence required for fundamental reality (being) contrasted with ordinary appearance (becoming). But the concept was given its classic formulation by Boethius, who thought of eternity as God’s mode of existence and defined God’s eternality as ‘the complete possession all at once of illimitable life’. As defined by Boethius the concept was important in medieval philosophy. The elements of the Boethian definition are life, illimitability (and hence duration), and absence of succession (or timelessness). Defined in this way, eternality is proper to an entity identifiable as a mind or a person (and in just that sense living) but existing beginninglessly, endlessly and timelessly. Such a concept raises obvious difficulties. Some philosophers think the difficulties can be resolved, but others think that in the light of such difficulties the concept must be modified or simply rejected as incoherent. The most obvious difficulty has to do with the combination of atemporality and duration. Special objections have arisen in connection with ascribing eternality to God. Some people have thought that an eternal being could not do anything at all, especially not in the temporal world. But the notion of an atemporal person’s acting is not incoherent. Such acts as knowing necessary truths or willing that a world exist for a certain length of time are acts that themselves take no time and require no temporal location. An eternal God could engage in acts of cognition and of volition and could even do things that might seem to require a temporal location, such as answering a prayer. The concept of God’s eternality is relevant to several issues in philosophy of religion, including the apparent irreconcilability of divine omniscience with divine immutability and with human freedom.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ciro De Florio ◽  
Aldo Frigerio
Keyword(s):  

1984 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 383-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas P. Lackey ◽  
Keyword(s):  

1988 ◽  
Vol 85 (3) ◽  
pp. 135 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Lane Craig

1992 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
David Basinger

The problem of evil normally discussed in philosophical theology is concerned with the pain and suffering experienced in this life. Why do so many innocent children die slow, torturous deaths as the result of disease, famine or earthquakes? Why do so many seemingly innocent adults suffer as the result of the greed, indifference or perversity of others? If God is all-good, then he certainly does not want such suffering. If God is all-powerful, he should be able to do away with such evils. Thus, must we not conclude that the existence of such evil counts against belief in the existence of an all-loving, all-powerful God?


2014 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
GARRETT PENDERGRAFT

AbstractTraditional views about God and about deliberation seem to imply that we need a deliberation restriction on the concept of divine omniscience. I will argue, however, that this deliberation restriction is both irrelevant and unnecessary. It is irrelevant because there is no time at which God needs to deliberate; and it is unnecessary because even if God does deliberate, it's possible for him to do so while knowing what the results of that deliberation will be. And because this possibility of deliberating despite knowing the results holds for deliberation in general, my argument provides useful (and perhaps surprising) results not only for discussions of the divine attributes, but also for broader discussions of deliberation itself.


1991 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomis Kapitan

It is said that faith in a divine agent is partly an attitude of trust; believers typically find assurance in the conception of a divine being's will, and cherish confidence in its capacity to implement its intentions and plans. Yet, there would be little point in trusting in the will of any being without assuming its ability to both act and know, and perhaps it is only by assuming divine omniscience that one can retain the confidence in the efficacy and direction of divine agency that has long been the lure of certain religious traditions.


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