Divine Omniscience and the Soteriological Problem of Evil: Is the Type of Knowledge God Possesses Relevant?

1992 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
David Basinger

The problem of evil normally discussed in philosophical theology is concerned with the pain and suffering experienced in this life. Why do so many innocent children die slow, torturous deaths as the result of disease, famine or earthquakes? Why do so many seemingly innocent adults suffer as the result of the greed, indifference or perversity of others? If God is all-good, then he certainly does not want such suffering. If God is all-powerful, he should be able to do away with such evils. Thus, must we not conclude that the existence of such evil counts against belief in the existence of an all-loving, all-powerful God?

Author(s):  
Michael L. Peterson

Lewis’s affirmation of Christian theism—based on its greater explanatory power in regard to the phenomena of rational thought, morality, and the existential need for joy and meaning—faces its toughest test in the problem of evil and suffering. This chapter reviews Lewis’s general philosophical responses to the problem of pain and suffering, noting their insights and critiquing their inadequacies, and placing his work in the larger context of contemporary philosophical discussions of the problem of evil. Interestingly, when Lewis met and fell in love with Joy Gresham, he experienced personally those pangs of pain and loss that he had previously dealt with only theoretically. Joy’s suffering and death by cancer caused Lewis to question his old answers and even to question God. He journals the troubled thoughts and feelings of his grief in a frank and honest way that gives permission to all who grieve to express their feelings and not be intimidated by supposedly proper answers. His “grief observed” ultimately works through to an even stronger faith than his original faith in which joy did not encounter suffering, concluding that suffering cannot be erased but can actually be subsumed by joy. An item of particular interest is the Lewis–Van Osdall correspondence (recently discovered, never before published) in which Lewis identifies with Van Osdall’s loss of his only son in a fatal car crash.


2013 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacobus W. Gericke

This article discusses the concept of deity in the book of Ecclesiastes (Qohelet) from the perspective of issues of interest in analytic philosophy of religion. Of concern are assumptions in the text about religion, the nature of religious language, religious epistemology, the concept of revelation, the attributes of the divine, the existence of God, the problem of evil, the relation between religion and morality and religious pluralism. A comparative philosophical clarification is offered with the aim of discerning similarities and differences between popular views in Christian philosophical theology and what, if anything, Qohelet took for granted on the same issues.


Horizons ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 304-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terrence W. Tilley

AbstractThe present essay distinguishes two ways to “settle” the problem of evil, “defense” and “theodicy,” as practiced in contemporary Christian philosophical theology. It argues that Christian theology can defend Christian belief from the charge of inconsistency, but that when it attempts to explain why and how God permits or wills evil in his world, it stumbles over denying the reality of evil or the goodness of God. The essay concludes by arguing that the Christian theologian cannot and should not attempt to make Christianity plausible by constructing theodicies but should concentrate on other methods of demonstrating the plausibility of Christianity.


Think ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (37) ◽  
pp. 77-83
Author(s):  
Tim Fisher

A traditional defense of God in the face of pain and suffering is that humans learn from encounters with suffering – learn something wonderfully valuable that could not be learned in any other way. God is a teacher, and we humans are the students. This article examines the Problem of Evil through this paradigm. It argues that any God-as-teacher defense of evil fails on its face because God does not meet even the most lax standard for teacher behavior and action.


1966 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-119
Author(s):  
Haig Khatchadourian

In a recent article, George Schlesinger adds his thoughts to the quite extensive literature on the Problem of Evil and the Problem of Suffering. What is noteworthy about this article is the fact that the author, after briefly discussing a number of familiar arguments for and against the traditional theistic conception of God as both omnipotent and perfectly good, attempts to dissolve the problem itself as a pseudo-problem. In the present paper I wish (1) to try to show that Schlesinger's attempt fails, whether or not he is right in his conclusion that the problem of evil is not a genuine problem; and (2) to raise, in the course of my criticism, certain fundamental questions that must be answered if the controversy between theists and their critics is to become logically capable of resolution. Further, in relation to (1) and (2), I shall (3) offer a very preliminary sketch of some of the fundamental terms or concepts involved in the discussion of the problem of evil and related issues of philosophical theology. I shall begin by saying a few things about Schlesinger's discussion of some of the familiar attempts of theists to resolve the problem, and the equally familiar attacks of the sceptics. I shall then pass to a criticism of Schlesinger's main thesis.


Author(s):  
John G. Stackhouse

Maybe Christianity is actually true. Maybe it is what believers say it is. But at least two problems make the thoughtful person hesitate. First, there are so many other options. How could one possibly make one’s way through them to anything like a rational and confident conclusion? Second, why do so many people choose to be Christian in the face of so many reasons not to be Christian? Yes, many people grow up in Christian homes and in societies, but many more do not. Yet Christianity has become the most popular religion in the world. Why? This book begins by taking on the initial challenge as it outlines a process: how to think about religion in a responsible way, rather than settling for such soft vagaries as “faith” and “feeling.” It then clears away a number of misunderstandings from the basic story of the Christian religion, misunderstandings that combine to domesticate this startling narrative and thus to repel reasonable people who might otherwise be intrigued. The second half of the book looks at Christian commitment positively and negatively. Why do two billion people find this religion to be persuasive, thus making it the most popular “explanation of everything” in human history? At the same time, how does Christianity respond to the fact that so many people find it utterly implausible, especially because of its narrow insistence on “just one way to God,” and because of the problem of evil that seems to undercut everything it asserts? Grounded in scholarship but never ponderous, Can I Believe? takes on the hard questions as it welcomes the intelligent inquirer to give Christianity at least one good look.


Author(s):  
Yujin Nagasawa

This chapter contends that the problem of evil arises not only for theists but also for atheists. To demonstrate this, focus is placed on ‘the problem of systemic evil’, where this is the problem of accounting for the violent, cruel, and unfair system of natural selection, a system which guarantees pain and suffering for uncountably many sentient beings. Unlike the traditional problem of evil, which concentrates on specific events, the more challenging problem of systemic evil emphasizes that the entire biological system is evil. Despite the systemic nature of evil, both theists and atheists typically uphold ‘existential optimism’, the thesis that the world is overall a good place and that we should be grateful for our existence in it. The combination of systemic evil and existential optimism gives rise to the ‘existential problem of systemic evil’, and this is a problem that theists have greater resources in answering than do atheists.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (7) ◽  
pp. 20-28
Author(s):  
Fryderyk Sylla ◽  

If you have the ability to do good, does failing to do so mean you are allowing evil to exist? Do we have a moral obligation to improve our offspring? In this work of philosophical short story fiction, Jane goes to visit her parents over the Christmas holiday. She has recently learned that her parents, under a program that favors the rich and elite, had had her genetically modified before she was born to be the best possible version of herself. Jane is crushed at learning that her life success has nothing to do with her hard work and is angry at her parents for having genetically modified her. Her father argues the problem of evil; that it was in his means to do good, and had he failed to do so, he would have been a god that allowed evil to exist. Jane is unhappy with his responses, but now must move forward with the choice of what she will do, when it is her time to have children.


Lumen et Vita ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chelsea King

One of the most difficult challenges facing belief in the Christian God is the problem of evil. How can there be a benevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent God, who allows pain, suffering and death in the world? Various theodicies have been constructed to address this question, and historically theologians have pointed to the Fall to explain such pain and suffering. However, theology in a post-evolutionary context is faced with a new challenge; the problem of pain and suffering is amplified by the millions of years of suffering and pain that have occurred before the advent of human beings.  Today, the theologian must wrestle with the claim that pain, suffering, and death not only precedes human beings, but are in fact instruments in the very process of creation itself.


Author(s):  
Noah Lemos

Many attempts to respond to the problem of evil appeal to the concept of an organic unity. The first part of Chapter 8 explains Roderick Chisholm’s views on organic unities, the concept of defeat, and how he thinks they bear on the problem of evil. The second part examines three prominent and recent objections to the principle of organic unities. Roughly, the objections are that (1) the principle of organic unities is incoherent, (2) it leads to “evaluative schizophrenia,” and (3) the examples that allegedly support it, do not, in fact, do so. It is argued that these objections give us no good reason to reject the principle of organic unities.


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