Measurement and Evaluation of Technology Transfer from U.S. Dual-Use and Technology Programs

An object of this research is to evaluate the premises of transfer of dual use technologies appeared in Ukraine and other CIS countries. It aims to highlight a hybrid impact of political, historical and other potential barriers faced between technology offeror/recipient nowadays. The investigated problem. Apart from the highlighted affect of political, historical and other potential barriers faced between technology supplier /recipient these days, the paper also discusses how the covid pandemic and democracy crisis on the global joined to and affect an efficiency, proper functioning and transparency of technology transfer process. The experience and practice show that the process of technology transfer is rather complicated, multi-leveled and involves more than two players. It is impacted with and follows few factors and conditions that constrain its success or failure at the end. It was shown that the development of dual use technologies continues in a quagmire of conflicting interests, in light of discussed factors therein, national security and export control rationales. For the time being, debates on dual use (DU) technologies and their misuse lack creativity and rather dim; political and diplomatic initiatives came finally to nowhere trying to find turnkey solutions, thus the discussed set of factors affecting the efficient transfer and strategic export control, is quite a challenge nowadays. The main scientific results. The discussed therein factors imply the hybrid threat to transfer of technologies, closely interrelated and possess a profound significance, tho. From today and forward each step towards optimization of transfer should be carried out considering all groups and specifics of high level of science intensity of advanced technologies. Ukraine being a country with still transitional (from socialist to capitalist) type of economy, a mechanism for IP protection with regard to their scientific and technical results providing this necessary level of science intensity of technology, in the analyzed period of time has not yet been properly worked out and not enshrined in bylaws. The result of this eresearch makes a solid background for further debates as to technology transfer in terms of political science and export control

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DUAL-USE MATERIAL SCIENCE TECHNOLOGIES TRANSFER IN UKRAINE: PREMISES AND PRESENT CATCH-22

ScienceRise ◽

10.21303/2313-8416.2020.001477 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 95-102

Author(s):

Iegor Kartuzov

Keyword(s):

Technology Transfer ◽

Ad Hoc ◽

Materials Science ◽

Vital Role ◽

Dual Use ◽

Weapon Systems ◽

Catch 22 ◽

Potential Improvement ◽

Control Regime

The object of effort is to assess the underpin premises of transfer of dual use materials science technologies appeared in Ukraine after the Independence and those developed until nowadays. It is also to shed a light on this issue and evaluate historical, technical, political, and mental barriers between technology supplier / recipient and future prospects and successful steps to be made to overcome those. The work puts a problem to scrutinize today’s and future materials science dual use technology transfer control regulations and all premises associated and leaving an imprint on the realities existing in Ukraine. First of all, it is important to study technology transfer issues and a vital role of those premises appeared in Ukraine otherwise one may chase a ghost while trying to understand how to put it correct in a right legal and political way to successfully resolve this matter since in this case none turnkey solutions ever exist. For example, central to a control regime debate is to discuss an evolution, or lack of the existing transparent legislation covering dual-use technologies, and a discussion on its orientation and scope. Does this really work and sound in practice, and if “yes” then to what extent? Second, at a time of fundamental change in nature and order of international relations, the wisdom of ad hoc control regimes must not escape scrutiny. Although experts are very much aware of these problems, future of control regulations remains still blurred and uncertain, so what are their potential implications for international state’s security? The research revealed that a reassessment of the problems surrounding dual use materials science technologies and today’s control regulations should be made – both in terms of their potential improvement and/or possible new universal multilateral agreements and transparency among states involved in technology transfer. This further argues a need for new international mechanisms to ensure the transfer of dual-use materials science technologies, while not powering proliferation opportunities for weapon systems. The results of this endeavor make a ground floor for further debates in terms of politics and export control in the field of transfer of intangible technologies.

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Which way to go? Defence technology and the diversity of ‘dual-use’ technology transfer

Research Policy ◽

10.1016/s0048-7333(97)00023-1 ◽

1997 ◽

Vol 26 (3) ◽

pp. 367-385 ◽

Cited By ~ 47

Author(s):

Jordi Molas-Gallart

Keyword(s):

Technology Transfer ◽

Dual Use

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A ‘Gentleman’s Understanding’: British, French, and German Dual-Use Technology Transfer to China and America’s Dilemma during the Carter Administration, 1977-1981

Diplomacy and Statecraft ◽

10.1080/09592296.2021.1883865 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 32 (1) ◽

pp. 168-188

Author(s):

Sheng Peng

Keyword(s):

Technology Transfer ◽

Carter Administration ◽

Dual Use

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Scope Economy And Issues In Technology Management

Journal of Business & Economics Research (JBER) ◽

10.19030/jber.v1i9.3050 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 1 (9) ◽

Author(s):

Simona Sung ◽

John R. Norsworthy

Keyword(s):

Technology Transfer ◽

Manufacturing Industry ◽

Technological Development ◽

Negative Relationship ◽

Spillover Effect ◽

Aircraft Engine ◽

Manufacturing Cost ◽

Dual Use ◽

Aircraft Manufacturing ◽

Manufacturing Productivity

In the 1980s, studies of technology transfer in dual-use industries have suggested a slow down in military technology spillovers to the civilian sector. This paper takes an econometric approach to measuring the bilateral spillover effect using the airframe manufacturing industry as a case study. The diffusion of technology benefits the industrial art regardless of where technological innovation is originated.  When horizontal spillover is measured as a bilateral flow of technology transfer regardless of the direction of the flow, i.e., either from military to civilian or from civilian to military, we find no evidence of a slow down, in airframe manufacturing at least, between 1961 and 1985, a period of rapid technological change in both military and commercial aircraft production. We also trace the flow of technological development in aircraft engine and measure its effect downstream on aircraft manufacturing productivity to obtain an estimate for any vertical spillover.  We find a negative relationship between upstream innovation and downstream manufacturing cost, but the linkage effect is statistically insignificant.  We suggest that further study should be pursued in a framework incorporating some concepts from organizational theory to better understand the differences in institutional structure that affect the adaptation and development of dual-use technologies, and the social setting that become necessary to achieve dual-use.

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From technology generation to technology transfer: the concept and reality of the “Dual-Use Technology Centres”

Technovation ◽

10.1016/s0166-4972(99)00063-2 ◽

1999 ◽

Vol 19 (11) ◽

pp. 661-671 ◽

Cited By ~ 21

Author(s):

Jordi Molas-Gallart ◽

Tom Sinclair

Keyword(s):

Technology Transfer ◽

Dual Use ◽

Technology Generation

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Four factors are in force pandemic joints to initiate an illicit dual use technologies transfer from Ukraine

ScienceRise ◽

10.21303/2313-8416.2021.001926 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 47-54

Author(s):

Iegor Kartuzov

Keyword(s):

Technology Transfer ◽

Export Control ◽

Technological Innovations ◽

Dual Use ◽

Factors Affecting ◽

Weapon Systems ◽

Conflicting Interests ◽

Scientific Results ◽

The Right ◽

A Current

An objective of this effort is a quick recap to assess the underpin barriers of transfer of technologies appeared in Ukraine after acquiring the Independence and those developed of today and to highlight and evaluate an impact of political, historical, mental and other factors affecting the science and as a consequence leakage of technologies abroad. Of importance is also a question if a current COVID-19 pandemic will join these factors if it initiates an illicit transfer of dual use (DU) technologies from Ukraine as it was in 1990s and how it affects an efficient and proper functioning and optimization of transfer of technologies process, and that is quite a challenge nowadays. Investigated problem. The process of technology transfer and specifically that one of DU as a whole is neither simple nor systematic and far from being that perfect, especially when it deals with dual-use technologies and at present reduced to a short relationship between supplier/recipient only. The experience and practice show that it is a rather complicated, multi-leveled and multi-players process which is impacted and follows several factors and conditions that determine its success and/or failure at the end. The main scientific results. The development of dual use technologies continues in a quagmire of conflicting interests and technology transfer export control rationales. There are historical, mental and political-military considerations where a state’s decision to develop weapon systems or related applications can be assessed not only as a function of perceived levels of threat to its security, but also as a need to respond and/or step forward to potential technological innovations; and second, the fundamental conceptual differences in appreciation among countries of the right to possess different advanced weapons systems for defensive or offensive purposes. The result of this endeavor makes a solid ground floor for further debates in terms of political science, export control regulations and factors affecting transfer of sensitive technologies.

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